Spatial Economics and Competitiveness by Nallari, Raj et al.
D I R E C T I O N S  I N  D E V E L O P M E N T
Infrastructure
Geography of Growth
Spatial Economics and Competitiveness
Raj Nallari, Breda Griffith, and Shahid Yusuf 
Pu
bl
ic 
Di
sc
lo
su
re
 A
ut
ho
riz
ed
Pu
bl
ic 
Di
sc
lo
su
re
 A
ut
ho
riz
ed
Pu
bl
ic 
Di
sc
lo
su
re
 A
ut
ho
riz
ed
Pu
bl
ic 
Di
sc
lo
su
re
 A
ut
ho
riz
ed

Geography of Growth

Geography of Growth
Spatial Economics and Competitiveness
Raj Nallari, Breda Griffith, and Shahid Yusuf
© 2012 International Bank for Reconstruction and Development / International Development 
Association or The World Bank
1818 H Street NW
Washington DC 20433
Telephone: 202-473-1000
Internet: www.worldbank.org
1 2 3 4 15 14 13 12 
This volume is a product of the staff of The World Bank with external contributions. The 
findings, interpretations, and conclusions expressed in this volume do not necessarily reflect 
the views of The World Bank, its Board of Executive Directors, or the governments they 
represent.
The World Bank does not guarantee the accuracy of the data included in this work. The 
boundaries, colors, denominations, and other information shown on any map in this work 
do not imply any judgment on the part of The World Bank concerning the legal status of 
any territory or the endorsement or acceptance of such boundaries.
Rights and Permissions
The material in this work is subject to copyright. Because The World Bank encourages dis-
semination of its knowledge, this work may be reproduced, in whole or in part, for noncom-
mercial purposes as long as full attribution to the work is given.
For permission to reproduce any part of this work for commercial purposes, please send a 
request with complete information to the Copyright Clearance Center Inc., 222 Rosewood 
Drive, Danvers, MA 01923, USA; telephone: 978-750-8400; fax: 978-750-4470; Internet: 
www.copyright.com.
All other queries on rights and licenses, including subsidiary rights, should be addressed to 
the Office of the Publisher, The World Bank, 1818 H Street NW, Washington, DC 20433, 
USA; fax: 202-522-2422; e-mail: pubrights@worldbank.org.
ISBN (paper): 978-0-8213-9486-1
ISBN (electronic): 978-0-8213-9487-8
DOI: 10.1596/978-0-8213-9486-1
Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data
Nallari, Raj, 1955-
Geography of growth : spatial economics and competitiveness / by Raj Nallari, Breda 
Griffith, and Shahid Yusuf.
 p. cm.
 Includes bibliographical references.
 ISBN 978-0-8213-9486-1—ISBN 978-0-8213-9487-8 (electronic)
1. Space in economics. 2. Urban economics. 3. Economic geography.  I. Griffith, Breda. II. 
Yusuf, Shahid, 1949- III. World Bank. IV. Title. 
  HT388.N36 2012
  330.9173’2 — dc23
2012008450
Cover photo: view of Sofia, Bulgaria by Boris Balabanov/World Bank.
v 
Preface  xi
About the Authors  xiii
Abbreviations  xv
Chapter 1 Frameworks for Spatial Analysis 1
The Form of Urbanization 2
Agglomeration Economies 8
Conclusion 11
Notes 12
References 12
Chapter 2 Urbanization as a Typology of Space 15
Urbanization and Space 16
Classification of Cities 18
Size of Cities across Developing and 
Developed Regions 20
Criticism of the Data and Suggested Alternatives 23
Conclusion 26
Notes 27
References 28
Contents
vi       Contents
Chapter 3 Urban Transition and Growth 29
Urbanization and Development 30
Urbanization in Developing Countries 38
Key Features of Cities in Developing Countries 43
Conclusion 46
Notes 47
References 48
Chapter 4 Spatial Concentration and Specialization 51
Specialization of Cities 52
Knowledge Cities 54
The Creative City 65
The Global City 73
Green Cities/Eco Cities 76
Conclusion 81
Notes 82
References 83
Chapter 5 The Attributes and Role of “Smart Cities” 89
Growth and Technology-Intensive Subsectors  91
What Makes Cities Smart 99
Toward an Urban Innovation Strategy 108
Policy Measures That Facilitate Technological 
Upgrading and Innovation 112
Identifying and Promoting Smart Cities 117
Annex: Technology Capability and Innovation 
Criteria 118
Notes 120
References 122
Chapter 6  Globalization, Urban Regions, and 
Cluster Development 127
A Holistic Approach to Development 128
The Role of Clusters 128
Policies to Support Clusters 130
Sustaining Clusters 130
Conclusion 132
Notes 134
References 134
Contents       vii
Chapter 7 Urban Development and Growth 137
Urbanization: From Canter to Gallop 139
The Metropolitan Powerhouse 143
Metropolitan Challenges 146
Wealth of Cities and National Policies 147
Notes 149
References 153
Chapter 8  Elements for Future Success of 
Metropolitan Regions 157
The Industrial Matrix 159
Connectivity 163
The Smarter Metropolis 167
Governing the Metropolitan Center 169
The Resilience Imperative 170
Metropolitan Futures 174
Annex: City Rankings 176
Notes 178
References 181
Box
4.1 Indexes Used in the Global City Indicators Program 76
Figures
1.1 Primacy and Economic Development, 1965–95 4
1.2 Concentration of Economic Activity in the 
United States 6
2.1 Total Population, by City Size, 1995, 2009, and 2025 19
2.2 Distribution of the World Urban Population, by Region, 
1950, 2009, and 2050 22
2.3 Key Indicators of the Agglomeration Index 25
2.4 Agglomeration Index and UN Estimates of Urban 
Population, by Region, 2000 25
2.5 Sensitivity to Indicators Used: Example of Minimum 
Population Size of Large Cities 27
3.1 Relationship between GDP and Spatial Concentration 32
3.2 Density and GDP per Capita in Selected Countries, 
by Phase of Urbanization 34
3.3 Rural-Urban Disparities in GDP per Capita 35
viii       Contents
3.4 Rural-Urban Disparities and Density in the Philippines, 
China, and India, Various Years  36
3.5 Change in Urban Population with and without 
China and India, 1985–2005 38
4.1 GCIF Membership in 2010, by Population Category 77
5.1 Shanghai R&D Public Service Platform 115
6.1 Ranking of Metropolitan Cities 133
7.1 Strong Correlates of Urban Productivity 
(City GDP per Capita) in China, 2007 142
7.2 Exposure of People to Cyclones and Earthquakes, 
2000 and by 2050 144
7.3 Coastal Population of Selected Countries That Are 
Highly Vulnerable to Sea Level Rise 145
8.1 Industry Contributions to Productivity Growth in the 
United States, 1960–2007 160
8.2 R&D Intensity, by Industry Averaged across 10 OECD 
Countries 161
8.3 Contributions to Productivity Growth in the 
United States, by Industry, 1960–2007  163
8.4 Industry Contributions to Productivity in the 
United States, 1960–2007  164
Tables
1.1 Regional Development Policies Calibrated to Integrate 
Countries, by Density of Population 9
2.1 Population and Average Annual Rate of Change, 
by Group and Selected Years, 1950–2050 17
2.2 Number of Cities and Percentage of Total Population, 
by Size of City, 2009 and 2025  19
2.3 Size of Cities, by Region, Number of Inhabitants, and 
Share of Population, Selected Years, 1975, 2009, 2025 20
2.4 Percentage of Population Living in Urban Areas 
by Region, Selected Years, 1950–2050 21
2.5 Average Annual Rate of Change in Urban Population, 
1950–2025 23
2.6 National and UN Data on Urbanization 
in Selected Countries  24
3.1 Regional Differences in Urbanization 39
3.2 A Dozen Economies of Scale 44
Contents       ix
4.1 Manufacturing and Business Services in the 
United States, by Size of City, 1910 and 1995 53
4.2 Share of New York County (Manhattan) 
in Total Private Employment in the United States, 1997 54
4.3 Dimensions of Knowledge Base: Measures and Results 56
4.4 The Knowledge Base and Economic Performance 
in Select Cities 57
4.5 Metropolitan Area Regressions 59
4.6 Underpinnings of Knowledge Cities 63
4.7 Creativity Rankings in the United States, 
by City Size 67
4.8 Creative Class Occupations, Ranked 
by Percentage Change  69
4.9 Creative Workers: Consumers and Producers 71
4.10 Global City Indicators: City Services 75
4.11 Global City Indicators: Quality of Life 75
4.12 Role of Standardized Indicators for Cities 77
4.13 Summary of Results on Carbon Emissions 
per Home, 2006 78
5.1 Sources of GDP Growth in China, 1978–2004 92
5.2 Sources of GDP Growth in the Industrial 
and Services Sectors in China, 1978–2004  92
5.3 Fastest-Growing Manufactured Exports Worldwide, 
1997–2007 93
5.4 Fastest-Growing Manufactured Exports from Asia, 
1997–2007 94
5.5 Fastest-Growing Manufacturing Industries in China, 
1996–2003 95
5.6 Top 10 Exports from China, 2006 95
5.7 Imports to China, 2002, 2005, 2008  96
5.8 Imports of High-Tech Products as a Percentage 
of Total Imports in China, 2002, 2005, 2008 96
5.9 Top USPTO Patents Worldwide, 2005–09 97
5.10 Share of WIPO Patents, by Sector, 2007–09 98
5.11 Top Five Patenting Industries in the United States, 2006 98
5.12 Top Five Industries Contributing to TFP Growth 
in the United States, 1960–2005 99
5.13 Science and Technology Occupations 
in the United States 103
x       Contents
5.14 S&T Jobs in Select High-Tech Industries 
in the United States, 1997 104
5.15 High-Tech Jobs in Select Cities in the United States, 1997 104
5.16 IT Jobs in Select Cities in the United States, 1997 105
5.17 Key High-Tech Sectors in Seattle 105
7.1 Contribution of Manufacturing and Services to GDP, 
1980–2008 140
8A.1 Mercer Quality of Living Ranking of Cities 
Worldwide, 2010 176
8A.2 Ranking of Creative Cities in the United States, 
by Arts Employees per Capita, 2008 177
8A.3 Ranking of Innovative Cities in the United States, 2008 177
8A.4 Top 10 Innovation Cities in the World, 2010  177
8A.5 Ranking of Innovation Cities in the Americas, 2010 178
xi 
Preface
Economists have emphasized the importance of geography in growth and 
competitiveness, yet rarely has there been literature that identifies the 
cause of growth in some cities but not in others. Why was the city of 
Bangalore more attractive for industries than Karachi? What are the 
defining characteristics of successful cities? This book seeks to answer 
these questions through multiple consultations with leading experts and 
in-depth research on urban centers. 
Geography of Growth has been written for academics and practitio-
ners; it combines the theoretical background on urban centers with 
concrete recommendations. The eight chapters move from providing 
background on the various models of urban centers to hypothesizing 
why growth and development are more prominent in some cities than 
in others. 
Chapter 1 addresses two questions: How has spatial concentration 
evolved with growth and development, and what are the efficiency 
implications of too much or too little spatial concentration? This chapter 
summarizes the various models that analyze growth by geographic 
concentration and sets the foundation for concepts discussed in later 
chapters.
Chapter 2 focuses on urbanization in geographies. There is pressure to 
effectively measure the urban population, which is expected to grow by 
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84 percent within the next 40 years. This chapter discusses how UN data 
measures growth, as well as the criticisms on the metrics used. 
Chapter 3 correlates urban presence with economic density in devel-
oped and developing countries. It initially focuses on how urban  transition 
and growth are blurring the rural-urban divide and the unprecedented 
volume of people who are moving to urban areas. The second part exam-
ines regional trends in urban growth for the developing countries, then 
discusses some key features of cities in developing regions. 
Chapter 4 discusses how different industries inhabit and impact vari-
ous urban sectors. For example, the chapter opens by describing how 
small and medium cities in Japan, the Republic of Korea, and the United 
States are highly specialized because of the requirements and influences 
of the types of industry there. This chapter expands on the economic cor-
relations mentioned in chapter 3. 
Chapter 5 contextualizes urban growth in the current technological 
landscape as innovation, particularly in information technology, has 
become critical to increasing productivity and consequently growth. This 
chapter provides examples of “smart cities” and identifies common attri-
butes that contribute to their success. This chapter also provides policy 
recommendations for practitioners on how to make cities “smarter.” 
Chapter 6 further analyzes urbanization in the current global context, 
specifically, the impact of globalization and industry clusters on urbaniza-
tion. By citing examples of how globalization has had spillover effects in 
the urban sector, the chapter demonstrates the importance of globaliza-
tion and the relevance of the growth of industry clusters in places such as 
Bangalore and Shenzhen. It segues to chapter 7.
Chapter 7 addresses a current fundamental global trend: Why has 
urbanization been growing rapidly since the 1950s? Some theories suggest 
that it is industry that spurs urbanization and consequently growth in infra-
structure, however this is not the case. Instead—the chapter concludes by 
looking at data across regions and cities—the municipalities are pivotal in 
influencing infrastructure development and growth in urban centers. 
Finally, chapter 8 deciphers why some cities are more successful than 
others. Why do Karachi and São Paulo have the human capital that 
qualifies them as urban centers but not as thriving cities? By citing 
examples of successful cities, this chapter provides policy recommenda-
tions on how to make a city competitive in today’s economy.  
The authors would like to thank the policy experts and academics who 
helped identify key data, as well the administrative and publishing staff 
for helping in the successful production of this book. 
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C H A P T E R  1
Frameworks for Spatial Analysis
Since the 1990s, the new economic geography has received a lot of atten-
tion, as mainstream economists such as Krugman (1991a, 1991b) and 
others began to focus on where economic activity occurs and why. While 
economic geography has always been central to such questions, it has 
often been ignored, given the difficulties with modeling some of the 
relationships—for example, increasing returns and imperfect competition 
at the regional and urban levels. Using models to analyze industrial orga-
nization, international trade, and growth theory has helped to spur the 
use of economic geography, which seeks to explain concentrations of 
population, economic activity, or both, such as agricultural areas, indus-
trial areas, cities, and industry clusters. These concentrations of popula-
tion or economic activity are subject to agglomeration economies and are 
thus self-reinforcing. The new economic geography seeks to understand 
why such concentrations arise and why they are self-reinforcing.1 Our 
concern here is not with the new economic geography per se but rather 
with the forces that give rise to spatial concentration of population and 
economic activity: How has spatial concentration evolved with growth 
and development, and what are the efficiency implications of too much 
or too little spatial concentration?
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The Form of Urbanization
Urbanization is a transitory process (Henderson 2003) exemplified by 
movements of population from rural to urban areas predicated on the 
marginal product of labor being higher in the urban area. The Harris and 
Todaro (1970) model, the workhorse for most development economists, 
deals with issues concerning rural-urban migration, where workers decide 
to migrate or not based on expected income differentials between rural 
and urban areas rather than just wage differentials. Here, we assume that 
agriculture is the traditional sector, with low productivity, low wages, and 
no unemployment, as labor is perfectly competitive and mobile. This 
implies that rural-urban migration in a context of high urban unemploy-
ment can be economically rational if expected urban income (defined as 
actual wages adjusted for the unemployment rate) exceeds expected rural 
income. In equilibrium, the expected urban wage is equal to the marginal 
product of an agricultural worker, and there is no migration. 
However, economic activity began to concentrate in certain places, 
leading to uneven growth and development. The assumption of constant 
returns to scale as in the Harris-Todaro model could not explain the 
unevenness or “spikes in economic maps.” Regional and urban develop-
ment seemed to be better explained by monopolistic competition and 
increasing returns to scale of production, and this meant that the assump-
tion of perfect competition in models of spatial economics had to be 
dropped. Around this time, Dixit and Stiglitz (1977) developed a model 
of monopolistic competition, and this proved useful in several fields, 
including spatial economics, new trade theory, and new growth theory: 
monopolistic competition gives rise to economic power, which in turn 
can lead to increasing returns.
Henderson (2003) acknowledges the contribution that these dual-
economy models make but points out critical defects. First, the dual start-
ing point is assumed and not modeled. Second, there are no forces for 
agglomeration where we would expect to see industrial concentration in 
the urban sector. And third, there is little mention of spatial aspects of the 
economy. The core-periphery models, especially those configured in an 
economic growth context, and Krugman’s 1991 interpretation attempt to 
address these three issues. Core-periphery models are “more about urban 
concentration” (Henderson 2003, 5). 
Urban Concentration
Urbanization involves the movement out of rural areas and into urban 
areas, and government policy can have an effect on this transition and on 
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the sectoral composition of national output. For example, central govern-
ment policies that promote labor mobility, develop infrastructure, and 
remove impediments to internal trade will affect the mix of urban-rural 
population. Other policies of local governments such as the provision of 
public goods and amenities also get reflected in the urban cost-of-living 
curve and may influence the population mix. At initial and middle stages 
of development, government policies—through tariffs, price controls, and 
subsidies—directly affect the national composition of output and indi-
rectly affect urbanization. 
Urban concentration is usually predicated on the existence of urban 
primacy and its robustness over time. For example, the convergence- 
divergence debate in the economic growth literature has also been applied 
to urban primacy—that is, it asks, Do the other urban centers converge 
on the primary city over time? What are the economic policies hindering 
or helping such a process? The models assume a dual-economy approach: 
the primary city and other urban places. Primacy is the simplest measure 
of urban concentration, and a common expression is the ratio of the 
population of the largest metro area to all of the urban population in 
the country (Henderson 2003).2 Results from the empirical studies 
 suggest that there is an inverted U-shape relationship, where relative 
concentration first peaks and then declines with economic development 
(figure 1.1). The U shape is more relevant in earlier (1965–75) than in 
later (1985–95) periods (Henderson 2003).
Optimal primacy is the level that maximizes national productivity 
growth, with large deviations in primacy strongly affecting productivity 
growth.3 Henderson notes a tendency toward primacy in Algeria, Argentina, 
Chile, Mexico, Peru, and Thailand. Political economy and government 
policies can be complicit in fostering excessive concentration and favoring 
a primary city (usually the national capital) over other cities. Favored cities 
tend to draw in enormous populations that create an “extremely congested 
high cost-of-living metro area” (Henderson 2003, 10). Local government 
can help to preempt this unsustainable situation, and Henderson notes 
previous efforts in China that did limit internal migration. Democratization 
and fiscal decentralization tend to disfavor the existence of primary cities. 
Ades and Glaeser (1995) find that if the primary city is a national capital, 
it is 45 percent larger; if the country is a dictatorship, then the primary city 
is 40–45 percent larger. Davis and Henderson (2003), using panel data 
from 1960–95 with instrumental variable estimation, find that moving 
from the extreme of most to least centralized government reduces primacy 
by 5 percent. Moving from the extreme of least to most democratic form 
of government reduces primacy by 8 percent (Henderson 2003). 
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Urban infrastructure (roads, airports, well-functioning rental markets) 
can reinforce productive efficiency and reduce primacy. Increasing the 
amount of roads per square kilometer of national land or the amount of 
navigable inland waterways per square kilometer, ceteris paribus, by one 
standard deviation reduces urban primacy by 10 percent. Urban policy 
making in developing countries often has the twin objectives of making 
cities better by improving the delivery of local public goods, such as gar-
bage collection, sewerage, and public transport and by limiting urbaniza-
tion, which implies limiting the inflow of people from rural areas to 
crowded cities. Cities bring efficiency gains and, therefore, economic 
benefits that are derived largely from between- and within-city allocation of 
Figure 1.1 Primacy and Economic Development, 1965–95
Source: Henderson 2003.
Note: GDP = gross domestic product.
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resources. Therefore, limiting urbanization entails losses. The policy objec-
tive should be to deal with imbalances (slums, congestion) rather than to 
stop the influx of people. The bottom line is to avoid concentrating 
resources in one place, which implies that governments should ensure 
competition in all markets and secure well-defined property rights and 
land markets if they want healthy urban areas.
During the past few decades, the costs of transport and communica-
tion have been reduced dramatically, and space as an impediment has 
been minimized. For example, lower transport and communication costs 
have enabled firms and their workers to compete globally across both 
developed and developing countries. Local markets, regional markets, and 
international markets are now seen as seamless “world markets” and open 
for competition. As such, all markets have to beat the “China price of low 
wage,” and this requires firms to innovate constantly to stay ahead of their 
competitors. Thus, China, Japan, and the Republic of Korea are able to 
produce steel in areas that are not known to have iron and coal mines. 
Locations now compete on the basis of providing secure property rights 
and law and order rather than strategic location or proximity to a seaport. 
Location becomes redundant for many services, as communications have 
become increasingly more accessible and mobile. Thus, numerous low-
skill service jobs have begun to migrate from high-wage locations to low-
cost locations overseas in places as diverse as Brazil or India or Ireland. 
Closeness and connectivity are important and concentrate goods and 
workers in the center.
Core-Periphery Models
The core-periphery models focus on the effect of transportation costs on 
spatial concentration. Krugman (1991a) introduces a basic trade model of 
“core-periphery” with two goods (agriculture and manufacturing) in two 
regions with two types of labor (farmers and workers), where increasing 
returns at the firm level interact with transport costs, and factor mobility 
can cause spatial economic structures to emerge and change. 
Using an approach originally suggested by Alan Turing (1952) for the 
analysis of morphogenesis in biology yields surprisingly clear results 
about this two-region economy. For instance, Krugman (1996) outlines a 
“racetrack economy” with 12 regions around the circumference of a cir-
cle, like a clock, in which goods must be transported along the circumfer-
ence. When one starts with any initial distribution of economic activity 
nearly equal across all space, the simulation always ends with all manu-
facturing agglomerated in just two regions, which are located on the 
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exact opposite side of each other. This self-organizing central place of 
activity can also be derived using Turing’s model, which is also called the 
reaction diffusion model. 
International trade and spatial economics are also linked. While trade 
theory deals with the immobility of factors of production (land and labor) 
between locations and the mobility of output or commodities, spatial eco-
nomics is concerned about the mobility of factors (labor and capital) and 
the implications for the concentration of economic activity. The approach 
introduces the possibility that labor can move between agriculture and 
manufacturing and assumes that manufacturing firms use each other’s 
outputs as intermediate inputs. This yields backward and forward linkages, 
as in the core-periphery model, but here it causes international inequalities 
in wages and could explain why some nations prosper while others decline. 
If there were no countries in the world, just one continuous space across 
the globe, this framework could be used to show the emergence of regions 
of specialization in a borderless world with continuous space. 
At one extreme lies the core-periphery dichotomy at the global scale. 
In 2000, for example, the North American Free Trade Agreement yielded 
35 percent of world gross domestic product (GDP), the European Union 
(15 countries) yielded 25 percent, and East Asia yielded 23 percent; thus, 
83 percent of world GDP was concentrated in three regions. Furthermore, 
the concentration of world GDP in these three regions has been intensify-
ing since 1980. At a national scale, about 50 percent of the output in the 
United States is produced on less than 2 percent of the country’s land 
(figure 1.2). Output is concentrated in a few counties such as the area 
along the Boston–New York–Washington, DC, corridor, in the state of 
Florida, in and around Galveston-Houston, in Silicon Valley in California, 
Figure 1.2 Concentration of Economic Activity in the United States
Source: Easterly and Levine 2002.
Note: Counties shown in black take up 2 percent of U.S. land area but account for half of U.S. GDP.
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and in a few other places. A similar pattern is observed within cities 
such as Washington, DC, where rich neighborhoods are concentrated in 
the northwest of the city and poor neighborhoods are concentrated in the 
southeast. 
Economic maps of France, Germany, India, Japan, Poland, and most 
other countries show a similar pattern, with “spiky” economic density 
(GDP per square kilometer). Maps of economic density indicate that 
some areas are lagging in relation to others—for example, Bihar, Orissa, 
and Rajasthan in India. The existence of lagging regions motivates policy 
and the commitment of large amounts of resources in the form of taxes 
and subsidies to these regions. 
Several concerns arise from such uneven growth and development. 
First, at the local level, people are concentrated in cities, and this trend 
threatens to outstrip the concentration of economic activity. As a result, 
a billion people live in the world’s slums, and this problem has to be dealt 
with in policy and planning. At the national level, spatial disparities in 
living standards widen as economic mass concentrates in leading prov-
inces and lagging regions are left behind: a billion people are now margin-
alized in remote and lagging areas of the world. At the global level, poor 
people are trapped in isolated countries that are not developing at all 
(Paul Collier calls them the “bottom billion”).
Should rural labor move to jobs, which are more likely to be in cities 
and leading regions, or should jobs be provided in remote parts of a coun-
try? The general policy advice is that governments should remove imped-
iments to the flow of capital and labor and reinforce agglomeration 
economies by abolishing national minimum wages, reducing unemploy-
ment and social benefits, and abolishing rent control to increase the sup-
ply of housing, among other policies. 
Do agglomeration economies accrue at the plant, industry, city, or 
regional level? Krugman (2010) believes that they accrue at the plant 
level, whereby firms are located in a single area nearer to consumer 
demand (in large cities with large populations), which minimizes transport 
costs. In contrast, Michael Porter (1990) is of the view that intraindustry 
economies lead to clusters. This debate has implications for policy: Should 
governments target industrial policy to facilitate individual firms or to 
facilitate a whole industry? 
The World Development Report 2009 (World Bank 2009) emphasizes 
that the most potent instruments for integrating leading and lagging 
regions are spatially blind improvements in institutions or, put more 
simply, the provision of essential services such as education, health, and 
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public security. The main findings of research on economic growth are 
that (a) growth will remain unbalanced and, to try to spread out  economic 
activity—too much, too far, or too soon—will discourage it (Gill 2010), 
and (b) development can still be inclusive, in that even people who start 
their lives far from economic opportunity can benefit from the growing 
concentration of economic activity in a few places. The way to get both 
the benefits of uneven growth and inclusive development is through 
economic integration and mobility of labor and capital to fast-growing 
areas, so (c) leading and lagging regions need to be connected not only by 
infrastructure that connects places but also by institutions (for example, 
political and fiscal decentralization, property rights for land, financial 
integration, education and training, and assured product markets) that 
connect people (table 1.1).
Agglomeration Economies
Agglomeration or clustering of activities (shops, restaurants, movie the-
aters) can happen when a new road or a new factory is built. Agglomeration 
occurs at many geographic levels and can take many forms. It is most 
intense at the level of the city, where close spatial proximity makes the 
prospect of agglomeration spillovers—both scale externalities and knowl-
edge economies—most relevant and a factor in promoting economic 
growth (Henderson 2003). 
Important forces affect geographic concentration and dispersion of 
economic activity. These are the centripetal forces, such as backward and 
forward linkages, thickness of markets, and knowledge spillovers. They are 
countered by or opposed to agglomeration by centrifugal forces such as 
immobile factors, transport costs, land rents, congestion, pollution, and 
other pure diseconomies. External effects are exerted on both centripetal 
and centrifugal forces, creating market failures that abound in urban eco-
nomics. These forces determine the size of the city—in other words, the 
agglomeration may be too big. 
Alfred Marshall ([1890] 1920) suggested over a century ago a three-
fold classification of the reasons for industrial concentration. Concentration 
arises because of (a) knowledge spillovers, (b) the advantages of thick 
markets for specialized skills, and (c) the backward and forward linkages 
associated with large local markets.4 Most of the theoretical and empirical 
work has focused on the backward and forward linkages. These linkages 
lead to increasing returns to production at the level of the individual firm. 
Increasing returns introduce self-reinforcing and multiplier effects and 
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Table 1.1 Regional Development Policies Calibrated to Integrate Countries, by Density of Population
Indicator
Sparsely populated 
lagging regions
Densely populated lagging 
regions in united countries
Densely populated lagging 
regions in divided countries
Example (countries) Chile, China, Ghana, Honduras, 
Pakistan, Peru, Russian Federation, 
Sri Lanka, Uganda, Vietnam
Bangladesh, Brazil, Colombia, Arab 
Rep. of Egypt, Mexico, Thailand, 
Turkey
India, Nigeria
Dimensions of the integration 
challenge
Economic distance Economic distance; high population 
densities in lagging areas 
Economic distance; high population 
densities; internal divisions 
What policies should facilitate Labor and capital mobility Labor and capital mobility; market 
integration for goods and services
Labor and capital mobility; market 
integration for goods and services; 
selected economic activities in 
lagging areas
Policy priorities
Spatially blind institutions Fluid land and labor markets; 
security; education and health 
programs; safe water and 
sanitation
Fluid land and labor markets; 
security; education and health 
programs; safe water and 
sanitation
Fluid land and labor markets; 
security; education and health 
programs; safe water and sanitation
Spatially connective infrastructure Interregional transport infrastructure; 
information and communication 
services
Interregional transport infrastructure; 
information and communication 
services
Spatially targeted incentives Incentives to agriculture and agro-
based industry; irrigation systems; 
workforce training; local roads
Source: World Bank 2009.
Note: Countries are classified based on a typology outlined in World Bank (2009). Three types of countries are identified: those with sparsely populated lagging regions; those with 
densely populated lagging regions that are united based on ethnolinguistic and little or no political fragmentation; and those with densely populated lagging regions and within- 
country divisions such as ethnolinguistic differences and political fragmentation.
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coexist with imperfect competition, which has implications for how 
firms set prices and wages. von Thünen’s model (1826) explained the 
economic effects of falling “space-bridging” costs. Owners of mobile fac-
tors of production, such as capital and technical knowledge, need to be 
paid the same return whether their assets are employed in the center of 
market activity or in the periphery. Otherwise there is an incentive to 
engage in “locational arbitrage.” For example, in a city or region, real estate 
rents drop as the distance from the center of activity grows. In the center, 
enterprises use a lot of capital to build high-rises, thus saving on land 
costs, and only space-saving offices are located there. Cheap land on the 
periphery is devoted to space-intensive uses, such as manufacturing 
plants, logistics centers, and dumps. If landowners on the periphery were 
to raise their rents, they would soon be out of business.
Why do certain cities such as Detroit for automobiles, Hollywood for 
movies, and Silicon Valley for high technology specialize in a narrow 
range of industries? A small modification of Von Thünen’s model shifts 
the focus from agglomeration of resources to the geographic concentra-
tion of particular industries. When production is vertically integrated, 
with both upstream and downstream sectors producing inputs for each 
other, and when both sectors have higher returns and transport costs, 
there are both backward and forward linkages, and production could be 
in a single location because both have an incentive to be closest to the 
largest markets for each other. 
What happens to spatial concentration if manufacturing is more 
dynamic and mobile, but agriculture is immobile? What happens to eco-
nomic mass if both manufacturing and agriculture are mobile? A model 
that combines a von Thünen–style explanation of land rent with a linkage 
explanation of manufacturing concentration can show how a spatial pat-
tern in which a single city is surrounded by an agricultural hinterland can 
be self-sustaining as long as the urban population is not too large. If the 
population does become too large, it will be in the interest of a small 
group of workers to move to some other location; by using the criterion 
of sustainability, it is possible to develop a model of the emergence of new 
cities and hence a multicity structure. If several manufacturing industries 
exist with different costs of transportation or economies of scale, the 
process of city formation can yield a hierarchy of cities of different types 
and sizes. 
A larger city allows for a more efficient sharing of indivisible facili-
ties (such as local infrastructure), risks, and the gains from variety and 
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specialization. Furthermore, a larger city also allows for a better matching 
between employers and employees, buyers and suppliers, and entrepre-
neurs and financiers. Finally, a larger city can facilitate learning about 
new technologies, market evolutions, or new forms of organization. 
More frequent direct interactions between economic agents in a city 
can thus favor the creation, diffusion, and accumulation of knowledge. 
Hence, many different mechanisms can generate increasing urban 
returns. Moreover, sources of increasing urban returns may also be 
sources of urban inefficiencies. 
The wage in a city increases with the size of the urban labor force, 
reflecting the existence of urban agglomeration externalities. The inten-
sity of increasing urban returns is measured by the slope of the wage 
curve. Since the nature and intensity of increasing returns are expected to 
differ across activities, so will the exact shape of the wage curve. This 
upward-sloping wage curve stands in sharp contrast to “neoclassical” wage 
curves that slope downward. Increasing urban returns have received a 
considerable amount of theoretical attention. 
The wage curve masks the many distortions beneath it. For example, 
most developing countries distort agricultural prices (rural) and manufac-
turing prices (urban). The “urban bias” of most developing countries is 
well documented, as reflected in higher urban wages and thus a higher 
wage curve. In turn, this bias should lead to larger cities. More generally, 
national technology and public policies are reflected in the wage curve of 
any particular city, affecting its level and, sometimes, its slope.
The cost-of-living curve in urban areas is linked to the wage curve and 
traffic congestion, among other determinants. Governments can address 
many components of the cost-of-living curve, from sewerage to public 
transport, and thus reduce the costs. 
Conclusion
The spatial economy was given new impetus in the 1990s with the work 
on the new economic geography, which provided economists with new 
tools to examine why and where population or economic activity is 
located. It also tied in with the theoretical and empirical work of the new 
economic growth literature at that time. The chapter has discussed the 
two principal ways in which urbanization is organized at a spatial scale. 
Central to this are the study of urban concentration and the study of 
agglomeration economies.
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Notes
 1. “By modeling the sources of increasing returns to spatial concentration, we 
learn something about how and when these returns may change—and then 
explore how the economy’s behavior will change with them” (Fujita, 
Krugman, and Venables 1999, 4).
 2. Henderson (2003) cites the empirical work of Ades and Glaeser (1995), 
Junius (1999), and Davis and Henderson (2003).
 3. “A 33 percent increase or decrease in primacy from a typical best level of 
0.3 reduces productivity growth by 3 percent over five years” (Henderson 
2003, 9).
 4. Concentration minimizes transport costs, but also creates other externalities, 
such as congestion and overcrowding.
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C H A P T E R  2
Urbanization as a Typology 
of Space
World urban population is expected to increase 84 percent by 2050, rising 
from 3.4 billion in 2009 to 6.3 billion in 2050. Almost all of this increase 
will take place in the developing regions. By 2050, the rate of urbanization 
is expected to reach 66 percent (from 45 percent currently) in the less 
developed regions and 86 percent (from 75 percent currently) in the 
more developed regions. 
The developing countries are experiencing rapid urbanization and are 
expected to become predominantly urban societies over the coming four 
decades. The transformation of the urban system has rendered obsolete 
the distinction between rural and urban areas, and the advances in 
 transportation and telecommunications have facilitated this. Settlement 
 systems have increased in complexity. An example is the change from 
a monocentric system of cities to a polycentric one, whereby clusters 
of smaller cities surround a larger one—in effect, a form of territorial 
 specialization. 
The chapter begins by examining the data on urbanization and projec-
tions over the coming four decades, primarily using urbanization data from 
the United Nations (UN). The remainder of the chapter discusses the 
main criticism of these data and suggests an alternative measure of urbani-
zation that provides a more robust measure of spatial concentration.
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Urbanization and Space
Classifying cities by population size is a comprehensive way of identifying 
various types of cities. The UN compiles data on urban population and its 
share of total national population for various countries. The countries 
report the data to the UN, and as a result, there is no standard definition, 
which makes cross-country comparisons problematic. The most recent 
UN publication on urbanization suggests the following:
• Half of the world’s 6.7 billion people will live in urban areas by 2010.
• Not all of the world’s regions are equally urbanized.
• Asia and Africa are the least urbanized regions but account for most of 
the urban population.
• Asia’s urban population, currently 1.6 billion, is expected to double over 
the coming four decades, adding another 1.8 billion persons by 2050.
• China is expected to become 70 percent urban (from 40 percent pres-
ently), accounting for 1 billion people by 2050.
• India is expected to urbanize the least over the coming four decades. 
Currently, 30 percent of its population live in urban areas, a rate that is 
expected to reach 55 percent by 2050, or 900 million people.
• Dhaka, Karachi, and Lahore are expected to grow the fastest and will 
acquire megacity status—cities with more than 10 million inhabit-
ants—by 2050.
• Africa’s urban population is likely to triple over the next 40 years, 
increasing from 340 million to more than 900 million.
• The fastest-growing cities in Africa are not yet megacities, but Kinshasa 
and Lagos are expected to surpass 10 million inhabitants by 2050.
• Urbanization in Latin America and the developed world will remain 
largely the same over the coming four decades.
• Natural increase accounts for the majority of urban growth, some 
60 percent. An exception is China, where increases in urbanization 
are primarily due to changes in the number of areas considered 
urban and to migration.
Projections to 2050 depend on a continuing decline in the fertility rate 
in the developing world. If fertility rates continue at their current levels 
and urbanization continues at the predicted pace, the global urban popu-
lation will reach 8.1 billion by 2050 instead of the projected 6.3 billion.
Table 2.1 illustrates these points. The world’s urban population is 
expected to reach 6.3 billion by 2050, with growth coming from the 
urban areas in the less developed regions. While rural population in the 
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Table 2.1 Population and Average Annual Rate of Change, by Group and Selected Years, 1950–2050
Group
Population (billions) Average annual rate of change (%)
1950 1975 2009 2025 2050 1950–75 1975–2009 2009–25 2025–50
Total population
World 2.53 4.06 6.83 8.01 9.15 1.89 1.53 1.00 0.53
More developed regions 0.81 1.05 1.23 1.28 1.28 1.02 0.48 0.22 −0.01
Less developed regions 1.72 3.01 5.60 6.73 7.87 2.25 1.82 1.16 0.63
Urban population
World 0.73 1.51 3.42 4.54 6.29 2.91 2.40 1.76 1.31
More developed regions 0.43 0.70 0.92 1.01 1.10 1.97 0.82 0.58 0.33
Less developed regions 0.30 0.81 2.50 3.52 5.19 3.96 3.30 2.15 1.55
Rural population
World 1.80 2.55 3.41 3.48 2.86 1.39 0.85 0.12 −0.77
More developed regions 0.39 0.35 0.31 0.26 0.18 −0.39 −0.35 −1.01 −1.62
Less developed regions 1.41 2.20 3.10 3.21 2.69 1.77 1.01 0.22 −0.71
Source: UN 2010.
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more developed regions has been declining for some time, rural popula-
tion in the developing regions is expected to continue increasing until 
2025, when it will begin to contract. Urban population growth at the 
global level is slowing down. Between 1950 and 2009, urban population 
grew at an annual average rate of 2.6 percent, increasing from 0.7 billion 
to 3.4 billion (UN 2010). Contraction of the rural population and sus-
tained increase of the urban population will result in increasing propor-
tions of the global population living in urban areas. 
Classification of Cities
The United Nations classifies various types of cities by the size of their 
population. Cities with less than 1 million people are classified as small cit-
ies, and those with greater than 1 million but less than 5 million are classi-
fied as medium-size cities. Large cities are those with populations between 
5 million and 10 million, and megacities have a population of 10 million or 
greater. Figure 2.1 shows total urban population by size of city for 1995, 
2009, and 2025. 
Figure 2.1 illustrates the uneven distribution of world population 
among cities of different sizes. Almost 52 percent of urban occupants live 
in cities of less than half a million people. These small cities are expected 
to account for 45 percent of the projected increase in the world’s urban 
population up to 2025. Small cities with less than half a million people 
account for 53.2 percent of the urban population in the more developed 
regions, marginally higher than the share in the less developed regions: 
51.4 percent (UN 2010). 
At the other end of the spectrum are the megacities, often comprising 
urban agglomerations of “several cities or urban localities that are func-
tionally linked” (UN 2010, 6). The largest megacity, Tokyo, the capital of 
Japan, with an estimated population of 36.5 million in 2009, comprises 87 
surrounding cities and towns, including Chiba, Kawasaki, and Yokohama. 
There were just three megacities in 1975—Mexico City, New York, and 
Tokyo. By 2009, 21 cities had attained this size, and 8 more are expected 
to become megacities by 2025, all in developing countries (table 2.2).1
Large cities, or those with a population of between 5 million and 
10 million, numbered 32 in 2009 and are expected to number 46 by 
2025. They accounted for 6.6 percent of the total population in 2009. 
Three-quarters of these large cities are “megacities in waiting” and are 
located in the developing regions (UN 2010, 8). Large cities account 
for a greater proportion of the urban population in the less developed 
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regions, 8.8 percent in 2009, than in the more developed regions, 4.9 
percent in 2009 (table 2.3).
Medium-size cities, with more than 1 million inhabitants but fewer than 
5 million, are numerous—374 in 2009, rising to 506 in 2025 (table 2.2). 
Source: UN 2010.
Figure 2.1 Total Population, by City Size, 1995, 2009, and 2025
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Table 2.2 Number of Cities and Percentage of Total Population,
 by Size of City, 2009 and 2025 
Size of city
Number of cities
Urban population 
(% of total population)
2009 2025a 2009 2025a
Mega 21 29 9.4 10.3
Large 32 46 6.6 7.1
Medium 374 506 21.9 22.1
Small 509 667 10.3 10.3
Source: UN 2010.
Note: Megacities = more than 10 million; large cities = between 5 million and 10 million; medium-size cities = 
between 1 million and 5 million; small cities = between 500,000 and 1 million.
a. Projection.
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They account for 22 percent of the urban population. Medium-size cities 
in the less developed and more developed regions account for the same 
percentage of the urban population—21.9 percent in 2009 (table 2.3).
The number of small cities, those with a population between 500,000 
and 1 million, was 509 in 2009, increasing to 667 by 2025. These smaller 
cities account for just 10.3 percent of the urban population (table 2.2).
Size of Cities across Developing and Developed Regions
Across the regions, city size varies tremendously. Roughly 67 percent of 
the urban population in Europe reside in cities with less than 500,000 
inhabitants, while just 8 percent live in cities of 5 million or greater. The 
urban distribution by city size is similar in Africa—58 percent of urban 
inhabitants live in smaller cities and 9 percent live in cities of 5 million 
Table 2.3 Size of Cities, by Region, Number of Inhabitants, and Share of 
Population, Selected Years, 1975, 2009, 2025
Region and size of 
urban settlement 
Population (millions) Percentage distribution
1975 2009 2025 1975 2009 2025
World
Total urban area 1,511 3,421 4,536 100.0 100.0 100.0
Mega 53 320 469 3.5 9.4 10.3
Large 109 225 321 7.2 6.6 7.1
Medium 292 749 1,004 19.3 21.9 22.1
Small 157 352 465 10.4 10.3 10.3
Very small 900 1,775 2,277 59.6 51.9 50.2
More developed region
Total urban area 698 924 1,014 100.0 100.0 100.0
Mega 42 101 104 6.1 10.9 10.3
Large 50 45 70 7.1 4.9 6.9
Medium 137 202 207 19.6 21.9 20.4
Small 73 84 92 10.5 9.1 9.0
Very small 396 491 541 56.7 53.2 53.4
Less developed region
Total urban area 814 2,497 3,522 100.0 100.0 100.0
Mega 11 219 365 1.3 8.8 10.4
Large 60 180 251 7.3 7.2 7.1
Medium 155 546 797 19.1 21.9 22.6
Small 83 268 374 10.3 10.7 10.6
Very small 505 1,284 1,736 62.0 51.4 49.3
Source: UN 2010.
Note: Megacities = more than 10 million; large cities = between 5 million and 10 million; medium-size cities = 
between 1 million and 5 million; small cities = between 500,000 and 1 million; very small-size cities = less than 
500,000.
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or more. Roughly one in five people lives in a large city in Asia, Latin 
America and the Caribbean, and North America. The proportion of 
people living in smaller cities is 49 percent in Asia, 48 percent in Latin 
America and the Caribbean, and 37 percent in North America. Oceania 
is a special case, as none of its cities is larger than 5 million people and 
relatively few—38 percent—of its inhabitants live in cities with fewer 
than half a million people (UN 2010). 
Table 2.4 shows the rapid urbanization that has taken place since 
1950 and is expected to continue. The process began in the more devel-
oped regions, which were approximately 30 percent urban in 1920. By 
1950, more than half of the population was living in an urban area. 
North America, Australia, and New Zealand led the group in 1950, with 
more than 60 percent of the population living in an urban area, while 
Europe was the least urbanized,2 with more than 50 percent living in an 
urban area (UN 2010). The ranking is expected to hold until 2050, when 
more than 90 percent of North America, New Zealand, and Australia and 
84 percent of Europe will be urban (UN 2010). 
Latin America and the Caribbean has a high level of urbanization, surpass-
ing Europe in 2009 and expected to increase until 2050, when 89 percent of 
its inhabitants will reside in urban areas. By contrast, Asia and Africa are 
mostly rural, with only 42 and 40 percent, respectively, of the population 
living in urban areas in 2009. These regions are expected to urbanize rapidly 
over the coming four decades, when 65 and 62 percent of the population, 
respectively, will reside in urban areas (table 2.4).
As a whole, in 2009, Asia was home to more than half of the world’s 
urban population (figure 2.2). Together with Africa, Asia will experience 
Table 2.4 Percentage of Population Living in Urban Areas
by Region, Selected Years, 1950–2050
Major area 1950 1975 2009 2025 2050
World 28.2 37.2 50.1 56.6 68.7
 More developed regions 52.6 66.7 74.9 79.4 86.2
 Less developed regions 17.6 27.0 44.6 52.3 65.9
Africa 14.4 25.7 39.6 47.2 61.6
Asia 16.3 24.0 41.7 49.9 64.7
Europe 51.3 65.3 72.5 76.9 84.3
Latin America and the Caribbean 41.4 60.7 79.3 83.8 88.8
North America 63.9 73.8 81.9 85.7 90.1
Oceania 62.0 71.5 70.2 70.8 74.8
Source: UN 2010.
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a significant increase in its urban population over the coming four 
decades . By 2050, roughly 54 percent of the global urban population will 
reside in Asia, and 20 percent will reside in Africa. 
The world’s urban population is highly concentrated, with roughly 
75 percent of the 3.4 billion urban dwellers worldwide living in 25 
countries. Urban population in these countries ranges from 31 million 
in South Africa to 620 million in China. Together, China, India, and 
North America account for 36 percent of the global urban population. 
Furthermore, the increase in world urban population is concentrated 
in a few countries. China and India are expected to account for roughly 
one-third of the total increase in urban population over the coming four 
decades, with nine additional countries expected to contribute 26 per-
cent of the urban increase. These countries, which will increase their 
urban population between 15 million and 51 million, are the Democratic 
Republic of Congo and Nigeria in Africa; Bangladesh, Indonesia, Pakistan, 
and the Philippines in Asia; Brazil and Mexico in Latin America; and the 
United States in North America. Table 2.5 shows the urban growth rates 
for the world regions. The rates in Africa and Asia are of particular 
note—a projected 3 and 2 percent a year, respectively, between 2009 and 
2025.
Figure 2.2 Distribution of the World Urban Population, 
by Region, 1950, 2009, and 2050
Source: UN 2010.
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Criticism of the Data and Suggested Alternatives
The main criticism of the UN data on population is the subjectivity in 
their compilation. Each participating country reports on the level of 
urbanization in the country according to its classification system, which 
may change over time. The national classification system does not always 
coincide with that used by the UN. Uchida and Nelson (2008) cite sev-
eral examples of where and how country-level data on urbanization differ 
from the official data reported by the UN (table 2.6).
Differing country classifications of urbanization make cross-country 
analyses difficult, if not impossible. For example, Sweden defines urban 
as settlements of 200 inhabitants, whereas Nigeria and Syria define urban 
as settlements of 15,000 (Uchida and Nelson 2008). Furthermore, the 
concept of “urban” is becoming more difficult to classify in an environ-
ment where improvements in transportation systems and communica-
tions render obsolete the traditional divide between urban and rural. 
The literature on the form of urbanization has thus moved away from 
the simple urban-rural dichotomy to embrace a more dynamic form that 
explores the relationship between urbanization and economic develop-
ment (see Cohen 2004, 2006). Dichotomy has been expressed in the 
core-periphery models, two-region models, dual-economy models, and 
urban primacy models. Theoretical and empirical studies examine the 
evolution of spatial concentration with development and the efficiency 
implications of too much or too little spatial concentration. Focusing on 
spatial concentration as opposed to a simple dichotomy emphasizes prob-
lems in the measurement of urban concentration. 
Various methods are used to measure urban concentration, including 
the Hirschman-Herfindahl index of concentration, the Pareto parameter, 
and primacy.3 All of these measures depend on how a city and an urban 
Table 2.5 Average Annual Rate of Change in Urban Population, 1950–2025
average annual rate of change (%)
Major area 1950–75 1975–2009 2009–25
Africa 4.77 3.85 3.14
Asia 3.66 3.24 2.04
Europe 1.81 0.55 0.34
Latin America and the Caribbean 4.17 2.51 1.22
North America 1.96 1.37 1.11
Oceania 2.60 1.44 1.20
Source: UN 2010.
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area are defined, and, given the vagaries across time and space, the mea-
sures may not be systematic or consistent. 
Uchida and Nelson (2008) suggest an alternative measure of urban 
concentration, which they term an agglomeration index (AI). Their 
agglomeration index consists of population density, the size of popula-
tion in a “large” urban center, and travel time to that urban center. They 
define their index for 2000 and note that it “creates a global definition 
of settlement concentration that could be used to conduct cross-country 
comparative analyses” (Uchida and Nelson 2008, 2) (figure 2.3). 
Locations that satisfy all three indicators are included in the agglomera-
tion index and are delineated by them. The concept of the AI is, as a 
result, more fluid and transcends discrete entities (cities, administrative 
boundaries, and rural and urban space [see Uchida and Nelson 2008]). 
The AI is not influenced by country definitions of urban. Furthermore, 
a key advantage of the index is that population counts are not used to 
calculate it but serve instead to define and locate cities for the purposes 
of measuring travel time. For this reason, the accuracy of population 
counts is far less important here than in the primacy measure (Uchida 
and Nelson 2008). 
Uchida and Nelson (2008) compare their agglomeration index, which 
uses a minimum threshold of 150 people per square kilometer for den-
sity, a maximum travel time of 60 minutes, and a minimum of 50,000 
inhabitants to define a large city, with the UN estimate for the share of 
urban population in world regions (figure 2.4).
Table 2.6 National and UN Data on Urbanization in Selected Countries 
% of population living in urban areas
Country and year
National 
data UN data Note
India, 1991 39 26.0 National data suggest a higher rate of 
urbanization and include 113 million 
inhabitants residing in areas with populations 
of 5,000 and more.
Mauritius, 2000 66 42.7 Reclassifying the population residing in 
settlements of between 5,000 and 20,000 
inhabitants suggests a much higher rate of 
urbanization than reported by the UN.
Mexico, 2000 67 74.4 UN data suggest a higher rate of urbanization 
when settlements of 2,500 are included.
Source: Compiled from Uchida and Nelson 2008.
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Figure 2.3 Key Indicators of the Agglomeration Index
Source: Uchida and Nelson 2008.
Travel time to
nearest large city
Population size of
large city
Population
density
AI
Figure 2.4 Agglomeration Index and UN Estimates of Urban Population, 
by Region, 2000
Source: Uchida and Nelson 2008.
Note: OECD = Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development. The agglomeration index defines 
urban as a minimum threshold of 150 people per square kilometer for density, a maximum of 60 minutes travel 
time, and a minimum of 50,000 inhabitants. 
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The index and the UN estimate differ markedly for South Asia, Middle 
East and North Africa, and Latin America and the Caribbean, where the 
agglomeration index indicates a higher urban concentration in the first 
two regions and the UN estimates indicate a higher share in the third 
region. Uchida and Nelson (2008) suggest that the higher AI share in 
South Asia is picking up the higher density of population in that region 
and that Latin America and the Caribbean may not be as heavily urban-
ized as originally thought. 
The results are, however, dependent on the threshold levels chosen, 
and it is therefore important to have good justification for those levels. 
Uchida and Nelson (2008) find that the results are quite robust when 
considering changes in the population density threshold—that is, from 
150 in the base case to 300 and 500 people per square kilometer. 
However, the results change remarkably when considering differences in 
travel time, from 30 minutes in the base case to 60 and 90 minutes, 
respectively. According to Uchida and Nelson (2008), with a moderate 
increase in the threshold (from 60 to 90 minutes), the AI for South Asia 
rises to 60.8 percent, more than double the UN figure. Similarly, a change 
in the minimum size for classification as a city from 50,000 in the base 
case to 100,000 and 500,000, respectively, alters the results for the AI, 
causing a steep drop relative to the UN estimates (figure 2.5).
The agglomeration index is a superior measure when examining 
issues of urbanization. Its components—density, travel time, population 
size—differentiate among cities of various sizes and in so doing provide 
greater information on urban settlements and the impact of, for example, 
environmental footprints, congestion, and provision of public infrastruc-
ture. The UN data alone cannot differentiate between “one city growing 
ever-larger and numerous small cities sprouting in what was a sparsely 
populated area” (Uchida and Nelson 2008, 10). While there are data 
difficulties in compiling the index, the authors note that developments 
in satellite technology make available a wide variety of data that are cur-
rent and accurate, facilitating a better-informed index. 
Conclusion
The chapter examined urbanization data by first focusing on the data 
collected by the United Nations. These data provide information on past, 
current, and future trends in urbanization for cities categorized by size 
and location. Although the UN data are the most comprehensive avail-
able, they are often criticized for not comparing cities adequately over 
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time and place. As urbanization continues, the traditional dichotomy 
between urban and rural areas is not tenable, yet the official data continue 
to be organized at these levels. The text considered an alternative mea-
sure of spatial concentration—an agglomeration index that takes into 
account population density, the amount of population in the large urban 
center, and travel time to that urban center. The index is sensitive to the 
threshold values chosen for these variables, and timely, up-to-date data 
availability may be an issue. Despite these caveats, the index has much to 
recommend it; its main advantage is that it facilitates a consistent cross-
country comparison of urbanization and differentiates among different 
city sizes. 
Notes
 1. Asia is expected to gain five megacities, while Latin America is projected to 
gain two, and Africa is projected to gain one.
 2. Oceania includes developing regions as well as the developed countries of 
Australia and New Zealand. Oceania includes Melanesia (Fiji, New Caledonia, 
Papua New Guinea, the Solomon Islands, and Vanuatu), Micronesia (Guam, 
Figure 2.5 Sensitivity to Indicators Used: Example of Minimum Population Size of 
Large Cities
Source: Uchida and Nelson 2008.
Note: OECD = Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development.
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Kiribati, the Marshall Islands, the Federated States of Micronesia, Nauru, 
Northern Mariana Islands, and Palau), and Polynesia (American Samoa, Cook 
Islands, French Polynesia, Niue, Pitcairn, Samoa, Tokelau, Tonga, Tuvalu, and 
the Wallis and Futuna Islands). 
 3. The Hirschman-Herfindahl index of concentration is the sum of the square 
of the share of population in each city relative to the national urban popula-
tion. The Pareto parameter is a measure of how cities decline in size as they 
move from the largest to the smallest (Uchida and Nelson 2008). Primacy is 
the share of the population contained in the largest city relative to the 
national urban population. 
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C H A P T E R  3
Urban Transition and Growth
There is a close association between urbanization—a growing share of 
urban population—and economic growth and development. This associa-
tion suggests various typologies that are based on population size, eco-
nomic density, and territorial specialization.1 Economic density refers to 
the economic mass or output generated on a unit of land. It is the defin-
ing characteristic of urban settlements. Density is measured by the value 
added or gross domestic product (GDP) generated per square kilometer 
of land and is higher the more concentrated these factors—capital and 
labor—are. Thus, economic density is highly correlated with employment 
and population density. 
Economic density is examined here for developing and developed 
countries as a key part of urban transition and growth. Further aspects of 
urban transition and growth are the blurring of the rural-urban divide and 
the unprecedented volume of people moving to urban areas. The second 
part of the chapter examines regional trends in urban growth for the 
developing countries and concludes with a discussion of some of the key 
features of cities in developing regions.
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Urbanization and Development
Urbanization is the pathway to development: no country has developed 
without the growth of its cities (World Bank 2009). The path to urban-
ization is not linear, and cities come in many different sizes. The economic 
landscape has a similar picture. The World Development Report 2009 con-
trasts the economic and population density of Brussels, where an average 
square kilometer hosts 2,000 workers producing US$350 million of 
goods and services and population density is 6,000 people per square 
kilometer, with the agricultural areas of Belgium, where an average square 
kilometer hosts 7 workers producing US$330,000. In between is a con-
tinuum of density. At the head is the primary or leading city, followed by 
a spectrum embracing secondary cities, small urban centers, towns, and 
villages. In some countries, the size difference between the leading or 
primary city and the next city is considerable. Paris has 10 million inhab-
itants; Marseille, the next largest city, has just 1.5 million inhabitants. 
By contrast, the primary city in the United States—New York, with 
22 million—is not that different from Los Angeles, with 18 million. 
Mumbai and New Delhi in India both have 22 million inhabitants (World 
Bank 2009). In addition to the continuum of density that transcends a 
simple rural-urban dichotomy, it is possible to identify a symbiosis of 
places. Cities of different sizes complement one another. The primary city 
forms the core of a country’s metropolitan area with adjacent cities. 
Furthermore, secondary cities may act as regional hubs, providing eco-
nomic functions for the areas around them—finance, commerce, public 
health, education, and culture (World Bank 2009). 
Using an agglomeration index that derives from the close association 
between the economic and urban landscape, the World Development Report 
2009 examines the relationship between city size (a proxy for economic 
density) and development. The agglomeration index facilitates cross-
country comparisons. Using this agglomeration index, the report identifies 
three main findings for developed and developing countries. 
• Economic density rises with development. The proportion of inhabit-
ants in an urban area rises rapidly as the city or town transforms from 
an agrarian to an industrial economy. This geographic transformation 
coincides with the urban area’s move from low to middle income. 
While urbanization may slow after this, economic density continues to 
increase, given that services (the next transformation) are even more 
geographically concentrated than industry.2
Urban Transition and Growth       31
• Rural-urban and within-urban disparities in welfare narrow with devel-
opment. Rural-urban gaps in income, living standards, and poverty 
begin to converge as economies begin to grow and development takes 
hold. Within-city gaps may take longer to narrow and may kick in only 
at advanced stages of development. 
• Neither the pace of urbanization nor its association with economic 
growth is unprecedented. What is unprecedented is the sheer number 
of inhabitants being added each year to the urban population in the 
developing regions (World Bank 2009).
Economic Density Rises with Development
The urban landscape at early stages of development is likely to consist 
of small towns and cities that evolved to fulfill various functions, such 
as a port city or a market town. As industrialization takes hold, urban-
ization takes off, with new cities emerging and current cities expanding, 
leading to a hierarchy of places. As cities multiply and expand, popula-
tion and economic density increase. The World Development Report 2009 
identifies two transitions that lead to a transformation of the geographic 
landscape. First, the move from an agrarian to an industrial base coin-
cides with urbanization and a transition from a rural to an urban econ-
omy. Second, the transition from a manufacturing to a service economy 
occurs at a much higher level of development and the process of urban-
ization is much slower. “In most countries, these transformations hap-
pen at the same time, but in different areas” (World Bank 2009, 57). 
The concentration of economic activity suggests that the richer the 
area, the more economically dense it is. Using the primary city and an 
area of 1° longitude by 1° latitude, the World Development Report 2009 
shows a historically rapidly rising concentration, followed by a leveling 
off for primary cities and cities in the densest grid cells (figure 3.1).
Dublin, London, Paris, Singapore, and Vienna ranked at the top of the 
densest cities in the world in 2005, with more than US$200 million in 
GDP per square kilometer. Tokyo-Kanagawa, New York–New Jersey, 
Oslo-Akershus-Vestfold, and Vienna-Mödling were the densest grid cells 
of 1° longitude by 1° latitude, producing GDP per square meter in excess 
of US$30 million (World Bank 2009). 
Primary cities in both developing and developed countries account for a 
disproportionate share of national GDP. For example, Mexico City contrib-
uted 30 percent of Mexico’s GDP in 2005 and occupied just 0.1 percent 
of its land. Similarly, Budapest, Casablanca, Lagos, Nairobi, and Riyadh 
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Figure 3.1 Relationship between GDP and Spatial Concentration
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contributed around 20 percent of the country’s GDP, while occupying 
less than 1 percent of its land. Faster urbanization, which occurs at early 
stages of development and is now taking place in the developing world, 
is associated with higher total GDP growth that then levels off (figure 
3.2). Furthermore, the geographic concentration of population, GDP, and 
household consumption rises sharply with development, then levels off 
(World Bank 2009).
Rural-Urban Dichotomies and Development
The “bumpy” nature of the economic and urban landscape has implica-
tions for economic welfare, living standards, and poverty that become 
more pronounced as countries develop (World Bank 2009). Rising 
income inequality accompanies urbanization initially, but then declines as 
urbanization takes hold. Rural-urban disparities among today’s developed 
countries have largely disappeared (figure 3.3). 
However, rural-urban disparities in productivity and income are very 
much part of the economic landscape in developing countries, which are 
still in the first phase of urbanization. As occurred for the developed 
countries before them, the disparities in consumption, social services, and 
productivity diminish with urbanization. World Bank (2009, 65) notes, 
“Most developing countries have passed the peak in their rural-urban 
disparities” and have made considerable progress toward achieving the 
Millennium Development Goals. Convergence takes place more rapidly 
when the economy is more urbanized, as has occurred in China, India, 
and the Philippines (figure 3.4). 
According to Cohen (2004, 37), “Ease of transportation and commu-
nication has blurred the distinction between urban and rural areas.” In 
some areas of the world, this has led to the emergence of new types of 
settlement systems that do not belong in the rural or urban classification. 
An example, from Pacific Asia, is the extended metropolitan areas called 
desakota. In these settlements, the geography is rural, with much of the 
land under cultivation, but the income derives from nonagricultural 
sources;3 for example, inhabitants are employed in nonfarm jobs or com-
mute to the city for work. Cohen also notes that the nature of agricultural 
work in these regions has shifted to higher-value production. In areas that 
are already highly urbanized, such as countries in Latin America, there is 
little point in continuing to differentiate human settlement into urban 
and rural areas. What is needed is an appreciation of the changing spatial 
context in a predominantly urban environment. Cohen (2004) refers to 
the experience in Mexico, where a highly monocentric system of cities 
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became, over two decades between 1980 and 2000, a polycentric system 
with nine large metropoles. Greater use of satellites and geo-coding of 
census and survey data enable different conceptualizations and measure-
ments of spatial concentration. One spatial form that has emerged over 
the past 20–30 years is the city-region. According to Cohen (2004, 38), 
“The ‘city-region’ can be identified loosely by the extent and nature of 
economic activity within an extended economic zone surrounding the 
city proper.” Bangkok is one such example, containing more than 17 mil-
lion people and expected to extend more than 200 kilometers from its 
center by 2010. These city-regions have evolved to house large-scale 
capital investments, such as airports and manufacturing plants, located on 
the urban fringe, and the core has become “the command center” for 
regional or global businesses, offering telecommunications, banking, law, 
financial management, information services, and management consulting 
services, for example (Cohen 2004). 
Income disparity within a city is a phenomenon that many developing 
cities experience. This disparity is visible in the slums—chronically over-
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crowded dwellings of poor quality in underserved areas within cities 
(World Bank 2009).4 Slums are a part of rapid urbanization—as labor 
markets expand to fulfill demand from industries and services, labor 
moves to cities. Underdeveloped land markets are unable to cope with 
increasing urbanization, and slums emerge. For many slum-dwellers, 
the proximity to the large city provides opportunities for economic 
gain. Many residents in the Dharavi slum in Mumbai started their own 
businesses after the state government provided limited rights over 
their dwellings and access to water and power (World Bank 2009). 
Henderson (2010) is less sanguine about the emergence of slums and 
suggests that the favela- or slum-style development of Latin American 
cities is a result of local government policy that favors certain areas by 
restraining inmigration.5 
Unprecedented Volumes of Population
The take-off in urbanization originated in nineteenth-century Great 
Britain. The urban share of population in 1800 was 19.2 percent, increas-
ing rapidly to 40.0 percent by 1820. Urbanization spread to the new 
world—Canada and United States—by the mid-nineteenth century. The 
pace of urbanization in Europe and North America at the end of the 
nineteenth century was 7.7 percentage points over the 20 years from 
1880 to 1900. This was not unlike the pace of urbanization for the devel-
oping countries between 1985 and 2005, which experienced median and 
mean absolute increases of 7.1 and 8.0 percentage points, respectively. 
There are two ways in which the urbanization story for the developing 
world today differs from the experience of the developed world during 
the mid-to-late nineteenth century. The first is the sheer size of popula-
tion. As one example, China added 225 million people to its towns and 
cities between 1985 and 2002, almost the entire population of the United 
States (World Bank 2009). Over the 10 years beginning in 1985, the 
developing world experienced an increase in its urban population of 
8.3 million, close to three times the increase in population witnessed by 
many countries in Europe and North America in the final two decades of 
the nineteenth century (World Bank 2009). Furthermore, the megacities 
in the developing world are unprecedented in their size and number 
(figure 3.5). The second way in which the developing countries are expe-
riencing a different pattern of urbanization is in public services. Cities in 
developing countries today are benefiting from advances in public health 
and medicine and improvements in water systems. Cities in developed 
countries at similar stages of urbanization in the nineteenth century had 
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Figure 3.5 Change in Urban Population with and without China and India, 
1985–2005
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poorer health and lower life expectancy than rural areas (World Bank 
2009). 
Urbanization in Developing Countries
Cohen (2004) summarizes the major differences in urbanization experi-
enced by the developing regions and identifies some of the challenges in 
the coming decades. The discussion is summarized in table 3.1. Enormous 
interregional and intraregional differences are evident in the pattern of 
Table 3.1 Regional Differences in Urbanization
Region
Rate of 
urbanization (%)
Characteristics of urbanization1950 2000
Latin America and 
the Caribbean 
42 75 Urban primacy; many cities with more than 1 million people; reverse polarization; spatial polarization 
 between rich and poor; long tradition of urbanization in some countries;a most Caribbean countries have 
a high rate of urbanization, with Haiti as an exception.
South Asia 18 27 Population becoming increasingly urban; extreme poverty and depravation, creating enormous urban 
 management challenges; region is home to 5 of the world’s 30 largest cities: Mumbai, Kolkata, and 
Dehli (India), Dhaka (Bangladesh), and Karachi (Pakistan); improved modes of transportation have extended 
the reach of urban areas and blurred the distinction between rural and urban—desakota; the majority of 
land is under cultivation, but nonfarm jobs are an important source of employment and income; region will 
be home to three of the world’s five largest urban agglomerations;b most urban growth in the future will 
take place in smaller cities and towns.
East Asia and 
the Pacific 
— 38 Areas that have integrated into the global economy experienced rapid urban transformation that is now 
 being repeated in the newly industrializing economies;c special economic zonesd along China’s coastal 
 regions were a catalyst for industrialization and urbanization; population projections suggest that the 
1.25 billion additional people by 2030 will be absorbed into urban areas and that 54% of the population 
will be urban by 2030.
Former Soviet 
republics
— — Historically, government determined the nature, scale, and spatial distribution of economic activities; cities 
were planned in concentric circles with large industrial plants and large-scale housing estates; the end of 
the Cold War and collapse of the Soviet Union had huge economic, social, and demographic consequences 
that were most apparent in the cities.
Middle East and 
North Africa
27 58 Less diversity in urbanization among countries in the region compared to other regions; the need for access 
to water, rapid industrialization, and high levels of international labor migration to oil-rich Gulf states 
 resulted in urban population of more than 50% and more than 85% in many countries;e socioeconomic 
and political heterogeneity within the region results in a wide variety of urban problems and challenges.
(continued next page)
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Sub-Saharan  Africa 15 38 Least developed and least urbanized region of the world; most cities are small by international standards; 
 Kinshasa and Lagos are exceptions; colonialism influenced the structure and pattern of economic growth—
cities displaced traditional networks of trade and influence and attracted migrants; colonial urbanization 
also affected the physical structure and layout of many cities into two highly uneven zones—a European 
space with a high level of infrastructure and an indigenous space with marginal services; postcolonial cities 
grew quickly as a result of high population growth and high spatial mobility; cities are economically 
 marginalized in the new global economy;f challenges for urban authorities are to provide low-income 
 housing, high-quality urban services, and employment.g 
Source: Compiled from Cohen 2004. 
Note: — = Not available.
a. Argentina, Chile, and Uruguay. 
b. Delhi, Dhaka, and Mumbai. 
c. Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, and, the Thailand. 
d. For examp,le, Shantou, Shenzhen, Xiamen, and Zhuhai, which were established as testing grounds for a more open, export-oriented development strategy. 
e. Bahrain, Kuwait, Lebanon, Libya, Qatar, and Saudi Arabia. The Republic of Yemen is an exception, with just 25 percent of the population classified as urban. 
f. “Since the 1970s, urban growth in Africa has been most affected by the region’s economic crisis. A current list of ailments includes declining productivity in agriculture and industry, a 
lack of foreign exchange, increasing indebtedness, worsening balance-of-payments position, and declining real wages” (Cohen 2004, 45). 
g. In addition to economic mismanagement, several countries have suffered from long civil wars, with large numbers moving to cities. Cities are growing despite poor macroeconomic 
performance and without significant foreign direct investment.
Table 3.1 (continued)
Region
Rate of 
urbanization (%)
Characteristics of urbanization1950 2000
40  
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urbanization from the 1950s to the present. In each case, the socioeco-
nomic and political history interacts with the geographic landscape to 
determine the urbanization experience and is affected by globalization, 
democratization, and decentralization. As each region’s and, indeed, each 
country’s socioeconomic, political, and geographic landscape is different, 
so too has been their path of urbanization. 
Latin America and the Caribbean is primarily an urban region with a 
long history, at least in some countries. The overall rate of urbanization 
masks intraregional differences, whereby Argentina, Brazil, Chile, French 
Guiana, Mexico, Uruguay, the República Bolivariana de Venezuela, and 
several Caribbean countries or territories (Anguilla, The Bahamas, Cuba, 
Guadeloupe, Martinique, Puerto Rico, Trinidad and Tobago) are more 
than three-quarters urban, while the Dominican Republic, Guatemala, 
Guyana, and Jamaica are around 50 percent urban. Haiti has the lowest 
rate of urbanization in the region, at around 30 percent. Large-scale rural-
to-urban migration, coupled with industrial policies that targeted cities 
and were predicated on import substitution and protection of infant 
industries, led to a high rate of urban primacy. Cities with more than 
1 million people in the region increased from 6 in 1950 to more than 50 
in 2000, and “the four largest cities—Buenos Aires, Mexico City, Rio de 
Janeiro, and São Paulo—have grown to previously unimaginable sizes” 
(Cohen 2004, 40). Rural-to-urban migration is expected to continue. 
However, industrial policy has shifted to favoring areas outside of the 
megacities. This shift, coupled with congestion costs, economic recession, 
and programs of structural adjustment in the 1990s, has adversely 
affected many Latin American cities and the megacities in particular. 
Urbanization will continue, but at a slower pace. 
At the other end of the spectrum is Sub-Saharan Africa, one of the 
least urbanized regions and where urbanization has been largely predi-
cated on demographic factors and not always for benign reasons (see the 
notes to table 3.1). The region’s colonial past affected the manner in 
which the physical aspects of urban space developed, incorporating two 
zones—a European zone “enjoying a high level of urban infrastructure 
and services and an indigenous space that was marginally serviced” 
(Cohen 2004, 45). Data problems make it difficult to describe urban 
trends. And while fertility rates are falling, population momentum sug-
gests a fast pace of urbanization, such that “before 2023, African society 
will become predominantly urban” (Cohen 2004, 45). 
The Middle East and North Africa region is home to some of the 
world’s oldest cities, yet urbanization was slow to take off, with just 
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27 percent of the population classified as urban in 1950. By 2000, there 
had been an eightfold increase in urban inhabitants. Cairo, Istanbul, and 
Tehran are among the largest urban agglomerations in the world, home to 
more than 7 million inhabitants each. Most countries within the region 
are at least 50 percent urban (Cohen 2004). The challenges for urban 
planners are many, given the socioeconomic and political heterogeneity 
within the region. For example, rural-to-urban migration and population 
growth in the Arab Republic of Egypt have led to many slums and hous-
ing shortages in Cairo. Urban issues in postconflict Iraq “have to do with 
establishing the infrastructure of urban government and other issues of 
rehabilitation and reconstruction” (Cohen 2004, 44). 
China and India dominate the East Asia and the Pacific region, and the 
combined urban population in the region contains just under half of the 
world’s urban population. The vastness of the region makes generaliza-
tions difficult. Cohen (2004) classifies countries based on their experi-
ence with economic development and urbanization (table 3.1). Some 
countries have opened up to the world economy, benefiting from global-
ization and experiencing increasing rates of urbanization. Many of the 
coastal cities have undergone rapid urban transformation as a result. The 
designation of special economic zones in China also led to rapid urban 
transformation in cities such as Dalian, Guangzhou, Qingdao, Shenzhen, 
Tianjin, and Xiamen. 
The pace of urban change in South Asia has been relatively modest 
due largely to the more rural nature of the countries. Significant urban 
challenges abound in an environment with extreme poverty and inade-
quate physical infrastructure. Increasing industrialization has benefited 
urbanization, as have improved modes of transportation that have 
extended the reach of the urban areas, blurring the distinction between 
urban and rural areas. Nonfarm jobs have become a feature of the 
desakota zones around the cities, contributing positively to employment 
and income. 
Urbanization in the former Soviet republics was dictated by govern-
ment decisions relating to the nature, scale, and spatial distribution of 
economic activities. The absence of a land market in cities led to a large 
amount of unused land throughout the city. Large-scale industrial pro-
duction was favored over the service or retail sectors. Moreover, many of 
these industrial production plants were kept in operation long after they 
had ceased to be profitable. The fallout once the Soviet Union collapsed 
was felt most strongly in the cities, with enormous declines in output, 
“rapid impoverishment of large sections of society, great uncertainty 
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about the future, and a fundamental reevaluation of the location, func-
tioning, and organization of productive activity” (Cohen 2004, 43). The 
social, economic, and demographic consequences were also unprece-
dented, with declining rates of marriage, birth, and male life expectancy.
Key Features of Cities in Developing Countries
Duranton (2008) provides a theoretical framework in which he examines 
the key features of cities in developing countries, first from a static effi-
ciency perspective and then from a dynamic growth perspective. He aug-
ments the theoretical discussion with examples from the empirical 
literature, where relevant and where available. 
The literature on cities in developing economies, although much thin-
ner in volume, is nevertheless consistent with the more voluminous lit-
erature on cities in developed economies in supporting an upward-sloping 
wage curve, costs of living that rise with city size, a bell-shape net wage 
curve, and some labor mobility driven by net wage differentials (Duranton 
2008).6 Various studies on agglomeration economies identify both local-
ization effects (agglomeration effects take place within sectors) and 
urbanization effects (agglomeration effects take place between sectors) 
for cities in developing countries (table 3.2).7 Localization economies 
foster specialized cities, while urbanization economies foster diversified 
cities. However, cities in developing countries are rarely specialized, espe-
cially when compared with cities in the developed countries. Despite 
some caveats with regard to the data, the evidence suggests the existence 
of both diversified and specialized cities in the developing regions.8 
Turning to the labor supply curve and mobility, the literature suggests 
that internal migration flows in developing countries are consistent with 
an upward-sloping labor supply curve but that mobility is not perfect 
(Henderson 2008). Brueckner (1990) and Ravallion and Wodon (1999) 
find that the direction of migration flows is consistent with existing dif-
ferences in net wages. Henderson (2008) concludes that movements in 
the labor supply curve are driven largely by what is happening in the 
countryside. For example, Barrios, Bertinelli, and Strobl (2006) note that 
climate change that affects living standards in rural areas gives rise to 
mobility to the cities. Fay and Opal (1999) suggest that worsening rural 
conditions that lower the labor supply curve lead to urbanization without 
growth. These “negative correlations may explain why many developing 
countries attempt to restrain urbanization,” yet Henderson finds “scant 
evidence about cities being too large in general” (Henderson 2008, 18, 19). 
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Table 3.2 A Dozen Economies of Scale
Type of economy 
of scale
Static or 
dynamic Example
Internal
1. Pecuniary Firms are able to purchase intermediate inputs at volume 
discounts.
Technological
2.  Static 
technological
Static Average costs fall because of fixed costs of operating a 
plant.
3.  Dynamic 
 technological
Dynamic Firms learn to operate a plant more efficiently over time.
External or agglomeration
Localization
4. “Shopping” Static Shoppers are attracted to places where there are many 
sellers.
5.  “Adam Smith” 
 specialization
Static Outsourcing allows both the upstream input suppliers 
and downstream firms to profit from productivity gains 
because of specialization.
6.  “Marshall” labor 
pooling
Static Workers with industry-specific skills are attracted to a 
 location where there is greater concentration.
7.  “Marshall-Arrow-
Romer” learning 
by doing
Dynamic Reductions in costs arise from repeated and continuous 
production activity over time and spill over between 
firms in the same place.
Urbanization
8.  “Jane Jacobs” 
innovation
Static The more different things are done locally, the more 
opportunity there is for observing and adapting ideas 
from others.
9.  “Marshall” labor 
 pooling
Static Workers in an industry bring innovations to firms in other 
industries; this is similar to number 6, but the benefit 
arises from the existence of diverse industries in one 
location.
10.  “Adam Smith” 
 division of labor
Static Similar to number 5 above, the main difference being that 
the division of labor is made possible by the existence of 
many different buying industries in the same place.
11.  “Romer” 
endogenous 
growth
Dynamic The larger the market, the higher the profit; the more 
attractive the location to firms, the more jobs there are, 
the more labor pools there are, the larger the market, 
and so on.
12.  “Pure” 
 agglomeration
Fixed costs of infrastructure are spread over more 
 taxpayers; diseconomies arise from congestion and 
 pollution.
Source: World Bank 2009.
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He refers to the strong barriers to labor mobility that have made Chinese 
cities too small, as examined in Au and Henderson (2006a, 2006b), but 
other examples are difficult to find. Henderson (2008) questions whether 
restrictions on labor mobility, either because of a misguided application 
of the Harris and Todaro (1970) model9 or because of a policy of restric-
tions, may be part of a political-economy equilibrium and therefore 
difficult to change. 
What is evident in developing economies is a large preponderance of 
urban primacy, where the largest city is often disproportionately bigger 
than the second largest city. Henderson (2008) disagrees with the trade 
policy arguments that have been used to explain urban primacy on the 
grounds of theoretical ambiguity and available empirical evidence.10 He 
suggests that urban primacy is due to political and institutional factors. 
These factors are difficult to quantify in terms of their magnitude and 
direction. Ades and Glaeser (1995) and Davis and Henderson (2003) 
suggest a positive relationship between urban primacy and unstable and 
undemocratic regimes. Henderson (2008) suggests that the many regula-
tions and permits that govern economic activity in developing countries 
may also favor urban primacy, as those nearer to the center of power 
may find it easier to obtain permits or circumvent regulations. The 
political economy associated with urban primacy may be very difficult 
to break. Henderson (2008) suggests that administrative deregulation, as 
in the Republic of Korea, may be an effective tool to limit primacy, but 
at the end of the day, the issue appears to be one of political economy. 
What one also finds in some cities in developing economies is the 
existence of a dual housing sector. This is manifest by a division between 
formal housing and squatter settlements. Henderson (2008, 29) notes 
that in “some large developing country cities, more than half the popula-
tion live in squatter settlements.” In examining the reasons for squatter 
settlements, he concludes the following:
• If squatter settlements were simply a matter of some of the poor opting 
out of formal housing, policy choices would revolve around issues of 
redistribution and the most effective way to do this.
• Squatter settlements arise because of a lack of effective, formal prop-
erty titles (which also have knock-on effects for enterprise develop-
ment and female labor supply).
• Squatter settlements may be the outcome of policy distortions—for 
example, binding minimum lot size and rent controls. 
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• Squatter settlements may not be so cheap if the inhabitants have to 
pay high prices for necessities such as water, for example, or, in the 
absence of titles, have to pay for some form of protection (Henderson 
2008). 
Based on these points, Henderson concludes that regulatory constraints 
in the formal housing sector, while limiting the size of the city, will be 
crowded out by the growth of squatter settlements. Removing regulatory 
constraints is socially desirable. Titling policies are desirable, and these 
should be grounded in the legal and taxation system. There is a political 
economy of squatter settlements, with many vested interests that benefit 
from this undesirable status quo (Henderson 2008). 
In summary, cities in developing countries would benefit from 
(a) eliminating primary city favoritism, (b) solving the biases that lead 
to squatter settlements by implementing a titling policy, and (c) not 
discouraging the internal migration of people. These policy suggestions 
also hold when examining the features of cities from a dynamic growth 
perspective. However, pursuing such policies is demanding,11 and the 
political economy of these issues may be difficult to address (Henderson 
2008).
Conclusion
Urbanization—the movement of people into cities—has implications for 
the economic development of the land area that this population will 
occupy or inhabit. The chapter examined several features of urbanization 
associated with economic development. Economic density—the output 
produced per unit of land—is a principal feature of urban transition and 
growth. It rises with urbanization and becomes ever more concentrated 
as the structure of output changes from manufacturing to services. The 
economic landscape is bumpy, with some areas exhibiting higher rates of 
economic density. This has implications for economic welfare, living stan-
dards, and poverty. Initially, inequality rises with economic density and 
urbanization, but over time, convergence occurs between the rural and 
urban areas, blurring the dichotomy between them. Urbanization in the 
developing world differs from that in the developed. First, it differs in its 
history: the volume of people moving into cities in the developing world 
today is unprecedented. Furthermore, advances in security, health, and 
sanitation suggest that the experience is different than what occurred in 
the developed world when urbanization was beginning to take place. The 
Urban Transition and Growth       47
chapter also examined regional differences in urbanization for the devel-
oping countries and noted some of the facets of urbanization—primacy, 
squatter settlements, discouragement of city growth—that characterize 
many developing cities today. 
Notes
 1. The population size of cities is examined in chapter 2. Chapter 4 examines 
territorial specialization of cities.
 2. One may argue that developments in transportation and in information and 
communication technology dispute this claim. However, the raison d’être of 
cities and urban areas is the face-to-face communication they facilitate. 
 3. Remittances from family members working in the city also constitute income 
to the deskota (Cohen 2004).
 4. Examples include Dharavi in Mumbai, Kibra and Huruma in Nairobi, 
Washington in Abidjan, Majboor Nagar and Kanchan Puri in Delhi, San 
Fernando in Buenos Aires, and Rocinha in Rio de Janeiro (World Bank 
2009). 
 5. China provides an example. An explicit policy limits migration to certain key 
cities by making living conditions unpleasant for migrants. This supersedes a 
less explicit policy that used the hukou (the system of household registration) 
to constrain rural people to live in rural areas but take industrial jobs and 
controlled migrants to ensure that urbanization was localized and diffuse 
(Henderson 2010). 
 6. Empirical studies on the cost-of-living and bell-shape net wage curve for 
developing economy cities are scant and not examined here.
 7. Duranton (2008) cites Henderson (1988) for localization economies in Brazil; 
Henderson, Lee, and Lee (2001) for localization economies for Korean indus-
tries, particularly traditional industries; Lall, Shalizi, and Deichmann (2004) 
for India; and Deichmann et al. (2005) for Indonesia. Henderson (2009) also 
finds urbanization economies for advanced sectors in Korea. Furthermore, 
Lall, Funderburg, and Yepes (2004) find evidence, albeit weak, of urbaniza-
tion economies in India, while Lall, Koo, and Chakravorty (2003) find stron-
ger evidence for India. Deichmann et al. (2005) find mild evidence of 
urbanization effects for several sectors in Indonesia, and Au and Henderson 
(2006a, 2006b) find both urbanization and localization effects for several cit-
ies in China. Henderson (2005) and Overman and Venables (2005) review 
the literature on agglomeration economies in developing countries. 
 8. Duranton (2008, 17) suggests two main criticisms. First, the presence of 
agglomeration economies may reflect the sorting of “more productive work-
ers in bigger and more specialized cities, rather than true agglomeration 
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 economies.” Second, the data represent the formal sector. Case study evi-
dence suggests that the informal sector is a strong contributor to agglomera-
tion economies. 
 9. The argument for dual labor markets “was first developed by Harris and 
Todaro (1970) and has been extremely influential in policy circles.” Workers 
in the formal sector are paid higher wages in urban than in rural areas. “The 
initial earnings gap between the rural and formal urban sector causes workers 
to move to the city” (Henderson 2008, 27).
 10. Trade liberalization does reduce urban primacy in the model of Krugman and 
Livas Elizondo (1996), in which all cities are able to import differentiated 
goods. This equalization of market potential reduces the tendency for 
agglomeration of manufacturing in a single core city. Henderson (2008) 
questions the assumption of equalization and suggests that trade liberaliza-
tion is more likely to benefit cities in coastal regions or cities close to trading 
partners, thus reinforcing their dominance. Empirical studies find weak evi-
dence for urban primacy and are beleaguered by other variables that are 
correlated with trade. According to Henderson (2008, 20), “Ades and Glaeser 
(1995); Nitsch (2006) suggest that trade plays no systematic role with 
respect to urban primacy.” 
 11. Henderson (2008, 44) writes, “Such an agenda is rather demanding since it 
includes raising the efficiency of public good provision, lowering barriers to 
mobility, improving market access to allow secondary cities to develop, and so 
forth.”
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C H A P T E R  4
Spatial Concentration and 
Specialization
The chapter presents a further typology of space based on today’s 
 specialization of cities. Urban specialization arises from the trade-off 
between scale economies—internal and localized external economies 
that include knowledge economies1 arising from the education level of 
city inhabitants—and diseconomies in own industry and in living (hous-
ing costs including rents, crime, overcrowding, land use).2 Industries 
that benefit from local agglomeration economies as well as internal 
economies are more likely to reside in larger cities. Industries that 
depend on their own activity for productivity improvements are likely 
to locate in small, specialized cities where own industry economies of 
scale are maximized (Henderson 2010).3 
Cities in developing countries tend to host many specializations. 
Territorial specialization has not yet taken place, as urbanization is still 
progressing. Furthermore, “The important inheritance of colonially cre-
ated port cities, the economic necessity to concentrate the first major 
efforts in infrastructure, the availability of skilled labour in a situation 
of great skills scarcities, the dependence upon imported manufacturing 
inputs and services” are suggestive of why developing cities lack territo-
rial specialization (Harris 1991, 26). The largest cities are the most 
accessible to foreign investors and are “incubators for new firms trying 
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to discover the best product lines and production methods” (Henderson 
2010, 524). 
Cities in developed economies are highly specialized, given their 
advanced stage of economic development and history of urbanization. 
Small and medium-size cities in Japan, the Republic of Korea, the United 
States, and other countries are highly specialized and have been for some 
time (Henderson 2010). When heavy manufacturing was a major part of 
the economy, the typology of cities included cities producing steel, tex-
tiles, automobiles, ships, aircraft, pulp and paper, and petrochemicals. 
Henderson (1974), using data from the United States, estimates that 
between 50 and 60 percent of the urban labor force lies in the nontraded 
sector (wholesale, retail, personal services, construction, utilities), with 
the remaining share engaged in the traded sector.4 In current times, small 
cities have become specialized in consumer service activities such as 
retirement, health, and insurance services (Henderson 2010). Very little 
research has yet been carried out on the scale economies arising from 
service activities.
Specialization of Cities
Cities have specialized in certain activities since the fourteenth century, and 
early writers in urban hierarchy have classified cities based on their engage-
ment in primary industries, secondary industries, and tertiary industries 
(MacKenzie 1933). Later, Ogburn (1937) classified seven types of cities 
based on their industrial and economic activity. These included (a) trading 
cities, (b) factory cities, (c) transportation cities, (d) mining cities, (e) plea-
sure cities, (f) health resort cities, and (g) college cities. Duncan and Reiss 
(1956) classified cities based on (a) regional location, (b) economic activity, 
(c) economic specialty, and (d) population size and growth rate. The 
authors noted the interdependence of cities in the urban hierarchy. 
Table 4.1 shows the spatial allocation of manufacturing and business 
services in U.S. cities for 1910 and 1995. In 1910, manufacturing was part 
of the urban landscape. As urbanization and development continued, 
manufacturing activity was replaced by business services. Henderson 
(2010) cites three principal reasons cities become inefficient for stan-
dardized manufacturing:
1. Firms and industries as a whole have accomplished much learning and 
adoption of foreign technologies and no longer benefit so much from 
the learning environment of the largest cities.
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2. Cities become very expensive locations, with high rents and labor costs. 
Infrastructure and skilled labor are in greater relative abundance in 
other locations.
3. The business service sector is expanding, demanding locations inside 
large cities and outbidding manufacturing for central city lands in them 
(Henderson 2010).
Henderson (2010) posits that territorial specialization is associated 
with a certain population size. Business and professional services suggest 
a large city by population size. Similarly, high-tech industries that 
undergo substantial technological progress locate in larger cities, where 
they also benefit from local agglomeration—for example, the aircraft 
industry in Los Angeles or the research and development (R&D) seg-
ment of the electronics industry in Tokyo (Henderson 2010). Cities like 
London and New York are global financial service cities, with a very 
small manufacturing sector (table 4.2 gives the example of New York). 
Strong institutions in the economic and legal environment contribute to 
Table 4.1 Manufacturing and Business Services in the United States, 
by Size of City, 1910 and 1995
% of employment
Metro area population
Share of 
employment in 
manufacturing
Share of 
employment in 
business services
Share of 
employment in 
consumer services
1910
Four largest MSAsa 35.1 6.2 18.5
Medium-size MSAsb 35.3 5.1 18.2
Small MSAsc 30.9 4.6 20.1
Nonmetro area 25.1 4.4 24.3
National average 30.2 5.0 21.2
1995
Over 2.5 million 14.3 21.3 23.3
1 million to 2.5 million 15.2 19.3 22.8
500,000 to 1 million 15.8 17.7 23.6
250,000 to 500,000 19.1 15.5 23.2
Under 250,000 18.8 13.3 24.6
Nonmetro area 26.9 9.1 22.6
National average 17.2 17.7 23.2
Source: Holko 1999. 
Note: MSA = metropolitan statistical area.
a. Refers to the largest MSAs (private sector employment over 600,000: New York, Chicago, Boston, Philadelphia).
b. Private sector employment between 100,000 and 600,000
c. Private sector employment under 100,000.
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the development and sustainability of these global cities, which are also 
cultural cities and attract a creative class of worker.
In between the large cities and small and medium-size cities are metro 
areas that are more diverse. Theoretical modeling and empirical work 
suggest that the share of service activity increases in line with the size of 
the metro area (Henderson 2010). 
Cities in developed countries that have made the transition from 
manufacturing to services and have become specialized in various service 
activities represent a new typology of cities. Among this typology are 
knowledge cities, creative cities, global cities, and green (eco) cities. The 
following sections examine this typology.
Knowledge Cities
The comparative advantage of developed economies lies in their knowl-
edge base. The generation and application of the knowledge base define an 
area’s competitiveness and growth at the local, regional, and national lev-
els.5 Knowledge may take the form of investment in R&D, a qualified and 
skilled labor force, high-quality entrepreneurship, or all three. Knowledge 
enhances productivity through innovation in products, services, and pro-
cesses (Lever 2002). Numerous writers attest to the association between 
the urban knowledge base and economic growth and development 
(Knight 1995; Kresl and Singh 1999; Lambooy 2000; Lever 2002). As the 
knowledge base of the city increases, the nature of development changes. 
Knowledge-based services (financial services, insurance, and communica-
tions) outgrew knowledge-based manufacturing industries (high-technol-
ogy and medium-technology industries) for the Organisation for Economic 
Co-operation and Development (OECD) countries as a whole between 
1985 and 1998 (Lever 2002). 
Table 4.2 Share of New York County (Manhattan) in Total Private 
Employment in the United States, 1997
Sector % of private employment
All industries 1.8
Headquarters 3.0
Financial headquarters 11.7
Financial services 12.0
Security brokers 25.0
Business services 7.5
Advertising 15.0
Source: Henderson 2010.
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Critical to the explanation of economic growth and development is 
the distinction between tacit and codified knowledge. Codified knowl-
edge is available to all businesses and at low or zero cost. It does not 
impart any competitive advantage. An example is the Internet. Tacit 
knowledge is available to only limited contacts and is often passed 
through face-to-face communication. It does confer competitive advan-
tage. Large cities, where inhabitants are in contact with one another, 
benefit from tacit knowledge. 
Lever (2002) examines a multidimensional index of the scale of the 
knowledge base for European cities. This study presents a wider defini-
tion of the knowledge base and is a departure from other studies that 
define it as the number of R&D establishments per million inhabitants or 
workers (Lever 2002). Three dimensions of the knowledge base are con-
sidered: tacit knowledge, codified knowledge, and knowledge infrastruc-
ture. Knowledge infrastructure is captured by telecommunications 
infrastructure (table 4.3).
Using the variables listed in table 4.3, Lever (2002) develops a general 
index comprising seven measures: presence of corporate producer service 
companies in the knowledge sectors (finance, law, marketing, research), 
connectivity of the local airport, the hosting of commercial conferences 
and exhibitions, the rate of new enterprise formation, two variables for 
the size of the local universities (number of students and number of pub-
lished academic research papers in science, computing, medicine, and 
technology), and the quality of local telecommunications infrastructure 
(Lever 2002). The index is then applied to 19 European cities that scored 
on at least four of the seven measures,6 and the mean rankings are calcu-
lated. The results are shown in table 4.4.
London and Paris emerge as “world cities” and are ranked in the top 
three positions in all but one of the seven variables (university size). 
National capitals fare well as knowledge-based cities, and many other cit-
ies in Germany also fare well on the knowledge base score. This may 
reflect the decentralized system of government there. Furthermore, the 
knowledge base in London and Paris is so heavily concentrated in the 
finance, law, and administrative sectors that no other cities qualify for 
inclusion. The mean score increases as the rankings fall, and Lever (2002) 
suggests that this may reflect the peripheral location of these cities from 
the center of the European Union. London and Paris fare less well across 
the measures of economic success: annual percentage employment 
change, annual percentage change in gross value added per worker, and 
the shift-share residual, which standardizes for industrial structure at the 
Table 4.3 Dimensions of Knowledge Base: Measures and Results
Dimensions of knowledge base 
and measures Data source Results
Tacit knowledge
(Rank of ) leading world cities in four 
service sectors (accountancy, advertising, 
banking and finance, and law)
Globalization and World Cities Research 
Group (Taylor and Walker 2001)
Alpha cities (London, Milan, Paris) 
Beta cities (Brussels, Madrid, Moscow, Zurich)
Gamma cities (Amsterdam, Barcelona, Berlin, Budapest, 
Copenhagen, Dusseldorf, Geneva, Hamburg, Munich, 
Prague, Rome, Stockholm, Warsaw)
Airport connectivity (number of 
connections and change in number over 
a period, 1991–93) 
Buursink (1994) Amsterdam, Brussels, Copenhagen, Dusseldorf, Frankfurt, 
Geneva, London, Munich, Paris, Vienna, Zurich 
Fairs and trade exhibitions (composite 
index based on local population size, 
rental levels, local per capita income, 
infrastructure, transport, and weather)
Regression study that defined the economic 
advantage to holding fairs and trade 
exhibitions (Rubalcaba-Bermejo and 
Cuadrado-Roura 1995)
Barcelona, Birmingham, Bologna, Cologne, Dusseldorf, 
Frankfurt, Hanover, London, Madrid, Milan, Munich, Paris 
New enterprise formation Registered new businesses (not cited) Not cited
Codified knowledge
Number of students in local universities Local universities (not cited) Not cited
Volume of academic and scientific papers 
in refereed journals
Total number of published papers; number 
of papers per 1,000 inhabitantsa 
(Matthiessen and Schwartz 1999)
Berlin, Cambridge, Copenhagen, Edinburgh-Glasgow, 
London, Madrid, Manchester-Liverpool, Moscow, 
Oxford-Reading, Paris, Randstadt, Stockholm 
Knowledge infrastructure
Quality of telecommunications provision Rankings based on technical definitions of 
the pricing of services, the choice of 
physical infrastructure available, and the 
availability of the most advanced and 
sophisticated connections (Finnie 1998)
Amsterdam, Berlin, Brussels, Frankfurt, London, Madrid, 
Milan, Paris, Stockholm, Zurich 
Source: Compiled from Lever 2002. 
a. Number of papers per 1,000 inhabitants yielded the following rank: Cambridge, Oxford-Reading, Geneva, Basel, Bristol-Cardiff, Zurich, Stockholm, Helsinki, Copenhagen, Randstadt, 
 Munich, Edinburgh-Glasgow.
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start of the period. This may reflect the fact that these cities do not com-
pete with smaller cities once their reliance on financial services, law, and 
administration is taken into account, and the urban agglomeration disec-
onomies of high rents, high living costs, and congestion outweigh the 
knowledge base of these cities. 
Gabe et al. (2010) argue for a broader interpretation of knowledge 
that would combine educational achievement and skills from various 
occupations. Classifying knowledge in this manner identifies clusters of 
U.S. and Canadian metropolitan areas by similar knowledge traits. Their 
study focuses on six specific groupings: making regions, which are char-
acterized by manufacturing activity; thinking regions, characterized by 
knowledge about the arts, humanities, information technology(IT), and 
commerce; comforting regions, with a high knowledge about mental 
health; building regions, with a high knowledge about construction and 
transportation; innovating regions, with a very high knowledge about 
information technology, arts, commerce, and engineering; and  working 
Table 4.4 The Knowledge Base and Economic Performance in Selected Cities
City
Knowledge 
base mean 
score
Annual % 
employment 
change, 
1985–96
Change in gross 
value added 
per worker (%), 
1985–96
Shift-share 
residual, 
1978–96
London 2.8 −0.3 2.0 −25.7
Paris 3.7 −0.1 3.3 −11.8
Frankfurt 6.0 0.2 3.1 6.5
Amsterdam 6.8 2.5 2.0 21.0
Stockholm 7.0 1.0 3.5 8.7
Milan 7.0 0.1 3.0 4.7
Cologne 7.2 0.3 2.7 4.8
Bologna 7.5 0.0 2.9 0.6
Zurich 8.0 1.7 3.3 3.0
Brussels 8.3 −0.8 2.8 −22.1
Madrid 10.0 1.5 4.1 5.5
Munich 10.0 −0.1 3.5 10.6
Copenhagen 10.0 0.2 1.6 −7.1
Dusseldorf 10.3 0.2 2.5 0.6
Barcelona 10.8 1.6 3.3 1.6
Geneva 12.0 1.7 3.0 1.0
Berlin 12.3 1.7 3.5 1.2
Rome 13.3 0.4 2.9 10.5
Vienna 14.5 0.5 2.3 −23.3
Source: Lever 2002.
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regions, characterized by low knowledge in information technology and 
commerce. Using data on occupations in an area provides a broader 
measure of human capital than using just college attainment, because 
this approach captures the skills and knowledge acquired in the work-
place. The authors find that this broader knowledge variable identifies 
clusters and is a better predictor of regional economic development than 
college attainment. Furthermore, in a fixed-effects regression, engineer-
ing, enterprising, and building regions have higher levels of productivity 
and earnings per capita. Teaching, understanding, working, and comfort-
ing regions have lower levels of economic development.
Education Level and City Growth
A significant part of the work on knowledge cities focuses on the relation-
ship between the education level of a city’s inhabitants and its growth. 
Education is an important ingredient in local agglomeration economies, 
and cities, by their nature, speed the accumulation of human capital.7 
Cities with an educated population grow faster than cities where 
inhabitants have less education. Glaeser and Saiz (2004) find this state-
ment to be true for more than a century of data in the United Kingdom 
and the United States. More recently, in the two decades prior to 2000, 
the population of metro areas in which more than 25 percent of adults 
held college degrees grew 45 percent. By contrast, the population in 
metro areas in which less than 10 percent held a college degree grew just 
13 percent. In a similar vein, Shapiro (2006) finds that, during the 
period 1940 to 1990, a 10 percent increase in a metropolitan area’s 
concentration of human capital is associated with an increase in that 
area’s employment of 0.8 percent. Shapiro (2006, 324) refers to a “sub-
stantial body of  literature that confirms this correlation between human 
capital and local area employment (or population) growth.”8 Furthermore, 
Glaeser, Ponzetto, and Tobio (2011) examine the relationship between 
education and city growth and find that, as the share of the adult popu-
lation increased 5 percent in 1970, predicted growth between 1970 and 
2000 increased about 8 percent. Table 4.5 examines the regression 
results from equation 4.1:
 log (Y2000/Y1970) = B * Schooling1970 + Other Controls, (4.1)
where Y denotes one of three outcome variables: population, median 
income, and self-reported housing values. Other controls refers to the 
initial values of population, median income, and housing values and three 
region dummies (the Midwest is omitted). The equation permits the 
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Table 4.5 Metropolitan Area Regressions
Indicator
Log change in population, 
1970–2000
Log change in median income 
(2000 US$), 1970–2000
Log change in median housing 
value (2000 US$), 1970–2000
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Log population, 1970 −0.007
(0.019)
−0.007
(0.019)
0.003
(0.006)
0.003
(0.006) 
0.056
 (0.013)**
0.057
(0.013)**
Log median income in 
2000 and 1970
−0.769
(0.191)**
−0.841
(0.191)**
−0.391
(0.061)** 
−0.403
(0.062)**
−0.297
(0.133)*
−0.328
(0.135)*
Log median housing 
value in 2000 and 1970
0.273
(0.117)*
0.272
(0.115)*
0.173
(0.037)**
0.174
(0.038)**
−0.008
(0.081)
0.004
(0.082)
South dummy 0.146
(0.054)**
−0.133
(0.122)
−0.010
(0.018)
0.015
(0.040)
0.028
(0.038)
0.012
(0.087)
East dummy −0.054
(0.057)
−0.077
(0.158)
−0.044
(0.016)**
−0.039
(0.052)
0.054
(0.040)
0.041
(0.112)
West dummy 0.384
(0.051)**
0.632
(0.135)**
0.797
(0.142)**
−0.145
(0.044)
0.299
(0.035)**
0.052
(0.096)
College completion 
among population 
25 and older 1970
1.528
(0.445)**
0.797
(0.142)**
0.802
(0.310)*
South dummy * % BA 
in 1970
3.840
(0.772)**
0.673
(0.252)**
0.405
(0.548)
East dummy * % BA 
in 1970
1.498
(1.310)
0.839
(0.428)
0.424
(0.929)
West dummy * % BA 
in 1970
−0.573
(0.812)
1.364
(0.265)**
2.257
(0.576)**
Midwest dummy * % 
BA in 1970
1.314
(0.597)*
0.583
(0.195)**
0.363
(0.424)
Constant 5.264
(1.576)**
6.074
(1.595)**
2.275
(0.504)**
2.407
(0.521)**
2.81
(1.100)*
3.040
(1.132)**
Number of observations 257 257 257 257 257 257
R2 0.427 0.466 0.379 0.396 0.339 0.362
Source: Glaeser, Ponzetto, and Tobio 2011.
Note: Standard errors in parentheses. * = significant at 5 percent, ** = significant at 1 percent.
Table 4.5 (continued)
Indicator
Log change in population, 
1970–2000
Log change in median income 
(2000 US$), 1970–2000
Log change in median housing 
value (2000 US$), 1970–2000
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
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impact of education to be estimated separately by region (South, East, 
West, and Midwest) and is thus a departure from the approach of other 
studies of education and city growth. B  interacts with four region dum-
mies and thereby allows the impact of schooling on population, income, 
and housing value growth to differ by region.
The second regression in table 4.5 allows the impact of education in 
1970 to differ by region. In the South, which shows the strongest effect, 
“a 5 percent increase in the share of the adult population with a college 
degree in 1970 is associated with 19 percent faster population growth” 
(Glaeser, Ponzetto, and Tobio 2011, 28). The results for the Midwest are 
also significant, and a 5.0 percent increase in the share of adults with a 
college degree in 1970 is associated with a 6.5 percent predicted increase 
in population. The Northeast shows the second largest coefficient of the 
group and is similar to the coefficient for the national average, but it is 
insignificant. The coefficient for the West is negative and insignificant. 
Regressions 3 and 4 in table 4.5 examine the effect of median growth 
in income. Glaeser, Ponzetto, and Tobio (2011) note that mean income 
reverts, except perhaps in areas with high housing values, which may 
indicate a migration of wealthier people to areas with more amenities. 
Coefficients on the regional dummies, apart from the West, where 
income increased the least, are statistically insignificant. There is a strong 
association between median income and initial education levels: “As the 
share of population with college degrees in 1970 increased by 5 percent, 
median income rose by 4 percent more since then” (Glaesser, Ponzetto, 
and Tobio 2011, 28). Moreover, this may reflect a return to skills and the 
tendency of highly educated people to move to areas already rich in 
human capital (see also Moretti 2003). Education has a positive impact 
on median income growth at the regional level (regression 4). The biggest 
impact is in the West (0.7 log points increase for a 5 percent increase in 
the share of those with a college degree), and the least impact is in the 
Midwest (less than half that found in the West).
Regressions 5 and 6 examine the impact of education on the appre-
ciation of median housing values. The West saw much greater apprecia-
tion in housing values compared to the other regions. In total, housing 
values increased about 4 percent more when the share of the population 
in 1970 with a college degree increased by 5 percentage points (Glaeser, 
Ponzetto, and Tobio 2011). Finally, turning to regression 6, the results 
indicate a much larger appreciation in the West: prices increased by more 
than 10 percent for a 5 percentage point increase in the 1970 share of 
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population with a college degree. The results for the other regions are far 
lower and statistically insignificant. 
Further studies examine the relationship between a city’s education 
level and other economic variables, such as migration, wages, and sectoral 
employment. These studies are representative of the empirical work on 
knowledge cities that deal with omitted-variable bias.9 Table 4.6 lists 
these variables and the studies that have used them.
The results from the empirical studies in table 4.6 show the positive 
impact of knowledge, measured by college education, on growth of the 
city or metropolitan statistical area (MSA). Controlling for other growth-
inducing variables raises this positive impact at the level of the MSA. 
Glaeser and Saiz (2004) find little impact at the level of the city and 
attribute this to the high level of service employment or better weather 
at this spatial level. However, college education is a more powerful pre-
dictor of growth at the MSA level, becoming even stronger when other 
control variables are included. Moretti (2003) refers to the long-run 
trend of increasing education in the United States. The features of this 
are a wide dispersion of human capital among cities (between 1990 and 
2000, the fraction of college graduates rose from about 10 percent in the 
least educated cities to above 40 percent in the most educated cities 
[Moretti 2003]) and an increasing stock of college graduates (cities with 
a larger stock of human capital in 1990 experienced larger increases over 
the next decade). 
For the most part, empirical studies of the knowledge city have 
focused on college education. Glaeser and Saiz (2004) also include the 
high school dropout rate as an alternative measure. This alternative mea-
sure is a stronger (negative) correlate of education at the level of the city 
compared to the MSA—the correlation between the share of high school 
dropouts and population growth is −28 percent for cities and −18 per-
cent for metropolitan areas. The correlations suggest that the impact of 
higher education may be more important at the MSA level, whereas the 
impact of low education is more important at the city level. Controlling 
for high school dropout rates and unemployment rates10 at the city level 
significantly reduces the impact of higher education on city growth. 
Avoiding low human capital11 matters more for smaller units of geogra-
phy. Shapiro (2006) finds no evidence to indicate a growth effect for high 
school graduates. 
The empirical studies also attempt to identify the connection between 
skills and growth. For the most part, productivity accounts for this 
 connection, but some authors (Glaeser and Saiz 2004; Shapiro 2006) 
63  
Table 4.6 Underpinnings of Knowledge Cities
Source and 
dependent variable Independent variable Observations Results
Shapiro (2006)
Growth in 
employment
Initial employment; log % prime-
age white males with a college 
degree
495 metropolitan areas, 
1940–90
A 10% increase in share of college-educated residents is 
associated with an 0.8% increase in employment.
Growth in wages Initial wages; log % prime-age white 
males with a college degree
495 metropolitan areas, 
1940–90
A 10% increase in share of college-educated residents is 
associated with a 0.2% increase in wages.
Growth in rental price Initial rental price; log % prime-age 
white males with a college degree
495 metropolitan areas, 
1940–90
A 10% increase in share of college-educated residents is 
associated with a 0.7% increase in rental price.
Growth in house value Initial house value; log % prime-age 
white males with college degree
495 metropolitan areas, 
1940–90
A 10% increase in share of college-educated residents is 
associated with a 0.7% increase in house value.
Moretti (2003)
Change in percent of 
college educated
Initial level of college; population; 
family income; black*; Hispanic; 
immigrants*; agriculture; 
manufacturing*; high tech; 
Northeast; Midwest; South; West
237 metropolitan areas, 
1990–2000
Overall fraction of college graduates grew faster in cities 
that were larger and richer in 1990; the percentage of 
Hispanics is negatively correlated with changes in college 
share; the percentage of agricultural jobs is negatively 
correlated with changes in college share; the percentage 
of high-tech jobs is a strong predictor of change in college 
share; change in college share was 3.7% (northeastern 
cities), 3.6% (midwestern), 3.2% (western), and 2.8% 
(southern).
Winters (2008)
ln in-migration Share with a bachelor’s degree 323 PMSAs/MSAs, 
1995–2000 
A 10% increase in share with a bachelor’s degree increases 
inmigration by 5%.
ln out-migration Share with a bachelor’s degree 323 PMSAs/MSAs, 
1995–2000
A 10% increase in share with a bachelor’s degree increases 
outmigration by 3%.
(continued next page)
ln net migration Share with a bachelor’s degree 323 PMSAs/MSAs, 
1995–2000
A 10% increase in share with a bachelor’s degree increases 
net migration by 2%.
ln in-migration, ln out-
migration, ln net 
migration
Share with bachelor’s degree; 
population; median family income; 
manufacturing share; January 
temperature; July temperature; 
precipitation; Midwest; South; 
West
323 PMSAs/MSAs, 
1995–2000
Adding controls raises the coefficients on share with a 
bachelor’s degree; population and median family income 
have a negative effect on inmigration, outmigration, and 
net migration; increases in the average January daily low 
temperature increase both the inmigration rate and the 
net migration rate; increases in average July daily 
temperature increases net migration.
Glaeser and Saiz (2004)
Difference in ln 
population between 
census years
Share of population with a college 
degree
723 cities
318 MSAs, 1970, 1980, 
1990, 2000
For the MSA regressions, a 1% increase in share of adult 
population with a degree increases the decadal growth 
rate by approximately 0.5%. For the city-level regressions, a 
1% increase in the share of adult population with a degree 
increases the decadal growth rate by approximately 0.2%.
Difference in ln 
population between 
census years
Share of population with a college 
degree; initial level of population; 
Ln average heating days; Ln 
average precipitation; share of 
workers in manufacturing; share of 
workers in professional services; 
share of workers in trade; 
unemployment rate; share of high 
school dropouts
723 citiesa
318 MSA,
1970, 1980, 1990, 2000
Controlling for the listed independent variables shows little 
effect on future city growth but does increase the impact 
of the education variable on the future growth rate of the 
MSA.
Source: Glaeser and Salt 2004; Moretti 2003; Shapiro 2006; Winters 2008.
Note: PMSA = primary metropolitan statistical area; MSA = standard metropolitan statistical area. * = results are insignificant and not reported in the results column.
a. Cities with a population of more than 30,000 in 1970. 
Table 4.6 (continued)
Source and 
dependent variable Independent variable Observations Results
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also suggest consumption or amenity factors. Glaeser and Saiz (2004) 
suggest that movement in wages and house prices sheds light on the 
productivity and consumption story. For example, increases in nominal 
wages and house prices stem from production-led growth, while 
decreases in real wages stem from consumption-led growth. However, 
Shapiro (2006, 330) finds that controlling for wages and rents implies 
that one-third of the employment growth effect stems from “rapid 
improvement in the quality of life.” The quality-of-life explanation oper-
ates through consumer amenities, such as bars and restaurants, rather 
than from improvements in crime, schools, or pollution (Shapiro 2006). 
The focus on quality of life and consumption-led growth has led to 
research into the concept of the creative city, discussed below. In fact, 
the creative city is a refinement of the knowledge city.
The Creative City
The concept of the creative city is a late twentieth-century construct. It 
gives a spatial context to creativity—the creative pursuits of individuals 
and industries—and suggests economic development potential. The 
creative city has been viewed as a home for the creative class (Florida 
2002), as an engine of structural change, as a catalyst for economic revi-
talization, as a facilitator of public and private partnership, and as an 
urban success story. The creative city typology can be applied to both 
large and small cities, dependent on a number of factors, which are dis-
cussed further below. 
The Creative Class
Florida (2002, 18) asserts that the creative class, “a fast-growing, highly 
educated, and well-paid segment of the workforce on whose efforts corpo-
rate profits and economic growth increasingly depend,” is critical for eco-
nomic growth. Roughly 38.3 million Americans or 30 percent of the U.S. 
workforce occupy the creative class and hold significant economic power. 
The average salary of a creative class worker in 1990 was US$48,752 com-
pared to almost US$28,000 for a working-class worker and US$22,000 for 
a service class worker (Florida 2002). The economic effects of creativity 
depend on Florida’s so-called three Ts: talent, tolerance, and technology:
• Talent, or creative share of the workforce, based largely on demographic, 
educational, and occupational characteristics
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• Tolerance, or diversity, based on indexes related to sexual orientation 
and bohemianism 
• Technology, or innovation, measured by patent activity and the high-
technology share of the economic base. 
Florida (2002) develops a creativity index, which is a mix of four 
equally weighted factors: the creative class share of the workforce, high-
tech industry (using the Milken Institute’s tech pole index), innovation 
(using patents per capita), and diversity (using the gay index). This index 
forms a baseline view of an area’s (city or region) position in the creative 
economy, which Florida asserts is suggestive of a “region’s longer run eco-
nomic potential” (Florida 2002, 22). Florida computes the index for large 
cities (a ranking of 49 metro areas reporting populations over 1 million in 
the 2000 census), medium-size cities (a ranking of 32 metro areas report-
ing populations 500,000 to 1 million in the 2000 census), and small cities 
(a ranking of 63 metro areas reporting populations 250,000 to 500,000 
in the 2000 census). Table 4.7 shows these results for the top and bottom 
three cities in each size category.
Each dimension—talent, tolerance, technology—is necessary to attract 
the creative class of worker and generate economic growth. 
The creative class is involved in wide-ranging occupations from arts 
and entertainment to high-technology, finance, and high-end manufactur-
ing occupations. Among these occupational groups, Florida (2002) identi-
fies three types of creative individuals. First is a core group, the 
“super-creative core” who exhibit an entrepreneurial spirit in “producing 
new forms or designs that are readily transferable.” Markusen (2006b) 
also identifies core cultural workers and the high rate of self- employment 
among this group—45 percent compared with 8 percent of the work-
force as a whole. Acs and Megyesi (2007) also identify a strong entrepre-
neurial element in the creative city. The second group includes the 
creative professionals who work in knowledge-intensive industries and 
possess a high level of formal education. Markusen (2006b) notes the 
high level of investment in human capital by artists and cultural workers. 
Zucker (1994) notes that artists are extraordinary citizens who have high 
rates of political and community participation. The third group repre-
sents workers who transcend the old distinctions between white-collar 
and blue-collar work. As an example, Florida (2002, 19) asserts that, as 
today’s technicians, secretaries take on “increased responsibility to inter-
pret their work and make decisions.” The result is an increase in creativity 
and a swelling of the creative class. 
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Given the occupational profile of the creative class worker, it is not 
surprising that regions with high growth, centers of learning, and exper-
tise attract the creative class. The creative class accounts for more than 
one-third of the workforce in the Washington, DC, area; the Raleigh-
Durham area; Boston; and Austin. Florida (2002) identifies a similar 
proportion of creative class worker in the college towns of East Lansing, 
MI, and Madison, WI. Comunian and Faggian (2011) investigate the 
relationship between creative cities and creative universities in the 
United Kingdom. 
Not all regions benefit from what Florida asserts is a “new geography 
of class.” In fact, Florida (2002) notes that inequality may increase in a 
creative city, where well-paid, highly educated people push out an 
Table 4.7 Creativity Rankings in the United States, by City Size
City rank and size
Creativity 
index
Creative 
workers(%)
Creative 
rank
High-tech 
rank
Innovation 
rank
Diversity 
rank
Top three cities
Large cities
San Francisco, CA 1,057 34.8 5 1 2 1
Austin, TX 1,028 36.4 4 11 3 16
San Diego, CA 1,015 32.1 15 12 7 3
Medium cities
Albuquerque, NM 965 32.2 2 1 7 1
Albany, NY 932 33.7 1 12 2 4
Tucson, AZ 853 28.4 17 2 6 5
Small cities
Madison, WI 925 32.8 6 16 4 9
Des Moines, IA 862 32.1 8 2 16 20
Santa Barbara, CA 856 28.3 19 8 8 7
Bottom three cities 
Large cities
Memphis, TN 530 24.8 47 48 42 41
Norfolk, VA 555 28.4 36 35 49 47
Las Vegas, NV 561 18.5 49 42 47 5
Medium cities
Youngstown, OH 253 23.8 32 32 24 32
Scranton, PA 400 24.7 28 23 23 31
McAllen, TX 451 27.8 18 31 32 9
Small cities
Shreveport, LA 233 22.1 55 32 59 57
Ocala, FL 263 16.4 63 61 52 24
Visalia, CA 289 22.9 52 63 60 11
Source:  Florida 2002.
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older population who can no longer afford to live in the areas they once 
inhabited. 
Why do some geographic areas fail to generate a creative core? In 
answering this question, Florida first considers why some places become 
destinations for the creative class. The creative class of workers values 
visible diversity—different food, music, people, varied nightlife, indige-
nous street-level culture, and outdoor recreation—as well as authenticity 
of place that combines urban grit alongside renovated buildings, a co-
mingling of young and old, of people as well as place. Examples of such 
places that have successfully combined high-tech industry, outdoor ame-
nities, lifestyle amenities, creativity, and innovation (the three Ts) are the 
greater Boston area (Route 128 suburban complex, Harvard University, 
Massachusetts Institute of Technology, and several charming inner-city 
Boston neighborhoods); the Seattle area (suburban Bellevue and Redmond, 
beautiful mountains and countryside, revitalized urban neighborhoods); 
the San Francisco Bay area (posh inner-city neighborhoods and ultra-hip 
districts like SoMa—South of Market—lifestyle enclaves like Marin 
County, as well as the Silicon Valley); and Austin (traditional high-tech 
developments, lifestyle centers for cycling and outdoor activities, and a 
revitalizing university-downtown community centered on vibrant Sixth 
Street, the warehouse district, and the music scene) (Florida 2002). 
Failure to adapt to the “demands of the creative age” has much to do 
with areas trapped by their past successes (Florida 2002, 24). Olson 
(1982) suggests that areas that fail to transition are experiencing an “insti-
tutional sclerosis.” This translates into being trapped in the “culture and 
attitudes of the bygone organizational age, unable or unwilling to adapt 
to current trends” (Florida 2002, 24). Glaeser (2011) notes that Boston 
has reinvented itself at least three times since the 1970s, whereas cities 
like Detroit and Cleveland have failed to transition to what Florida terms 
the “creative age.” 
Reinvention and Structural Change
Acs and Megyesi (2007) argue that diverse areas have lower entry barri-
ers, making it easier for human capital with various backgrounds to enter 
an area and stay there. They also associate entrepreneurship with creativ-
ity and note that it is more apt to flourish in areas rich in creativity. In the 
same vein, Cohendet, Grandadam, and Simon (2010) refer to the cre-
ative city as a place for ideas to flourish and take shape, ultimately result-
ing in economic growth and wealth. Liu-Wei and Yin-Ko (2010) link the 
creative city to an urban environment capable of generating creativity, 
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innovation, and, thus, income growth. Markusen (2006b, 1) suggests that 
the creative city “heralded a new revitalization strategy for older indus-
trial cities” and that urban and economic development planners of com-
munities of all sizes have increasingly turned to arts and culture as 
development tools. As an example, Acs and Megyesi (2007) combine data 
on the core group and creative professionals for Baltimore and other 
industrial areas (table 4.8). The benchmarked areas show a huge increase 
in population over the decade 1990 to 2000.
Romein and Trip (2010) suggest that structural change arising from 
several forces—economic (globalization and an economy built on ser-
vices), geopolitical (vanishing national borders and the rise of regions as 
engines of growth), technological (improved information and communi-
cation technology and transport), and sociocultural (consumption, 
amenities)—herald the creative city. It is not just occupations that are 
labeled creative; entire branches of industries are also termed cultural, 
such as the arts, performances, heritage-based products, and creatively 
designed products. Creative people are therefore the most crucial 
resource for the economic performance of a creative city. On the basis of 
questionnaires and regressions, Florida (2002, 223) asserts, “Regional eco-
nomic growth is driven by the locational choices of creative people—the 
holders of creative capital—who prefer places that are diverse, tolerant, 
and open to new ideas.” Florida’s work has been criticized for not being 
new and for ignoring “the productive dimensions of the cultural indus-
tries” (Pratt 2008, 2).12 Peck (2005) lambastes Florida’s promotion of the 
creative class, castigating it as an elitist place-marketing ploy. While 
Florida highlights one critical part of the creative city and contributes 
Table 4.8 Creative Class Occupations, Ranked by Percentage Change 
Target statistical area % change, 1990–2000
Chicago, IL (PMSA) 169
Cleveland, OH (PMSA) 151
Pittsburgh, PA (PMSA) 139
Baltimore, MD (MSA) 126
Philadelphia, PA–NJ (PMSA) 123
Milwaukee, WI (PMSA) 123
St. Louis, MO– IL (MSA) 117
Detroit, MI (PMSA) 108
Source: Acs and Megyesi 2007. 
Note: PMSA = primary metropolitan statistical area; MSA = metropolitan statistical area.
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enormously to this part, his approach does not necessarily exclude the 
productive base of the economy.
Romein and Trip (2010) differentiate between “innovation production 
milieus” and “urban consumption milieus,” while noting that it is the close 
association of both that ensures the success of the creative city. The for-
mer focuses on innovative ideas and processes from inception to market 
realization across clusters of firms, not all of which are creative, but all of 
which benefit from the close proximity that an urban environment pro-
vides. The urban consumption milieu focuses on the qualities of place and 
life in a city that makes individuals want to move and stay there. In a 
sense, capital (investments and jobs) follows creative labor. In noting the 
tendency of artists to gravitate to inner-city areas, Markusen (2006a) sug-
gests a revitalizing role for areas that may have lost population. Romein 
and Trip (2010) identify key elements of success for creative cities—social 
climate; representation; labor market and employment; buzz and atmo-
sphere; built environment; living and residential environment; amenities; 
clusters and incubators; and policy, government, and governance. These 
elements show how difficult it is to disentangle the production and con-
sumption bases of the creative city. Pratt (2008) suggests that policy 
makers would achieve more successful regeneration outcomes if they 
would view the cultural industries as an object that links production and 
consumption, manufacturing and services. This is a more useful approach 
in interpreting and understanding the significant role of cultural produc-
tion in contemporary cities and how it relates to growth. 
One of the reasons why smaller towns or cities may be more successful 
at fostering creativity and generating economic growth may stem from 
their consumption base. The focus on occupations emphasizes the human 
capital aspect of economic growth, an aspect that has generated huge cur-
rency among growth theorists, development planners, and policy makers. 
The cultural sector is of particular relevance here, given that artists as core 
cultural workers make considerable investments in human capital, move 
easily across commercial, nonprofit, and community sectors, and have 
exceptionally high rates of self-employment (table 4.9). Markusen (2006a) 
applies to the cultural sector a consumption-base theory of economic 
growth—the portion of local economic activity that is sold to local resi-
dents and acts as a growth catalyst. Residents are assumed to spend on 
local cultural products that benefit the resident creative class and the local 
economy. Creative class workers are then assumed to spend their incomes 
locally, generating a positive growth multiplier for the local economy. 
Glaeser and Saiz (2004) find that amenities or consumption spending is 
Spatial Concentration and Specialization       71
Table 4.9 Creative Workers: Consumers and Producers
Occupational title 
Total 
employment
Self-
employed
% self-
employed Primary job
Secondary 
job
Writers and authors 138,900 94,377 68 80,509 13,868
Visual artists 307,254 155,159 50 129,109 26,050
Artists and related 
workers 148,682 80,022 54 70,731 9,291
Arts directors 50,664 27,139 54 23,988 3,151
Fine artists, painters, 
sculptors, illustrators 23,192 12,866 55 11,372 1,494
Multimedia artists and 
animators 74,826 40,017 53 35,371 4,646
Photographers 130,442 65,432 52 54,024 14,408
Camera operators, TV, 
video, motion picture 28,130 6,705 24 4,354 2,351
Performing artists 176,463 42,724 24 38,174 4,550
Actors 63,033 10,992 17 9754 1,238
Producers and directors 76,125 24,995 33 21,683 3,312
Dancers and 
choreographers 37,305 6,737 18 6,737 0
Dancers 19,992 3,854 19 3,854 0
Choreographers 17,313 2,883 17 2,883 0
Musicians, singers, 
composers 215,425 83,121 39 56,770 26,351
Music directors and 
composers 54,271 21,354 39 14,584 6,770
Musicians and singers 161,154 61,767 38 42,186 19,581
Designers 531,921 168,806 32 132,827 35,979
Commercial and 
industrial designers 51,823 16,088 31 12,659 3,429
Fashion designers 14,844 4,353 29 3,425 928
Floral designers 103,993 33,832 33 26,621 7,211
Graphic designers 211,871 67,422 32 53,052 14,370
Interior designers 60,050 19,325 32 15,206 4,119
Merchandise displayers, 
window trimmers 77,221 23,881 31 18,791 5,090
Set and exhibit 
designers 12,119 3,905 32 3,073 832
Architects 136,378 29,678 22 23,809 5,869
Architects, except 
landscape and naval 113,243 24,253 21 19,457 4,796
Landscape architects 23,135 5,425 23 4,352 1,073
Total, all artistic 
occupations 1,506,421 573,865 38 461,198 112,667
Total, all occupations 144,013,600 11,451,600 8 9,926,000 1,525,600
Source:  Markusen 2006.
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more likely to catalyze growth in cities than in metropolitan areas, which 
rely more on increases in productivity for their economic growth. 
Harnessing the Potential of Creative Cities 
The United Nations (UN 2004) outlines several ways in which the poten-
tial of the creative city might be unleashed to benefit developing and 
developed economies: 
• Urban regeneration through culture. The concept of the creative city has 
been tested in response to the economic decline of industrial cities in 
Australia, Europe, and the United States over the past two decades. 
These experiences have shown that industries in fields such as televi-
sion, cinema, multimedia, music, books, and festivals can flourish in 
cities that provide efficient transport, communications, and public 
protection infrastructure combined with coordinated public policies 
that encourage innovation and small businesses in the creative fields. 
• Public-private partnership as a key to effective policy. Planners take into 
account the role of creativity during economic policy planning in order 
to integrate their tangible and intangible cultural assets into the educa-
tion systems, natural environment, and geographic location. Cities 
across the developed world are establishing municipal services to sus-
tain the local creative economy, facilitating cooperation between the 
private and public sectors as well as civil society; some have even gone 
so far as to develop creativity indexes based on the three Ts of technol-
ogy, talent, and tolerance. 
• Creativity as an unexploited opportunity. Discussion of creativity 
remains at the academic level or policy level. Planners and the general 
public are unaware of or underestimate the value of creativity for the 
community; political or artistic figures do not champion the role of 
culture; administrative resources, skills, and capacities to manage such 
projects are in short supply; or clear and usable indicators do not exist 
for measuring success. 
• The need for UNESCO’s Creative Cities Programme. Designed to pro-
mote the social and economic development of cities in both the devel-
oped and the developing world, the program will emphasize the role of 
creativity and the arts and create a platform for information exchange 
between cities.
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• Impact far beyond the economy. Creative cities programs have already 
been tried and tested on a limited scale and have proved to be innova-
tive in finding new ways to promote social and economic development 
by stimulating the creation of new enterprises and cultural diversity for 
both struggling as well as prosperous city communities.
The Global City
The “global city”13 is a term that was popularized by Sassen in 1991 
with her book of that title (Sassen 1991). According to Sassen (2010), 
the global city makes new norms. In order for this to happen, the city 
must be complex and diverse. These factors are often a function of size, 
but not all large cities or megacities are global cities. For example, 
Tokyo is a global city, but Mumbai or São Paulo, both megacities, are 
not  necessarily global. Sassen attests that many of the global cities of 
today are old-world cities that have reinvented themselves, citing 
Istanbul, London, and New York as examples. In contrast, Miami is a 
global city, combining complexity and diversity and making new norms, 
but it is not a megacity. This was not the case prior to the 1990s. Since 
then, several factors have coalesced to make Miami a global city: the 
infrastructure of international trade developed by Miami’s Cuban 
population; real estate development spurred by wealthy individuals 
from Latin America; the opening up of Latin America and setting up of 
regional headquarters in Miami by firms from all over the world; a mix 
of cultures in a small, concentrated space; and a burgeoning creative 
class (Sassen 2010). 
Sassen (2009) identifies key structural trends in the economy that are 
contributing to the rise of global cities worldwide. These trends are 
predicated on a growing demand for intermediate services—for example, 
insurance, accounting, legal, financial, consulting, software programming, 
and even traditional sectors. These services tend to be located in an urban-
ized environment where tacit and codified knowledge are maximized. 
As firms become less local in their operations, expanding into national, 
regional, and global markets, management operations become more com-
plex, and the firm is likely to outsource its corporate functions that pre-
viously had been managed in-house. Advances in technology have fostered 
outsourcing of many routinized sectors, but control remains at the center, 
and, with it, centralized headquarter functions have grown, facilitated by 
the development and growth of the intermediate sector. Cities house the 
headquarters.14 
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The specialized firms that emerge to fulfill these intermediate functions 
are themselves subject to agglomeration economies. These arise from the 
“mix of firms, talents, and expertise from a broad range of specialized 
fields” (Sassen 2009, 56). The agglomeration economies rely on the 
exchange of information, and the urban environment is key in providing 
the face-to-face communication and exchange of knowledge opportunities. 
Sassen (2009, 59) notes, “Cities can generate kinds of knowledge, both 
formal and informal, that go beyond the sum of recognized knowledge 
actors (e.g. professionals and professional firms in the case of the economy),” 
which she terms “urban knowledge capital.” It has the same features as the 
tacit and codified knowledge identified by Lever (2002). 
A key aspect of cities is their centrality, which relies on density. Density 
has typically been associated with a downtown or central business dis-
trict. However, while centrality remains critical in today’s global economy, 
the geography of this has extended to include other spatial forms, such as 
the city-region, for example, or indeed the global city-region.15 
The Global Cities Indicators Program (GCIP), created in 2006 by the 
World Bank with funding from the government of Japan, helps member 
cities to monitor their performance.16 The GCIP provides a framework 
for the collection of city indicators that are comparable and consistent 
over time and place. Each member city is responsible for updating its data 
on the web portal.17 This effort enables “cities to measure, report, and 
improve their performance and quality of life, facilitate capacity building, 
and share best practices” (Bhada and Hoornweg 2009, 1). The Global 
City Indicators Facility (GCIF) at the University of Toronto18 took over 
the GCIP in 2008 and oversees the development of indicators, while also 
assisting cities to join the program. The GCIF is structured around themes 
that are organized into two broad categories covering city services and 
quality of life (tables 4.10 and 4.11). The indicators listed are core indicators; 
other supporting indicators are also used (see http://www.cityindictors.org
/themes.aspz#Education).
The two categories—city services and quality of life—are organized 
around 20 themes, consisting of core and supporting indicators. Cities are 
expected to report on core indicators annually and are encouraged to 
report on supporting indicators. There are presently 27 core indicators 
and 38 supporting indicators. 
The GCIF has identified a set of 10 future indexes for the various 
themes. These are constructed as weighted combinations of the indica-
tors and give a more complete view of city performance or quality of life 
(box 4.1).
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 Table 4.10 Global City Indicators: City Services
Theme Indicator
Education Percentage of children completing primary and secondary educa-
tion; student-teacher ratio
Fire and 
emergency 
response
Number of firefighters per 100,000 population; number of fire-related 
deaths per 100,000 population
Health Under-five mortality per 1,000 live births; number of in- patient hospi-
tal beds per 100,000 population; number of physicians per 100,000 
population; average life expectancy
Recreation Square meters of public indoor recreation facility space per capita; 
square meters of public outdoor recreation facility space per capita
Safety Number of homicides per 100,000 population; number of police 
 officers per 100,000
Solid waste Percentage of city population with regular solid waste collection; 
Percentage of city’s solid waste that is recycled
Transportation Number of kilometers of high-capacity public transit system per 
100,000 population; number of kilometers of light passenger transit 
system per 100,000 population; number of personal automobiles 
per capita; annual number of public transit trips per capita
Wastewater Percentage of city population served by wastewater collection
Water Percentage of city population with potable water supply service; 
 domestic water consumption per capita; Percentage of city popula-
tion with sustainable access to improved water source
Energy Percentage of city population with authorized electrical service; total 
residential electricity use per capita
Finance Debt service ratio (debt service expenditures as a Percentage of a 
municipality’s own source revenue)
Governance Percentage of women employed in the city government workforce
Urban planning Jobs-housing ratio
Source:  http://www.cityindicators.org/themes.aspx#Education.
Table 4.11 Global City Indicators: Quality of Life
Theme Indicator
Civic engagement Voter participation (percentage of eligible voters)
Culture Percentage of jobs in the cultural sector
Economy City product per capital-city unemployment rate
Environment PM-10 concentration greenhouse emissions measured
in tons per capita
Shelter Percentage of city population living in slums
Social equity Percentage of city population living in poverty
Subjective well-being Subjective well-being index
Technology and innovation Number of Internet connections per 100,000 population
Source:  http://www.cityindicators.org/themes.aspx#Education.
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Each city is responsible for supplying and updating its data on the web 
portal. The GCIF is a host for globally standardized data, providing free 
web-based information and assisting cities by identifying and sharing 
expertise on specific areas of performance so that they may strengthen 
their policy and management (McCarney 2010). The information can be 
used to generate reports by peer groups (land area, region, climate type, 
gross operating budget, and population or gross domestic product [GDP] 
per capita) or by themes. More than 30 cities have joined the GCIF since 
its inception, and figures for 2010 indicate 74 member cities. The city 
membership by population category is shown in figure 4.1. 
The GCIF is an important tool for urban planners and policy makers, 
providing, as it does, a series of themes that facilitate measuring city per-
formance, capturing trends over time and place, and monitoring the 
global role being played by cities (table 4.12).
Green Cities/Eco Cities
“Cities represent a challenge and an opportunity for climate change pol-
icy” (Corfee-Morlot et al. 2009, 3). Responsible for most of the world’s 
economic activity, population, innovation, output, and employment, cit-
ies arguably produce most of the global greenhouse gas emissions. 
Furthermore, cities, especially those located along coastal regions, are 
Box 4.1 
Indexes Used in the Global City Indicators Program
• Competitiveness
• Social capital
• Creativity
• Subjective well-being
• Greenhouse gas
• Total energy use
• Governance
• Urban accessibility
• Recreation and culture
• Water quality.
Source:  Bhada and Hoornweg 2009.
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Figure 4.1 GCIF Membership in 2010, by Population Category
Source:  McCarney 2010.
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Table 4.12 Role of Standardized Indicators for Cities
Purpose Rationale
Measuring city performance Role of cities has expanded to include addressing climate 
change, partnering with private sector and civic organiza-
tions, and attracting foreign investment. Indicators are 
 intended to determine municipal capacity for delivering 
services, managing growth, providing enhanced account-
ability, as well as determining management and financial 
capacity. National governments are increasingly looking at 
fiscal discipline at the local government level.
Capturing trends over time 
and across cities
There is increasing need to know the quality of life, eco-
nomic and demographic trends, and environmental mea-
sures adopted in cities. Indicators enable development 
 organizations to monitor aid effectiveness. Indicators can 
determine benchmarks and targets for cities based on the 
experience of other cities and enable cities to share best 
practice.
Playing a global role In a more global world, cities are increasingly competing for 
investments, international events, and corporate and insti-
tutional headquarters. Cities are playing an increasingly 
 active role in climate change negotiations. Cities are trying 
to “brand” themselves and become individual members of 
a wider urban concept. 
Source:  Bhada and Hoornweg 2009.
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Table 4.13 Summary of Results on Carbon Emissions per Home, 2006
Cause of carbon 
emissions 
Highest carbon emissions 
per home
Lowest carbon emissions 
per home
Driving (A) Southern cities; Greenville, SC; 
Nashville, TN; Oklahoma City, OK; 
Atlanta, GA
New York
Electricity (B) Houston, TX; New Orleans, LA; 
Memphis, TN; Dallas, TX; 
Phoenix, AZ
Coastal California; Northeast; 
San Francisco, CA; San Juan, 
CA; New York, NY; Boston, MA; 
Las Vegas, NV
Natural gas (C) California; Detroit, MI; Grand Rapids, 
MI; Buffalo, NY; Chicago, IL; 
Minneapolis, MN
Florida; Miami, FL
A + B + C + public 
transit
Houston, TX; Birmingham, AL; 
Nashville, TN; Memphis, TN; 
Oklahoma City, OK
San Diego, CA; San Francisco, 
CA; Los Angeles, CA; San Jose, 
CA; Sacramento, CA
Source:  Glaeser 2011.
vulnerable to the effects of climate change such as urban heat island 
effects. 
At the same time, “cities are much better for the environment” 
(Glaeser 2011, 201). Living in high-rises and walking to work are better 
for the environment than residing in leafy suburbs in large houses and 
driving to work (Jacobs 1961, 1969; Owen 2009). Glaeser (2011) dis-
cusses the work he carried out with Matthew Kahn on a carbon inventory 
of new housing throughout America (see Glaeser and Kahn 2010). Some 
of the results are shown in table 4.13. 
Summary facts from table 4.13 and Glaeser (2011) suggest the follow-
ing conclusions:
1. Big cities mean less driving: on average, when population doubles, 
carbon dioxide emissions per household due to driving decline by 
almost a ton per year.
2. City-dwellers use less gas than suburbanites.
3. Electrical appliances account for two-thirds of residential energy use; 
urbanites use less electricity than suburbanites.
4. The main factor explaining the difference between cities is summer 
heat. 
5. Bigger, denser homes use less electricity. On average, a single-family 
detached home consumes 88 percent more electricity than the aver-
age apartment in a five-or-more-unit building. 
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6. More centralized metropolitan areas use less electricity than more 
sprawling places.
7. Natural gas, America’s primary source of warmth, is responsible for 
almost 20 percent of residential carbon emissions.
8. Adding household emissions (driving, electricity, natural gas) and 
public transit together shows that cities are greener than suburbs.
9. However, the differences between metro areas are even larger than 
the differences between individual cities and their suburbs. 
10.  Therefore, coastal California is the greenest part of the country, and 
the Deep South is the brownest.
Cities have not always been held in such high esteem. Ruskin, an art 
critic in nineteenth-century London and “an early advocate of town plan-
ning,” was a proponent of the small town surrounded by a greenbelt. 
Greenbelts were a feature of English town planning—for example, 
London’s greenbelt from 1947 covers 2,000 square miles—and elsewhere 
(Toronto, Pacific Northwest). One of the major figures in urban planning 
in the United States, Ebenezer Howard, championed the concept of the 
“garden city” that would be surrounded by a greenbelt to prevent the 
town from expanding beyond 32,000 inhabitants. Inhabitants of these 
cities would “live in nice houses and gardens at the center, walk to work 
in factories at the rim, and be fed by farms in an outer greenbelt” (Kunzig 
2011, 132). The first garden city was Letchworth, England. A further 
aspect of “bringing the countryside into the city” was to build parks in 
cities (Glaeser 2011, 203).19 These efforts to merge country and city—
greenbelts, garden cities, and parks—were overshadowed by the develop-
ment of suburbia in the late nineteenth century. Not all developers were 
so inclined, but the 1920s, which benefited from architects like Raymond 
Hood and Hugh Ferriss, turned out to be the “high-water mark for verti-
cal America” (Glaeser 2011, 205).20 Rising income and cheap transporta-
tion have exacerbated this trend. Furthermore, government subsidies for 
highways and homeownership have contributed to sprawl as well as indi-
viduals’ preferences for large homes on large lots. 
Urbanization continues. People are moving in droves to the cities, par-
ticularly in the developing economies; in China and India, in particular, 
the sheer numbers pose the biggest challenge for urban development. If, 
as Glaeser (2011) remarks, carbon emissions in China and India rise to 
U.S. levels per capita, the world’s carbon consumption will increase 
139 percent, even if their population stays the same. Most of the carbon 
emissions in China come from industry. Chinese households are thrifty 
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energy users—the typical Beijing household emits 3.997 tons of carbon 
dioxide per year compared to 43 tons in the typical Washington, DC, 
household (Zheng et al. 2009). Both negative and positive aspects of the 
urbanization patterns of China and India are evident. On the positive side, 
both countries have cities that are extremely dense. Mumbai, with more 
than 50,000 people per square mile, is almost twice as dense as Bangalore, 
Kolkata, and New York City, each with more than 20,000 people per 
square mile. In China, Shenzhen has more than 15,000 people per square 
mile. These levels of density are compatible with public transport and are 
challenging for car usage. However, Shanghai and Beijing, at 20 million 
and 17 million inhabitants, respectively, are roughly one-tenth as dense as 
New York City and less than half as dense as Los Angeles. Car ownership 
rates in both China and India are increasing exponentially, and India’s Tata 
Group has produced a car for US$2,500 (Glaeser 2011). 
Glaeser (2011, 222) concludes, “If the future is going to be greener, 
then it must be more urban. Dense cities offer a means of living that 
involves less driving and smaller homes to heat and cool.” 
The manner in which cities develop offers many possibilities for the 
environment. Managing this change requires input from many different 
levels of government. The 2009 OECD report “Cities, Climate Change, 
and Multilevel Governance” provides an in-depth examination of this 
topic and advocates a multilevel governance framework to ensure that 
cities develop in an eco-sustainable manner (Corfee-Morlot et al. 2009). 
The multilevel governance framework explores the relationships between 
the various levels of government—local, regional, and national—in clos-
ing or narrowing any policy gaps for climate change. Policy gaps are 
examined along two dimensions: vertical and horizontal. The vertical 
dimension of multilevel governance calls for national governments to 
work closely with local and regional governments and vice versa. While 
local and regional governments may be the agents of change, change often 
cannot proceed without modifying the legal and institutional frameworks 
of the country. The horizontal dimension recognizes the chances for 
transmitting information and best practices between cities, regions, and 
nations (Corfee-Morlot et al. 2009). The report concludes with some 
general observations of good multilevel governance practice:
1. National policies can powerfully enable local action on climate change 
adaptation and mitigation.
2. There is significantly greater potential for experimentation at local 
scales, which in turn can be a testing ground for national governments. 
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3. Close collaboration between local and national authorities to build 
capacity to address climate change will improve the chances that local 
authorities will exploit potential for cost-effective mitigation and adap-
tation to climate change.
4. Some effective cross-sectoral regional or urban development strategies 
appear to be driven by the climate change imperative, where climate 
change mitigation and adaptation are seen to be a potential source of 
regional economic development (Corfee-Morlot et al. 2009).
The multilevel governance framework represents the ideal in manag-
ing climate change. The reality is far from this: “Climate policy at the 
city-scale remains fragmented, and the basic tools to facilitate good deci-
sion making are still lacking” (Corfee-Morlot et al. 2009, 87). The report 
suggests that the following tools could assist cities to be more effective in 
their climate change efforts:
• Harmonized inventory of greenhouse gas emissions and reporting pro-
tocols to allow cities to monitor and compare progress in mitigating 
emissions, to assess cost-effectiveness of additional mitigation options, 
and eventually to become active participants in international carbon 
markets. 
• Regional impact science and other policy-relevant research programs to 
support the interface between expert information and local knowledge 
and promote local understanding of climate change risk and policy 
options—from assessment to management—for better mitigation and 
adaptation decision making. 
• Urban climate policy networks to build on regular channels of com-
munication among national planners and regional and local government 
officials as well as among local stakeholders and decision makers about 
targets, goals, strategies, and measures (Corfee-Morlot et al. 2009). 
The report concludes by noting the progress made on a multilevel 
governance framework in various countries and cities. 
Conclusion
The chapter has examined several constructs by which cities have been 
identified in recent years—the knowledge city, the creative city, the global 
city, and the green or eco city. These are typically developed-country 
constructs. This typology arises from the continuing structural change at 
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the level of the economy, which sees more and more employment in the 
service sectors as routinized manufacturing moves to the edge of the 
 cities or even farther afield. Globalization further emphasizes this trend. 
At the same time, urban living has become more attractive; lower crime 
rates in inner-city areas have attracted inhabitants, and the rise of the 
creative class has contributed to the economic development and sustain-
ability of the city. Density and diversity are in vogue. Furthermore, urban 
living is good for the environment. 
Notes
 1. “Theory and empirical evidence suggest scale and knowledge externalities 
may interact, so that scale benefits are enhanced by knowledge accumula-
tion—information spillovers are more beneficial the more educated the 
population” (Henderson 2010, 520). 
 2. “Moving from a city of 250,000 to one of 2.5 million is associated empirically 
with an 80 percent increase in commuting times and housing rental prices” 
(Henderson 2010, 521). 
 3. In addition, natural advantage is often a prime reason for the concentration of 
industry in a geographic location. 
 4. Roughly half of the 243 urban areas examined were specialized in subsectors 
of manufacturing, while the rest were specialized in nontraded sectors of 
education, banking and commerce, medical, and government services. 
 5. Lever (2002) cites OECD (1999) for demonstrating that investing in research 
and development, nationally, could be linked to competitive performance and 
economic growth and that this was the basis for economic development in the 
developed world. A similar point was made in the U.K. government white 
paper “Our Competitive Future: Building the Knowledge-Driven Economy” 
(U.K. Department of Trade and Industry 1998). At the local level, the Scottish 
executive advocated policy initiatives on economic sectors or clusters that are 
based on research, knowledge, information, and creativity (Lever 2002). 
 6. Four cities were excluded from the original 23 European cities owing to dif-
ficulties in measuring economic performance during the process of marketi-
zation in the 1990s, for example, Budapest, Moscow, Prague, and Warsaw. 
 7. “Human capital spillovers occur at the city level because skilled workers pro-
duce more product varieties and thereby increase labor demand” (Glaeser, 
Ponzetto, and Tobio 2011, 1).
 8. Shapiro (2006), citing Glaeser, Scheinkman, and Shleiffer (1995); Glaeser and 
Shapiro (2003); Simon (1998, 2004); Simon and Nardinelli (2002). 
 9. Variables that are correlated with both education and city growth are missing 
from the regressions.
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 10. Glaeser and Saiz view dropout and unemployment rates as measures of 
human capital, but at the lower end of human capital distribution: “Differences 
in the unemployment rate across cities (less so across metropolitan areas) are 
generally time invariant and reflect characteristics of the labor force and the 
industry structure in the city” (Glaeser and Saiz 2004, 57).
 11. “In other words, a local neighborhood, in contrast to a region, succeeds 
by avoiding large numbers of low-educated workers” (Glaeser and Saiz 
2004, 58).
 12. “The idea of the creative class is far from new; in fact, it is a revival of the 
high-tech ‘boosterism’ and place marketing” (Pratt 2008, 2).
 13. Some writers criticize the concept of the global city as being too exclusive 
(McCann 2004) and too Western (Robinson 2002).
 14. “The number of headquarters is what specifies a global city” (Sassen 2009, 56).
15. The global city-region was identified by Geddes (1915) and Hall (1966) and 
was the focus of an international conference in 1999.
 16. The pilot cities were Belo Horizonte, Porto Alegre, and São Paulo in Brazil; 
Montreal, Toronto, and Vancouver in Canada; Bogotá and Cali in Colombia; 
and King County in Washington State, United States. 
 17. See http://www.cityindicators.org.
 18. The Global City Indicators Facility offices opened in Toronto in October 
2008, with support from the World Bank’s Development Grant Facility, the 
University of Toronto, the government of Canada, and participating cities. 
The GCIF was officially launched in Nanjing, China, on November 3, 2008, 
at the United Nations World Urban Forum.
 19. “In the United States, Frederick Law Olmsted specialized in bringing bucolic 
vistas to the heart of a city”—for example, Central Park in New York, Jackson 
Park in Chicago, Belle Isle in Detroit—as well as “green spaces in Buffalo, 
Louisville, Milwaukee, Montreal, and Washington, DC” (Glaeser 2011, 204). 
 20. “Between 1930 and 1933, five new buildings opened that soared above 
849 feet, the height of the tallest skyscraper in Western Europe today. 
America would not build another tower that tall for another thirty-six years” 
(Glaeser 2011, 205).
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C H A P T E R  5
The Attributes and Role 
of “Smart Cities”
Growth in developing countries since the early 1980s has been strongly 
buttressed by globalization and by a wave of innovations released by new 
general-purpose technologies that have transformed the electronic, 
 electrical engineering, telecommunications, and biopharmaceutical indus-
tries and created the Internet. Some countries, mainly in East Asia but 
also in Latin America, absorbed the new technologies and, through heavy 
investment in production capacity, infrastructure, and skills, emerged as 
successful manufacturers and exporters of industrial products. 
The tempo of global change quickened in the 1990s. It slowed toward 
the end of that decade, because of the East Asian crisis, but recovery was 
swift, with world trade and capital flows expanding at record-setting rates 
between 2005 and 2007.1 However, the financial crisis starting in 2008, 
the worldwide recession through much of 2009, the severe contraction of 
trade, and the urgent need for external and internal adjustments by coun-
tries with large current account imbalances have given rise to concerns 
over the medium-term growth prospects of the world economy and the 
future efficacy of the principal external drivers of growth in recent years: 
import demand from the leading Organisation for Economic Co-operation 
and Development (OECD) countries and the offshoring of tradable 
activities from the United States and Western Europe to economies 
where production costs are lower.
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These concerns are motivating a reexamination in industrializing 
economies of development strategies reliant on processing and assembly-
type industries that generate relatively little domestic value added. The 
viability of investment and export-led growth is being questioned, and 
countries with trade surpluses are looking for ways to increase the share 
of domestic consumption in final demand and lessen the reliance on 
investment as the primary driver of growth. This effort has focused 
increasing attention on measures to raise the contribution of total factor 
productivity (TFP) so as to compensate partially or wholly for a decline 
in investment. If TFP is to displace other sources of growth, policy makers 
are searching for a combination of factors that will lead to steadily 
increasing productivity of industry and services (Mokyr 1999).
Productivity is a function of the efficient allocation and use of 
resources, technological capabilities, and innovation across the full spec-
trum of economic activities. To maximize gains in productivity, industrial-
izing countries will need to address four priorities: 
• Products and services that will be in growing demand and subject to 
technological change
• A competitive business environment and a financial system that, in 
concert, lower the barriers to the entry and exit of firms
• Incentives for research and development (R&D) with the intention of 
building world-class innovation capabilities in areas with the greatest 
long-term commercial potential
• The quality of the scientific and technical workforce and the steady 
accumulation of intangible factors in business and institutions so as to 
raise efficiency, promote entrepreneurship, increase the returns from 
research, and encourage profitable innovation.
With industrial development of a modern economy almost wholly 
concentrated in cities, productivity gains accruing from technological 
progress and from innovation will be spearheaded by urban centers. The 
experience of advanced countries suggests that a country has only a few 
such centers of innovation or “smart cities.” Hence, the viability of a 
“productivity-led” strategy in an industrializing context will rest on the 
effectiveness of policies—national and local—to groom one or a small 
number of smart cities that not only are technologically dynamic and 
innovative but also realize the industrial scale needed to contribute sub-
stantially to the overall growth rate of the national economy.
This chapter profiles smart cities and discusses policies that can 
 contribute to their flowering and growth. Smart cities are not called into 
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existence by the wave of a policy maker’s wand. In recent times, they have 
morphed from cities that have a strong base of industries with large 
research content. Therefore, the chapter first underscores the  significance 
of productivity as a source of growth and identifies those industries and 
products with robust growth prospects, which are the focus of rapid tech-
nological change and could provide the underpinnings of a smart city. It 
draws on the experience of China, which, among the middle-income coun-
tries, is most aggressively pursuing the objective of developing smart cities. 
The chapter then examines the attributes of smart cities that are responsi-
ble for their success. It concludes with policy  suggestions for how aspiring 
countries could develop the potential of a few nascent smart cities.
Growth and Technology-Intensive Subsectors 
The centrality of capital for growth in the world as a whole since 1980 is 
highlighted by Jorgenson and Vu Khuong (2009), who show that capital 
was the source of 54 percent of growth in 1989–95 and 41 percent during 
2000–06, exceeding the contribution of other factors. However, the com-
pelling development is the increasing importance of TFP, which accounted 
for 36 percent of growth in the most recent period compared with less 
than a fifth in the first. If this trend persists, TFP will become the princi-
pal driver of growth, as it already is in the advanced countries (Comin and 
Hobijn 2010),2 and its persistence will depend less on the intersectoral 
transfer of resources and more on technology advances, the diffusion of 
technology, and the narrowing of technological gaps among production 
units within a subsector. Innovation, or the successful exploitation of new 
ideas and technology, is the cornerstone of this process.3
A striking example of the salience of total factor productivity is 
apparent from the partitioning of the sources of growth in China, the 
second largest and fastest-growing economy in the world (Bosworth and 
Collins 2007). Capital and TFP contributed 3.2 and 3.8 percent, respec-
tively, to China’s gross domestic product (GDP) growth between 1978 
and 2004.4 During the period 1993 to 2004, their shares were 4.2 and 
4.0 percent, respectively (table 5.1). Capital and TFP contributed 
2.2 and 4.4 percent of industrial growth during 1978–2004 compared 
with 3.2 and 6.2 percent during 1993–2004 (table 5.2). Cross-country 
empirical evidence from other countries suggests that TFP has risen 
much faster in the technology-intensive electrical and nonelectrical 
machinery subsectors (Jorgenson, Ho, and Stiroh 2007). This has 
enlarged the output share of those industries and raised the average TFP 
for manufacturing as a whole. 
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Table 5.1 Sources of GDP Growth in China, 1978–2004
annual % rate of change
Source 1978–2004 1993–2004
Output 9.3 9.7
Employment 2.0 1.2
Output per worker 7.3 8.5
Physical capital 3.2 4.2
Land 0.0 0.0
Education 0.2 0.2
Factor productivity 3.8 4.0
Source: Bosworth and Collins 2007.
Table 5.2 Sources of GDP Growth in the Industrial and Services Sectors in China, 
1978–2004 
annual % rate of change
Source of growth
Industry Services
1978–2004 1993–2004 1978–2004 1993–2004
Output 10.0 11.0 10.7 9.8
Employment 3.1 1.2 5.8 4.7
Output per worker 7.0 9.8 4.9 5.1
Physical capital 2.2 3.2 2.7 3.9
Education 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2
Factor productivity 4.4 6.2 1.9 0.9
Source: Bosworth and Collins 2007. 
Over the same two periods, capital contributed 2.2 and 3.2 percent to 
industrial growth in China, respectively, and TFP contributed 4.4 and 
6.2 percent. In 1978–2004, services derived 2.7 percent of growth from 
capital and 1.9 percent from TFP. The contribution of TFP to services (a 
sector where technological advances have been slower) fell to just 
0.9 percent a year between 1993 and 2004. 
With China investing more than 46 percent of GDP in 2009–10 and 
capital spending subject to decreasing returns, as is evident from rising 
incremental capital output ratios (Yu 2009), the scope for squeezing out 
additional growth through even larger injections of capital has been 
largely exhausted. Investment as a share of GDP must decline, and if 
growth rates in the 7–8 percent range are to be maintained, the share of 
TFP would need to rise even higher. This also applies to other middle-
income countries, where the investment rates are trending downward 
and threaten to depress growth rates that are already well below the 
peaks reached in the 1990s. Undoubtedly, reducing intersectoral and 
The Attributes and Role of “Smart Cities”        93
intrasectoral gaps in productivity will boost TFP in all the industrializing 
economies, but raising and maintaining the contribution of TFP to levels 
in excess of the 1.5 percent average in most countries will require accel-
erating technological change and innovation, which in turn will be paced 
by the evolving composition of industry.
This raises an important question regarding subsectors that are growing 
most strongly, are likely to undergo rapid technological change, and are 
likely to register the largest productivity gains. Answers must necessarily 
be hedged because an examination of past trends casts a narrow beam of 
light into the near future only. International and Chinese experience sug-
gests that manufacturing is the leading source of technological innovation. 
It has more links to other activities, including services, and the highest 
direct and indirect job multipliers (see Yusuf and Nabeshima 2010). This 
is borne out by recent trends in production, trade, patenting activity, and 
exports. These are not a sufficient basis for targeting industry, but they do 
indicate the nature of industrial opportunities for countries seeking to 
restore their growth rates through the midwifery of smart cities.
Export Composition and Growth
From the data on the fastest-growing global exports during 1997–2007 
and the most rapidly expanding exports for the Asia region (tables 5.3 
and 5.4), three manufactured products stand out: optical devices, tele-
communications and transport equipment, and white goods. In 1985, 
more than 60 percent of China’s exports were resource- and agro-based 
products and primary products. Electronics and other high-technology 
products accounted for a little more than 5 percent of the total. Five years 
later, the share of the former group had been cut almost by half, and by 
Table 5.3 Fastest-Growing Manufactured Exports Worldwide, 1997–2007
Type of product Average growth rate (%)
Optical instruments and apparatus 77.0
Platinum and other metals 74.0
Glycosides; glands or other organs 50.7
Other nitrogen-function compounds 49.0
Other articles of precious metal 48.4
Nickel and nickel alloys, unwrought 46.4
Nickel and nickel alloys, worked 40.3
Cyclic hydrocarbons 40.0
Orthopedic appliances 39.2
Medicaments (including veterinary) 39.2
Source: UN Comtrade data. 
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Table 5.4 Fastest-Growing Manufactured Exports from Asia, 1997–2007
Type of product Average growth rate (%)
Dish washing machines, household 1,703.0
Other articles of precious metals 198.7
Radiotelegraphic and radiotelephonic 147.8
Cellulose acetates 135.5
Silver, unwrought, unworked or semimanufactured 135.1
Aircraft 126.1
Optical instruments and apparatus 122.1
Reaction engines 111.4
Nickel and nickel alloys, unwrought 109.5
Drawn or blown glass, unworked 104.6
Source: UN Comtrade data. 
2006, it was down to 12 percent. The big gainers were exports of elec-
tronic and telecommunications products and office equipment, the 
shares of which grew from 5.4 percent in 1985 to more than one-third in 
2006. A very similar transformation can be seen in the export mix of 
other Southeast Asian countries.
Further information on China’s exports can be gleaned from tables 5.5 
and 5.6. Transport equipment, electrical equipment, chemicals, and 
machinery emerge as the leading industries that are also contributing 
the most exports.
Pattern of Imports
Imports of manufactures by industrializing countries, many of which are 
from technologically more advanced countries, provide further clues by 
highlighting the demand for products and services that cannot be met 
competitively from local sources and pointing to opportunities for upgrad-
ing and diversification. Again, China can illuminate the situation because 
it is a large importer of intermediate and capital goods that support its 
assembly industries. China’s imports for 2002–08 are presented in table 
5.7. The data are highly aggregated, but they indicate that growth rates for 
electronics, computers, telecommunications, and optoelectronics are slow-
ing and their shares in total imports are falling (table 5.8). The demand for 
life sciences and biotechnology products remains robust, and their share of 
total imports, although still small, is on the rise. Scale favors electronic 
components and telecommunications, while growth is in the life sciences. 
R&D and Patenting
The R&D intensity of individual industries and trends in patenting during 
2005–09, by identifying the most technologically dynamic subsectors, 
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Table 5.5 Fastest-Growing Manufacturing Industries 
in China, 1996–2003
Industry Average growth rate (%)
Transport equipment 505.3
Iron and steel 496.4
Industrial chemicals 476.8
Machinery, except electrical 474.0
Food products 464.8
Machinery, electric 352.8
Professional and scientific equipment 17.6
Petroleum refineries 16.0
Furniture, except metal 14.4
Nonferrous metals 14.1
Source: UN Comtrade data.
Table 5.6 Top 10 Exports from China, 2006
Description Trade value (US$ millions)
Complete digital data-processing machines 43,384
Peripheral units, including control and adapting units 37,594
Television, radio broadcasting, transmitters, other 35,776
Parts, nes of and accessories for machines of headings 
7512 and 752 32,786
Parts, nes of and accessories for apparatus falling in 
heading 76 31,474
Electronic microcircuits 21,306
Other sound recording and reproducer, nes; video 
 recorders 21,266
Footwear 21,015
Children’s toys, indoor games, and so on 18,011
Outerwear, knitted or crocheted, not elastic or rubber-
ized; other, clothing accessories, nonelastic, knitted 
or crocheted 14,892
Source: UN Comtrade data.
Note: nes = not elsewhere specified.
offer additional guidance on industrial prospects. For this purpose,  patents 
registered with the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO) and the 
World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) can provide a global 
perspective and also reveal the trends in patenting by Chinese residents. 
Because it is costly to register with the USPTO and the WIPO and the 
evaluation process is both standardized and exacting, the patents 
approved by these bodies tend to be, on average, of higher quality than 
patents registered elsewhere.
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Table 5.7 Imports to China, 2002, 2005, 2008
US$ (100 millions) 
Indicator 2002 2005 2008
Total merchandise 2,951.7 6,599.5 11,325.6
Total industrial products 2,459.0 5,122.4 7,701.7
Machinery and electronics 1,555.9 3,503.8 5,386.6
Percentage of merchandise 52.7 53.1 47.6
Percentage of industrial products 63.3 68.4 69.9
High-tech products 828.4 1,977.1 3,418.2
Percentage of merchandise 28.1 30.0 30.2
Percentage of industrial products 33.7 38.6 44.4
Source: Ministry of Science and Technology (http://www.sts.org.cn/sjkl/gjscy/index.htm); State Statistics Bureau; 
General Administration of Customs.
Table 5.8 Imports of High-Tech Products as a Percentage of Total Imports 
in China, 2002, 2005, 2008
Imports 2002 2005 2008
Computers and telecommunications 9.50 9.10 7.03
Life science technologies 1.00 0.70 0.70
Electronics 11.50 15.30 14.20
Computer-integrated manufacturing 3.10 2.50 2.20
Aerospace 1.60 1.30 1.20
Optoelectronics 0.50 0.50 4.30
Biotechnology 0.04 0.02 0.03
Materials 0.70 0.40 0.50
Other technologies 0.20 0.03 0.04
Source: Ministry of Science and Technology (http://www.sts.org.cn/sjkl/gjscy/index.htm); State Statistics Bureau; 
General Administration of Customs.
As presented in table 5.9, the top five categories approved by the 
USPTO are drug, bio-affecting and body treating compositions (3.1 per-
cent), semiconductor device manufacturing process (2.9 percent), active 
solid-state devices (2.7 percent), multiplex communications (2.4 per-
cent), and telecommunications (2.0 percent). Residents of China who 
registered with the USPTO received the largest number of patents for 
electronic and electrical devices, followed by communications devices, 
software, pharmaceutical compounds, and optical devices.
The two leading categories of patents approved by the WIPO are elec-
tronic and electrical devices and chemical compounds, including pharma-
ceutical and biotech products (table 5.10). These are followed by 
mechanical engineering patents and patents for instruments, including 
optical devices. Electronic and electrical industries dominated patenting 
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Table 5.9 Top USPTO Patents Worldwide, 2005–09
Class Class title % of total patents
424 Drug, bio-affecting and body-treating compositions 
(includes class 514)
3.1
438 Semiconductor device manufacturing: process 2.9
257 Active solid-state devices (for example, 
transistors, solid-state diodes)
2.7
370 Multiplex communications 2.4
455 Telecommunications 2.0
435 Chemistry: molecular biology and microbiology 1.7
532 Organic compounds (includes classes 532–70) 1.6
375 Pulse or digital communications 1.3
359 Optical: systems and elements 1.3
385 Optical waveguides 1.1
123 Internal-combustion engines 1.0
356 Optics: measuring and testing 0.9
280 Land vehicles 0.7
530 Chemistry: natural resins or derivatives; peptides 
or proteins; lignins or reaction products thereof
0.5
296 Land vehicles: bodies and tops 0.5
180 Motor vehicles 0.4
426 Food or edible material: processes, compositions, 
and products
0.2
99 Foods and beverages: apparatus 0.1
452 Butchering 0.1
Source: USPTO.
in the United States from 1960 to 2005 and also contributed the most to 
gains in productivity (tables 5.11 and 5.12). 
The R&D data and patent statistics provide a window on the distribu-
tion of technological activity and point to those industries that are likely 
to be a focus of innovations as patented knowledge is commercialized. 
When the data on patents are combined with the data on trade, electronic 
and optical devices are in the lead with respect to global demand and 
technological prospects. Chemical products and transport and engineering 
products fall into second and third places. This is the crude ranking of 
industrial activities that emerges from trends in a few select indicators. 
This ranking is in line with casual empiricism and the information pre-
sented in the business literature: over the next five or more years, elec-
tronic, communication, and optical industries will remain the leading 
subsectors in the world. Chemical and biological products, drawing on the 
vast amount of research in the life sciences, will also be of significance.
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 Table 5.10 Share of WIPO Patents, by Sector, 2007–09
Sector and field of technology
% of all patents 
issued
% of China’s 
patents
China’s patents 
as % of all patents
Total 100.00 100.00 3.15
I Electrical engineering 29.48 53.14 5.67
1 Electrical machinery, 
apparatus, energy 5.20 5.38 3.25
2 Audio-visual technology 3.16 2.46 2.45
3 Telecommunications 4.61 11.33 7.73
4 Digital communication 4.69 25.76 17.28
5 Basic communication 
processes 0.87 0.78 2.84
6 Computer technology 6.37 5.11 2.53
7 IT methods for management 1.27 0.70 1.72
8 Semiconductors 3.31 1.62 1.54
II Instruments 16.23 7.86 1.52
9 Optics 2.96 1.59 1.69
13 Medical technology 5.90 2.72 1.45
III Chemistry 29.61 18.49 1.97
15 Biotechnology 3.61 1.98 1.73
16 Pharmaceuticals 37.67 4.55 2.34
18 Food chemistry 1.11 0.72 2.04
19 Basic materials chemistry 3.42 1.68 1.54
20 Materials, metallurgy 2.00 1.37 2.16
21 Surface technology, coating 2.04 1.08 1.67
22 Microstructural and 
nanotechnology 0.25 0.04 0.45
23 Chemical engineering 2.76 2.08 2.38
24 Environmental technology 1.51 1.20 2.49
IV Mechanical engineering 18.31 12.93 2.22
32 Transport 3.46 2.21 2.01
Source: China State Intellectual Property Office. 
Note: Under the WIPO approach, one application may have several classes of intellectual property and may 
belong to different fields of technology. In this case, every technology field is counted. As a result, the sum of the 
total number of all technology fields could be larger than the total number of applications in the year.
Table 5.11 Top Five Patenting Industries in the 
United States, 2006
Rank Industry
1 Electronic components and accessories and com-
munications equipment
2 Office computing and accounting machines
3 Professional and scientific instruments
4 Electrical transmission and distribution equipment
5 Industrial organic chemistry
Source: World Intellectual Property Organization.
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Table 5.12 Top Five Industries Contributing to TFP 
Growth in the United States, 1960–2005
Rank Industry
1 Computers and office equipment
2 Electronic components
3 Telephone and telegraph
4 Food
5 Rubber and miscellaneous plastics
Source: World Intellectual Property Organization.
This suggests that the aspiring smart city in an industrializing country 
should be building on an emerging or established comparative advantage 
in such manufacturing activities. This is not to say that other industries 
and tradable services should be excluded from consideration, only that 
virtually all of the dynamic smart cities in the world have achieved their 
standing because of the electronic, information technology (IT), tele-
communications, transport, and biotech industries. For some, these are 
now providing the stepping-stones to the development of “green” indus-
tries, new materials, and advances in nanotechnology. Having established 
a strong presence in several of the most dynamic industries, Chinese 
firms, for example, are eager to move up the value chain from the assem-
bly and testing of standardized products to the design and manufacture 
of differentiated parts and components and innovative products that 
generate higher profit margins.5 
What Makes Cities Smart
From the perspective of tomorrow’s smart cities, IT, electronics, biotech, 
chemical, and yet undiscovered general-purpose technologies6 will serve 
as the springboards for tackling a new generation of problems with 
novel solutions and laying the groundwork for new industries. As 
W. Brian Arthur (2009, 164, 169) observes, “Innovation arises when 
people are faced with … well-specified problems. … Novel technologies 
arise from a combination of existing technologies.” He rightly notes 
that a general-purpose technology “does not just offer a set of limited 
functions, it provides a vocabulary of elements that can be put 
together— programmed—in endlessly novel ways for endlessly novel 
purposes” (Arthur 2009, 88). Thus, the makings of the next techno-
logical revolution are already in place and primed for a new round 
of innovation. What is needed is the orientation of research efforts 
toward key longer-term problems backed by the credible commitment 
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of resources to the deepening of scientific knowledge and to the nur-
turing of technologies that weave together findings from relevant 
fields. National policy can provide the incentive framework for tech-
nology development and urbanization, but, because of trade and com-
petition, the forces of comparative advantage are exacerbating the 
differences among the regions of a country. For this reason, municipal 
policies and local innovation systems will determine the emergence of 
smart cities (Acs 2000). 
When East Asian and Latin American economies were attempting to 
accelerate industrialization and exports, it was important to build produc-
tion capacity in processing industries as widely as possible, and in those 
circumstances, breadth and scale mattered most. By investing in produc-
tive assets and borrowing technology from abroad, manufacturing indus-
tries could be quickly built up using tried incentives. This explains the rise 
of industrial cities in Asia, Eastern Europe, and Latin America. A few 
could become smart cities.
In the Right Place 
Cities with long-term technology or innovation potential are likely at a 
minimum to be distinguished by (a) a strategic location in a prosperous 
and growing urban region, (b) a robust recent history of urban develop-
ment and industrialization, and (c) adequate land area to accommodate 
future growth. Climate, environmental conditions, accessibility, and 
potential amenities have traditionally favored coastal cities, which tend to 
have first-mover advantages and rich hinterlands and are the focus of 
migration. For these reasons, China’s “open cities” of the 1980s were all 
coastal cities. But some smart cities in Europe and the United States are 
located in the interior, and some are emerging in China as well—cities 
such as Changsha, Wuhan, Xian, and Zhengzhou. Virtually all of the 
European and North American cities owe their standing to a strategic 
location, an industry with one or several leading firms, or the presence of 
established major teaching and research institutions.
Harnessing Intelligence
Before industrial cities can become smart cities, enhancing the depth and 
quality of human capital is critical. Smart cities require institutional 
mechanisms and research infrastructure for generating ideas and ways of 
debating, testing, and perfecting these ideas. Smart cities can achieve 
rapid and sustinable growth of industry by bringing together and fully 
harnessing four forms of intelligence: the human intelligence inherent in 
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local knowledge networks, the collective intelligence of institutions that 
support innovation through a variety of channels, the production intelli-
gence of the industrial base, and the artificial intelligence that can be 
derived from the effective use of digital networks and online services 
(Komninos 2008). Smart cities are open to ideas and thrive on the het-
erogeneity of knowledge workers drawn from all over the country—and 
the world. Moreover, such cities are closely integrated with other global 
centers of research and technology development, and their teaching and 
research institutions must compete with the best for talent and validation 
of their own ideas. Last but not least, because smart cities are at the lead-
ing edge of the knowledge economy, their design, physical assets, 
attributes, and governance need to reflect their edge over others. Industrial 
cities can become smart cities, and a strong manufacturing base is an 
important asset, as in Munich, Seattle, Seoul, Stuttgart, Tokyo, and 
Toulouse. But industry is not a necessary condition: Cambridge (United 
Kingdom), Helsinki, Kyoto, and San Francisco are not industrial cities; 
they are smart cities that have acquired significant high-tech or IT pro-
duction capabilities. 
Being Big or in an Urban Region
Research on agglomeration economies has pointed to the productivity 
gains that accrue to large cities from scale, diversity, and density of activ-
ities and from the apparent superlinearity (albeit modest) of innovations 
in relation to the size of the city (Carlino, Chatterjee and Hunt 2007; 
Carlino and Hunt 2009; Gill and Goh 2010; Glaeser and Gottlieb 2009; 
Rosenthal and Strange 2004; World Bank 2009).7 Diversified urban 
economies recover more quickly from shocks. Moreover, evidence sug-
gests that, because of their greater innovativeness, large cities can serve as 
nurseries for high-tech, new start-ups (Carlino, Chatterjee, and Hunt 
2007; Duranton and Puga 2001). However, it is desirable not to overstate 
the advantages of size, especially for smart cities. A meta-study of the 
empirical research on agglomeration economies finds that the productiv-
ity gains are in the 3 percent range (Melo, Graham, and Noland 2009). 
Furthermore, many cities noted for innovation are medium-size cities 
such as Austin, Boston, Raleigh, San Francisco, and Seattle in the United 
States and Cambridge (United Kingdom), Eindhoven, Helsinki, Munich, 
Stockholm, and Toulouse in Europe.8 Even the entire population of 
Silicon Valley does not exceed 2.6 million. Productivity gains from local-
ization economies can be realized by mid-size cities that specialize in 
manufacturing activities (Henderson 2010). If they are located in an 
102       Geography of Growth
urban region, they can realize economies of agglomeration, specialization, 
and scale (a polycentric urban region).9 
A typical urban region in an industrializing country is likely to be 
composed of a large core city ringed by smaller satellite or edge cities. The 
core city with a broad economic base and clusters of business services 
serves as the hub of the region and the major source of knowledge gen-
eration and spillovers. The more specialized neighboring cities, with lower 
land and housing costs, host clusters of industrial firms and other activi-
ties. The urban core can provide the technological leadership and many 
of the supporting business services, but innovation is frequently a region-
wide activity, and smart cities can be the smaller ones, with specialized 
clusters and other attributes, which are examined below.
Human Capital and High Technology
Almost by definition, export-oriented and sustainable cities are (and will 
be) ones that produce and attract large numbers of skilled and technical 
workers, raise the quality of human capital,10 and nurture a local innova-
tion system.11 The quality of human and knowledge assets is what makes 
a city smart and entrepreneurial. International research suggests that the 
presence of “star scientists” can initiate virtuous spirals in the fields where 
innovation is keyed to scientific advances. The biotech cluster in San 
Diego arose because several star scientists chose to locate there because 
the city was enticing and the university offered singular opportunities. 
First, smart cities have a high ratio of science and technology (S&T) 
workers in the labor force. Table 5.13 provides a classification of S&T 
workers for whom data are available in the United States. A similar clas-
sification is available for China and other countries. Second, smart cities 
host several universities, and tertiary-level enrollment is high. Third, the 
industrial composition of the city favors industries that employ large num-
bers of S&T workers and have high rates of patenting (see table 5.14). 
Fourth, smart cities usually attract one or a few major firms with a focus 
on dynamic industries that invest heavily in R&D and rely on innovation 
to maintain competitiveness. Table 5.15 lists U.S. cities ranked by the per-
centage of high-tech jobs in the total workforce. Table 5.16 does the same 
for IT jobs. 
Smart cities use information and communication technology (ICT) to 
support industry, the education and research infrastructure, and gover-
nance. In the future, ICT will be critical to sustainability because it will 
enable urban centers to contain energy consumption (for example, in 
Singapore), provide better services, and build more resilient infrastructure. 
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Table 5.13 Science and Technology Occupations in the United States
Occupation employment 
statistics code Occupational title
13017 Engineering, math, natural sciences managers
22102 Aeronautical and astronautical engineers
22105 Metallurgists or metallurgical, ceramic, and materials engineers
22108 Mining engineers
22111 Petroleum engineers
22114 Chemical engineers
22117 Nuclear engineers
22121 Civil engineers
22123 Agricultural engineers
22126 Electrical and electronic engineers
22127 Computer engineers
22128 Industrial engineers, except safety
22132 Safety engineers, except mining
22135 Mechanical engineers
22138 Marine engineers
24102 Physicists and astronomers
24105 Chemists, except biochemists
24108 Atmospheric and space scientists
24111 Geologists, geophysicists, and oceanographers
24199 All other physical scientists
24302 Foresters and conservation scientists
24305 Agricultural and food scientists
24308 Biological scientists
24311 Medical scientists
25102 Systems analysts
25103 Database administrators
25105 Computer programmers
25111 Programmers, numerical tool, and process control
25310 Mathematical scientists
25312 Statisticians
Source: Markusen et al. 2004. 
Smart cities have also taken the lead in providing affordable housing and 
space for industry and tradable services, thereby ensuring that new indus-
tries and talented people remain and contribute to local development. By 
retaining industry and not segregating the population by income, the city 
avoids sharp cleavages in income distribution.
A city that is top ranked with respect to high-tech and IT scores is 
Seattle, the home of Boeing and Microsoft. Table 5.17 shows the compo-
sition of employment in Seattle by subsector, underscoring the impor-
tance of activities notable for their technology intensity, such as aircraft 
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Table 5.14 S&T Jobs in Selected High-Tech Industries in the United States, 1997
Standard industrial 
classification Description
1997 U.S. 
employment
S&T occupations as 
% of industry total
376 Guided missiles and space 
vehicles and parts
76,808 42.7
737 Computer programming, data 
processing
1,425,663 40.7
381 Search, detection, navigation, 
guidance equipment
185,888 34.1
871 Engineering, architectural, and 
surveying services
938,469 30.5
357 Computer and office equipment 277,495 30.1
873 Research, development, and 
testing services
491,699 26.7
366 Communications equipment 294,531 20.8
372 Aircraft and parts 415,022 17.0
482 Telegraph and other message 
communications
815,427 16.4
131 Crude petroleum and natural gas 100,308 15.9
Source: Markusen et al. 2004. 
Note: S & T = science and technology.
Table 5.15 High-Tech Jobs in Selected Cities in the United States, 1997
Metropolitan statistical area Share of workforce (%)  Number of jobs (thousands)
San Jose, CA 41.3 289.1
Seattle, WA 21.1 174.9
Boston, MA 20.9 281.5
Washington, DC 20.3 321.6
Austin, TX 19.7 75.7
Orange County, CA 18.4 152.4
Raleigh-Durham, NC 16.8 69.0
San Diego, CA 16.4 112.7
Dallas, TX 16.4 197.9
Salt Lake City, UT 16.2 60.6
Source: Markusen et al. 2004. 
and measuring instruments, and for IT intensity, such as insurance, com-
puter programming, and architectural services. 
Industrialized and Export Oriented
From the experience of the OECD countries and the evidence cited ear-
lier in this chapter, it appears that an export-oriented manufacturing base 
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Table 5.16 IT Jobs in Selected Cities in the United States, 1997
Metropolitan statistical area Share of workforce (%) Number of jobs (thousands)
San Jose, CA 21.2 148.7
Washington, DC 17.5 277.1
Boston, MA 16.2 218.5
Orange County, CA 13.9 114.9
Denver, CO 13.5 88.0
Raleigh-Durham, NC 13.5 55.2
Minneapolis–St. Paul, MN 12.5 133.5
Dallas, TX 12.5 150.8
Austin, TX 11.5 44.0
San Diego, CA 11.2 77.1
Source: Markusen et al. 2004.
is a precondition for the rise of a smart city. As noted, some kinds of manu-
facturing industries are among the leading innovators and have registered 
the highest gains in productivity. Even in the U.S. economy, with its heavy 
emphasis on services, manufactures account for 62 percent of exports (in 
2008), with the 10 leading metropolitan areas responsible for a large 
Table 5.17 Key High-Tech Sectors in Seattle
Standard industrial 
classification Description Employment
367 Electronic components and 
accessories
4,787 
372 Aircraft and parts 74,500 
381 Search, detection, navigation, 
guidance equipment
15,593 
382 Laboratory apparatus and 
analytical, optical instruments
5,166 
384 Surgical, medical, and dental 
instruments
5,606 
631 Life insurance 4,235 
737 Computer programming and 
data-processing services
23,174 
871 Engineering, architectural, and 
surveying services
14,906 
874 Management and public 
relations services
7,406 
 Total high-tech industry 
employment
174,902 
 High-tech specialization index 2.23
Source: Markusen et al. 2004. 
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share of the total. Istrate, Rothwell, and Katz (2010, 7) note, “The intro-
duction of innovative products often precedes exports … and metro areas 
are the home to most inventors of patents and a disproportionate share 
of R&D, science, and even venture capital investments .... There is evi-
dence [also] that export-oriented industries produce more patents if they 
are located near other firms in the same industry.” Industries that nurture 
a dense network of suppliers facilitate innovation by reducing the cost of 
bringing ideas to fruition.12 Manufacturing industries are also more likely 
to attract foreign direct investment (FDI) and to benefit from spillovers.13 
The significance of manufacturing as the basis for technology-intensive 
and innovative activities is even more apparent in the industrializing 
countries, such as Brazil, China, Malaysia, Poland, and Thailand. Smart 
cities in these countries will arise from the ranks of the leading centers of 
industry, such as Bangkok, Penang, Shanghai, and Shenzhen.
Walkable
Cities that are livable, energy efficient, and well furnished with social 
capital are designed to be walkable. This means, in practice, that they are 
compact, zoned for mixed use, safe, pedestrian friendly (with green 
spaces, sidewalks, shaded lanes, street lights, and underpasses integrated 
into the walking experience), and have readily accessible public transport. 
Designing a city to be walkable also minimizes the likelihood of urban 
sprawl, which results in a healthier population and reduces energy and 
infrastructure costs (Frumkin, Frank, and Jackson 2004). Compactness 
and density facilitate face-to-face encounters, which, as Venables (2010, 2) 
observes, “allow high-frequency exchange of ideas and complex dis-
course … the building of trust .… [Moreover,] larger and thicker labor 
markets can improve the quality of the match between firms with par-
ticular skill needs and workers with particular skill attributes, can increase 
competition in the matching process, and can increase the frequency of 
meetings.” Wuhan, for example, has the topography and the potential to 
morph into a city as attractive for the Chinese (and, eventually, interna-
tional) creative class as Austin or San Diego or Singapore, but the poten-
tial of its many watercourses has yet to be exploited, and little attention 
has been paid to redesigning the city to reverse its drabness and sprawl. 
Penang equally has the makings of an innovative city, but it lacks a com-
prehensive action plan (see Yusuf 2008).
Sustainable
Sustainability has taken on much greater significance in the face of 
impending climate change, but not only because global temperatures 
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are rising.14 For a city to thrive and to grow, the availability of adequate 
supplies of water and energy is a must, as is the effectiveness of infra-
structure for disposing sewage and waste and of regulations for manag-
ing environmental pollution. Sustainable cities are notable for the 
quality of governance, and they maintain sound finances with the help 
of fiscal planning, local tax instruments, intergovernmental transfers, 
budgetary rules, and accounting procedures. Sustainability in the con-
text of an urban region demands systematic coordination among munic-
ipalities to ensure the effective planning of infrastructure and also 
coordination of taxation and zoning.15 In the future, sustainable cities 
will need to be much more energy frugal and “green” and to strengthen 
their ability to sustain shocks—financial and weather or climate related. 
A sustainable urban center in the average lower-middle-income country 
will need to plan on accommodating a large increase in the population 
and adopting measures to avoid the spread of urban poverty and of 
slums (see Linn 2010). In middle-income countries, cities will also have 
to prepare for the aging of populations. Even the most dynamic Chinese 
and Indian cities do not meet most of the criteria of sustainability.16 
Existing metropolitan regions will need to be significantly reshaped, and 
emerging cities will need to be much better designed. Because China, 
India, and other developing countries in Asia and Africa are only partly 
urbanized, there is scope for improvement, but past mistakes will be 
costly to undo.
Connected
Urban connectedness is important at two levels. Successful metropolitan 
cities are open, trade oriented, and innovative. In a globalized environ-
ment, this depends on the quality of the transport and the ICT infrastruc-
ture that links the city to the rest of the country and the world and 
facilitates the flow of goods, services, and capital as well as the circulation 
of people and ideas. Connectedness at the local level using ICT can 
deliver efficient solutions for the development of energy, transportation, 
housing, and buildings. It can promote commercial, social, and academic 
networking and the creation of social and research capital (it induces 
face-to-face encounters), which is good for productivity and for livability. 
Villa and Mitchell (2009, 11) observe, “Knowledge workers are opting for 
more collaborative and flexible forms of work that allow them to contrib-
ute when they want, from virtually anywhere, and with almost anyone. 
At the same time, the speed demands and complexity of knowledge work 
have increased significantly, driving the need to collaborate and engage a 
broader workgroup to obtain needed results.”
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Catalyzing Innovation 
Cities become innovative because existing industries or institutions help 
to nucleate new activities and start a chain reaction. The process can be 
initiated by any number of catalysts: the transformation of a local univer-
sity, the creation of a new institution, the arrival of a major firm, a small 
cluster of dynamic start-ups, or some other catalytic event that energizes 
a combination of intellectual and productive activities. There are virtually 
no instances in the past two decades of innovative cities being success-
fully made to order anywhere in the world. The attempts to engineer 
science cities such as Tsukuba in Japan and Daejeon in the Republic of 
Korea as well as other technopoles in Europe have rarely lived up to 
expectations. Most often, existing urban centers became innovative places 
because a critical mass of human capital, productive assets, and infrastruc-
ture and service providers was catalyzed by a firm, a leader, a university 
chancellor, or some other event. China is currently taking a top-down 
approach to creating smart cities. Only time will tell whether the out-
comes will match expectations.
Toward an Urban Innovation Strategy
For smart cities, openness and connectivity are more important than 
scale. They contribute to the productivity of research and the generation 
as well as the testing of ideas. However, a minimum level of urbanization 
economies arising from industrial diversity can confer important benefits 
by providing a mix of technologies and production expertise out of 
which innovations can arise and which provide the soil for new entrants 
to take root. Connectivity via state-of-the art telecommunications and 
transport infrastructure is a source of virtual agglomeration for an intel-
ligent city that confers the advantages of a large urban center without the 
attendant disadvantages of congestion and pollution. In this respect, the 
smaller smart cities of Europe and the United States enjoy the advantages 
of livability without sacrificing the productivity gains accruing from 
agglomeration. 
The inland cities of China, such as Changsha, Wuhan, Xi’an, 
Zhengzhou, and others, have a broad and diverse industrial base; all have 
the scale to become smart cities, but they do not fit the description of 
“open” cities connected to other nodes of innovation in China and the rest 
of the world. These cities remain inward looking and protective of local 
industry. Wuhan is a production center for optoelectronics, but it is not 
comparable, for example, with Warsaw (Indiana) in the United States, a 
The Attributes and Role of “Smart Cities”        109
small city that has become the global leader of the medical equipment 
and devices industry and the home of leading companies such as Biomet, 
Medtronic, Symmetry, and Zimmer. Neither can Wuhan’s leading univer-
sities, which are among the best in China, compare with the expertise 
accumulated by Purdue University (in Indiana) and Indiana University in 
medical technologies. Likewise, Penang in Malaysia hosts a large cluster 
of electronics firms and is a major source of Malaysia’s exports, but in 
spite of the efforts of the national and local authorities, Penang is far from 
becoming a smart city.
To exploit the innovation potential inherent in virtual agglomera-
tion, smart cities need to network actively with other centers through-
out the region and the world and build areas of expertise, as Wuhan 
can in optoelectronics. This calls for embracing a culture of openness 
and activism on the part of major local firms and universities to trans-
late such a culture into  commercial and scientific linkages that span 
the globe. Wuhan will be recognized as an innovation hotspot for opto-
electronics when a few local firms enter the ranks of the world’s lead-
ing companies in this field and local universities are viewed as doing 
path-breaking research in  optoelectronics. 
The remarkable feature of China’s leading inland cities is that each one 
has moved aggressively to build tertiary institutions and research facilities, 
trains thousands of engineers and scientists, and is home to one or two 
universities, which are among the top ranked in China. Chengdu, Xi’an, 
Zhengzhou, and the others have managed to groom a few firms that 
could become industrial anchors for local clusters, much like ARM and 
Cambridge Consultants served as the anchors for the electronics cluster 
in Cambridge (United Kingdom).17 Several inland cities such as Chengdu, 
Chongqing, Dalian, and Shenyang have also been successful in persuading 
multinational corporations to set up production facilities, which augment 
manufacturing capabilities and create the preconditions for a concentra-
tion of the value chain.18 Moreover, the leading inland cities are investing 
in the transport infrastructure to improve connectivity, and all have estab-
lished industrial parks to provide space and services for industry to grow. 
These, plus a full suite of incentives, satisfy most of the preconditions for 
the emergence of innovative industrial clusters. What might be missing is 
focus. The inland cities want to develop several of the industries desig-
nated as high tech. For example, electronics, automobiles, biotech, renew-
able energy, and advanced materials are on the shopping list of all cities 
vying to become the smart cities of tomorrow. All of these cities are 
attempting to upgrade local industries so as to move “up the value chain” 
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and to link this with a localization of the innovation value chain. All are 
aiming to increase local value added so as to maximize well-paid jobs and 
expand the urban revenue base. Although this sets the stage for intense 
competition, it also could lead to a waste of resources, as cities bid for a 
limited pool of talent, offer generous incentives to attract domestic and 
international companies, and protect local producers in an effort to 
deepen technological capabilities. 
The end result could be a suboptimal dispersion of scientific talent and 
of research and production facilities. Instead of a few world-class centers 
with substantial innovation capabilities and a focus on one or a few tech-
nologies, there is the risk that the inland cities would fail to acquire the 
critical mass of expertise in any area and fail to build innovative clusters. 
The competition among cities can lead to a massive expenditure on R&D 
infrastructure and on production capacity, most of it redundant, as each 
city attempts to raise local value added and reel in more of the innovation 
value chain. This may have worked when Chinese cities were beginning 
to produce manufactures for an expanding global market and investing in 
production capacity was a safe bet. Developing innovative capacity in 
various smart cities requires a different approach, and capacity building is 
only one part of the strategy. 
The innovativeness of cities is related directly to the quality of human 
talent. China’s coastal cities have been quicker off the mark because they 
have been more successful in nurturing quality, retaining the most tal-
ented knowledge workers, and attracting the cream of the knowledge 
workers from other parts of the country. The coastal cities are also more 
open and accessible to outsiders and have integrated with global knowl-
edge networks. For smaller inland cities to become innovative smart cit-
ies, they will need to specialize and pull in some of the best brains in 
their fields of specialization from across the country. Any serious attempt 
to become an innovative city built on the quality of talent, which after 
all is the life blood of innovation, will have to combine urban design and 
renewal with a focus on developing a few core areas of world-class 
expertise.
It may be misleading to think that the only industries appropriate for 
smart cities are the so-called high-tech ones with the largest number of 
patents in recent years. These deservedly attract the most attention and 
resources; however, many traditional industries can generate handsome 
returns through innovations that leverage findings in the life sciences and 
ICT. The dairy industries in Denmark and New Zealand, two of the lead-
ing exporters, have enhanced competitiveness and profitability with the 
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help of innovations that improve herd management, optimize the feed of 
animals, and monitor the condition of individual head of cattle. Efforts to 
reduce water consumption by the meat-packing and beverage industries 
and to control pollution are prompting a host of innovations that contrib-
ute to the bottom line of firms. The textile industry is improving the 
variety of its offerings and the attributes of materials as a result of 
advances in nanotechnology. The huge construction materials industry is 
primed for technological change, as the efforts to minimize greenhouse 
gases gather momentum. Likewise, manufacturers of machinery and 
equipment, at the heart of the industrial economy, are also faced with the 
challenge of designing machines and techniques so as to use different 
kinds of materials, reduce waste, and lessen energy consumption. The 
point is that successful smart cities in industrializing countries do not all 
have to join the rush toward the electronics, biotech, transport, and 
renewable energy sectors. There are plenty of other low-hanging fruit, and 
there are numerous innovations to be made in seemingly mundane indus-
tries, some of which will require an adroit combination of technologies—
the food-processing industry being one. This industry, which is a natural 
for cities in northeastern China, such as Changchun, is ripe for innova-
tions to cut back sharply on waste, pollution, and energy and water use 
and to introduce foods that are more nutritious and safeguard health.
Aspiring smart cities hosting medium-tech industries can consider 
whether the future focus of innovative activities could be on some of 
these industries rather than the fashionable high-tech ones. Their com-
parative advantage in innovation might lie in food processing and not in 
the auto industry. And food processing may call for the development of 
research in the life sciences in a few specific areas, such as packaging. In 
other words, a realistic assessment of innovation potential must start from 
a clear understanding of existing competitive advantage and promising 
future niches for which competition will not be too fierce. In electronics 
and auto parts, competition will be deadly, and inland cities might well 
consider whether they want to invest scarce human resources and capital 
in becoming, at best, the second-ranked innovative cities in a high-tech 
industry as opposed to the leading innovative city in a medium-tech or 
even a formerly low-tech industry, which they are able to revolutionize 
through innovation. Such innovation is more likely to be inclusive than 
innovation in advanced materials, for example.
Although human talent is the main contributor to the intelligence of 
cities, the firms that conduct most of the downstream research have a 
large role to play. The innovativeness of the business sector is a function 
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of many factors, some of which, such as management and the investment 
climate, are listed above. With respect to cities in several industrializing 
countries, two points need to be emphasized. First, state-owned and 
state-controlled enterprises continue to account for a significant share of 
production in key industries. Second, although the innovation systems 
created by the cities are encouraging new entrants, it is not apparent from 
the low rate of exit that truly innovative firms are being groomed or that 
struggling firms are being allowed to fail in sufficient numbers. State-
owned enterprises tend to be among the least innovative firms and low 
on the scale of productivity. The larger their share of gross value of indus-
trial output (GVIO) and R&D spending, the more protective municipal 
governments will be of local industry and the less easy it will be for inland 
cities to enhance innovation capabilities. Furthermore, attempting to 
build high-tech industries by supporting the entry of firms producing 
standardized products using well-established technologies is not a prom-
ising strategy. 
Policy Measures That Facilitate Technological 
Upgrading and Innovation
Some policy options with regard to the two-track strategy are outlined 
below. More efficient business and technical services and government 
procurement can facilitate the success of the two-track approach. 
Building “Smart Cities”
The central government can promote urban innovation capabilities 
through several measures.
First, the government can enhance the incentives to innovate country-
wide by taking steps to increase the integration of the national economy 
and discourage local protectionism. This would intensify the degree of 
competition among domestic firms and the competitive pressures from 
imports, increasing both entry and exit of firms and encouraging firms to 
compete on the basis of technology. Pricing energy and other nonrenew-
able resources appropriately, setting national standards (including envi-
ronmental standards and standards encouraging energy efficiency) for 
products, and enforcing these standards would also generate pressures to 
upgrade technologies, which some Western countries have done to good 
effect. The ability of smaller firms to meet these standards would be 
facilitated by strengthening the industrial extension system and providing 
smaller firms with access to laboratory, testing, and certification facilities. 
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The German Fraunhofer Institutes and the Industrial Development 
Corporation of Norway are good models for industrializing countries to 
adapt. In Japan, the TAMA (Technology Advanced Metropolitan Area) 
Association provides its member firms, most of which are of small and 
medium sizes, with laboratory facilities and testing equipment plus other 
services. 
Second, the central government can take the initiative in building 
countrywide research networks that enhance the sharing, absorption, and 
development of technology. Research consortia in Japan, Korea, and the 
United States have assisted in disseminating the latest technologies and 
pushing the technology frontier in selected areas. Recognizing the cost 
and complexity of research in frontier fields, even the largest firms are 
finding it desirable to specialize and to form partnerships with other firms 
or with universities when developing sophisticated new products or tech-
nologies. In addition to consortia, the technological and innovative capa-
bilities of nascent smart cities would benefit if both domestic and foreign 
firms could be persuaded to locate some of their R&D centers, not just 
their production facilities, in the cities.
Third, international experience suggests that smart cities house leading 
research universities that compete with each other and with other uni-
versities throughout the country. Smart cities are home to at least two to 
three of a country’s top-ranked schools, and these institutions can mobi-
lize the funding to sustain cross-disciplinary postgraduate and postdoc-
toral programs and set up specialized, well-staffed research institutes so 
as to achieve a level of performance comparable to that of institutions in 
more advanced countries.
Many high-tech multinational corporations are investing in R&D 
facilities outside of their home countries. Smart cities can derive spill-
overs from facilitating such investment in R&D infrastructure and in the 
creation of intangible assets. Cities also gain from significant spillover 
effects arising from the knowledge and experience imparted to the local 
workforce, the reputational gains for cities that will come to be seen as 
science hubs, and the contribution that such research can make to indus-
trial upgrading locally.
Fourth, the most important contribution universities can make to 
innovation is by generating ideas and serving as a breeding ground for 
entrepreneurs who are the vehicles for transforming ideas into commer-
cial products and services. Central and municipal governments are in a 
position to enlarge the share of basic research and to ensure the continu-
ity of funding, both of which could build innovation capacity in the smart 
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cities. The National Institutes of Health in the United States played a 
central role in the boom in the life sciences because it was and is a source 
of large and stable funding, much of it for basic research done in universi-
ties. This funding financed countless research programs, trained thousands 
of PhDs, supported postdocs, and created the depth of expertise that 
enabled the United States to become the leader in the field of biotech. To 
maximize the spillovers from the government-sponsored research and 
contests to develop particular types of technologies, one possibility is to 
make the findings of this research widely available. In the 1950s and 
1960s, the research on electronics financed by the U.S. government was 
shared generously, and this enabled many companies to come up to speed 
and become innovators themselves. Good research is inseparable from a 
stringent and disciplined process of refereeing and evaluation of research 
findings. The research community needs to take the initiative in this area, 
but the government could provide the parameters. The universities can 
also take the lead in thickening the scientific culture of their cities by 
promoting public lectures and exhibitions and contributing to the teach-
ing of science in local schools.
Fifth, there is the perennial issue of risk capital for innovative firms. 
Although some public risk capital is available in the industrializing coun-
tries, private venture capital for smaller private firms that are trying to 
scale up is still scarce. One partial solution is to increase lending by banks 
to high-tech private firms—and not mainly to government-linked compa-
nies. Such lending by local banks to local firms and the creation of bank-
led relational networks are a mode of financing that seems to work in the 
United Kingdom and the United States and complements the resources 
of entrepreneurs, “angel” investors, and venture capitalists. Too little bank 
financing goes to private firms, especially the riskier high-tech ones.
Sixth, high-tech industry depends on a vast range of technical skills to 
staff factories, render IT support, repair complex equipment, and provide 
myriad other services. Smaller firms and start-ups frequently have diffi-
culty finding such skills and can rarely afford to provide much training 
in-house. Hence public-private initiatives to secure and replenish the base 
of technical skills essential for a smart city can circumvent market failures 
and promote desirable forms of industrial activity, aside from minimizing 
both frictional and structural unemployment. Labor market institutions 
can be strengthened and made nondiscriminatory by setting up multilevel 
professional advisory agencies and increasing the provision of vocational 
training for which there would be a demand from expanding and new 
enterprises.
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Industrial cities have attracted a range of business service providers 
such as engineering research centers and productivity centers, but many 
of them lack market orientation and suffer from funding and skills short-
ages. It is important to make them more functional and more responsive 
to private sector needs through a public-private partnership approach. 
However, there are some good examples in China that could be repli-
cated. Figure 5.1 illustrates the example of Shanghai’s R&D public ser-
vice platform, which offers a wide range of business and extension 
services. These services cover the innovation development process, 
including the sharing of scientific information, technology testing and 
transfer services, and support for entrepreneurship and management. 
Seventh, although universities across the industrializing world churn 
out huge numbers of graduates each year, the quality of the training pro-
vided is frequently weak. In the meantime, employers experience a serious 
Source: Shanghai Municipality Science and Technology Commission 2006. 
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shortage of highly skilled technicians, engineers, and executives. This com-
bination of low-skill glut and high-skill shortage poses a difficulty for the 
skill transfer that companies need to improve the quality of their output 
or move to a more value added link in the chain. Transfer of managerial 
experience is one of the key ways in which FDI contributes to the Chinese 
economy. In effect, the education system in China does not sufficiently 
encourage creativity and initiative, meaning that new graduates often lack 
the skills most needed as the economy strives for technological maturity.
To move forward, both the private sector itself and the government 
need to invest more in improving human resources management in pri-
vate small and medium enterprises (SMEs). The following measures can 
be considered through a public-private partnership approach (for more 
details, see Zhang et al. 2009): 
• Using the legal instruments of confidentiality agreements and competi-
tion restrictions to protect technical secrets from being taken by R&D 
personnel when they leave the firm
• Improving labor market conditions by using relevant services. For exam-
ple, local governments could create skill development centers to (a) pro-
vide SMEs with management and technical training, especially related to 
innovation; (b) provide information on the demand for and supply of 
various skills and the premium on various job categories through close 
relationships with schools, training institutions, and the labor market; 
(c) collect and disseminate success stories about the management of 
skilled employees and the promotion of an innovation culture
• Strengthening policies supporting training and vocational education 
by reviewing the ceiling on tax-deductible training expenditures 
(2.5 percent of wage bill) of enterprises and redefining the role of the 
government in vocational education. 
In addition to human resources management, improvements can also 
be made in facilitating the collaboration of SMEs with knowledge institu-
tions and enhancing innovation services.
Eighth, scope exists for making better use of demand-side instruments 
such as government procurement and standard setting. Combined with 
adequate efforts to guard against the potential risks of rent seeking and 
protectionism, this would go a long way to encourage the demand for 
innovation services. However, the procurement policy can be a double-
edge sword. The key to success lies in open competition. Some potential 
risks in this area need to be carefully addressed: (a) the risk of turning the 
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government procurement instrument into one that protects national and 
local products from international and national competition, (b) the chal-
lenge of following the procedures laid out to identify the “indigenous 
innovation products” for the government catalogue, and (c) the risk of 
making government merely a passive taker of what domestic suppliers 
offer, rather than a demanding buyer of technologically sophisticated 
products (Zhang et al. 2009).
The demand for innovation could be increased through government 
standard setting. Standard setting allows governments and other entities 
to generate demand for advances in, for example, the performance, safety, 
energy efficiency, and environmental impact of products. To generate 
more demand for innovation, certain measures could be taken: (a) focus-
ing exclusively on product improvement and resisting the temptation to 
use standard setting to protect or help domestic or local industry; (b) tak-
ing European Union or U.S. standards as a technical starting point, while 
looking for ways to improve product performance; (c) involving industry 
leaders more in standard setting (this needs to be done in a productive 
way); and (d) changing the role of government from sole standard setter 
to time-sensitive driver of industrial consensus (Zhang et al. 2009). 
Identifying and Promoting Smart Cities
Industrializing countries need to embark on a new urban development 
strategy to realize their growth expectations. Such a strategy will have 
to be centered on transforming the leading urban centers into smart 
cities that are not only industrially dynamic but also fruitful sources of 
innovation. 
Various cities would benefit from such policies; however, because each 
city differs with respect to resource base and comparative advantages, 
additional polices differentiated according to the circumstances would be 
needed to accelerate the transition to a smart city and create the founda-
tions for sustainable innovation. Such differentiated policies that factor in 
the capabilities of a city, actual and potential, can be constructed using 
longitudinal data on trade, investment, industrial composition, and the 
labor market, combined with the gathering of qualitative information 
from the principal players in a local innovation system (see the annex to 
this chapter). Picking tomorrow’s smart cities is both easy and difficult. 
The easy part is identifying cities that are already demonstrating their 
innovativeness and need to smarten up their act. The hard part is identify-
ing the future performers from a long list. 
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Annex: Technology Capability and Innovation Criteria
Cities: Profile and technological capacity
• Population of city
• Population growth
• GDP per capita
• Overall GDP growth rate since 2000 and growth by sectors (in com-
parison with main competitors in China)
• Number of high-tech companies
• Percent of workers in high-tech fields
• Percent of workforce with advanced degrees
• Number and skill composition of in-migrants (since 2000); where do 
they go?
• Number and skill composition of out-migrants
• FDI
Science and technology input-output indicators
• Number of firms filing research joint ventures 
• Number of research institutes
• Number of full-time R&D personnel 
• Total public funds invested in R&D (and distribution of spending)
• R&D funds per capita of R&D personnel
• Patents registered by residents at their national offices
• Receipts of royalty and license fees
• Number of scientists and engineers in workforce
• Number of scientific publications (in major journals, past five years)
University sector
• Number of tertiary institutions and enrollment or number of graduates; 
percentage in science and engineering disciplines
• Percentage of high-achieving graduates who stay in municipality (top 
5 percent of class); where do those who leave go?
• Enrollment in doctoral programs
• Enrollment in postdoctoral programs
• Spending on research as a fraction of university budgets; as a fraction of 
total spending on R&D in municipality
• Number of spinoffs
• Number of contracts with enterprises; what kinds of contracts?
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• Number of patent applications; number of patents granted?
• Strongest university departments (by what criteria? national ranking)
• Leading research institutes (by what criteria? national ranking)
Manufacturing sector
• Largest three manufacturing sectors (percent of GVIO)
• Fastest-growing three manufacturing sectors (and share of GVIO)
• Top five exports to rest of the country and the world in 2000 and latest 
year; top five fastest-growing exports
• Largest five firms by turnover
• Top three firms in the three fastest-growing manufacturing subsectors 
(how does the largest firm in this set compare in size with the leading 
firm in this subsector?)
• Number of new entrants in these three subsectors in the past five 
years
• Number of exits from these subsectors in the past five years
• Number of high-impact firms in these subsectors; that is, firms that 
doubled their output value in five years
• R&D spending by subsectors as a percentage of turnover
• Expenditure on technology licensing in the past five years
• Number of patents applied for; number granted
• FDI in these subsectors over the past five years; national investment in 
these subsectors; national firms with subsidiaries in city
• Labor force composition of fastest-growing subsectors; increase in 
employment in three fastest-growing subsectors 
• Number of industrial and technology parks and incubators; numbers of 
firms in parks, change in number since 2005
Firms in selected subsectors (based on firm surveys)
• Proportion of enterprises that conduct R&D activities to total number 
of enterprises
• Proportion of R&D expense to total sales income 
• Proportion of R&D personnel to total staff 
• Proportion of enterprises that apply for patents
• Proportion of enterprises that possess patents
• Proportion of enterprises creating new products in the past three 
years
• Percentage of sales derived from new products
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• Proportion of enterprises making any technique improvement in the 
past three years
• Proportion of enterprises having cooperation with high-level education 
and research institutes
• Proportion of product export-oriented enterprises
• Enterprises whose proportion of sales of new products or products 
using new techniques is more than 25 percent of total sales
• Proportion of employees with tertiary- or graduate-level qualifications 
• Proportion of staff who received training abroad
• Firm size
• Plant vintage
• Foreign ownership or part of multinational group
• Existence of formal R&D department
Policies and incentives
• Principal industrial policy objectives
• Key policy incentives for achieving these objectives employed since 
2000–01
• Results of policy incentives; which were most effective?
• Main problem areas and policy challenges
Notes
 1. The stability of the renminbi during this difficult period assisted the recovery 
of East Asian economies. World merchandise trade rose by almost 7 percent a 
year, and annual inflows of foreign direct investment increased from US$959 
billion in 2005 to US$1.8 trillion in 2007 (UNCTAD 2008; WTO 2008).
 2. Helpman (2004, 33) observes, “More than 60 percent of the variation in 
income per worker is explained by differences in TFP. The role of TFP is even 
greater in explaining the cross-country differences in the growth rate of income 
per worker rather than the differences in the level of income per worker. In the 
former case, differences in TFP account for 90 percent of the variation.”
 3. The literature on the use of knowledge for economic growth originated with 
the writings of Fritz Machlup in the early 1960s (Machlup 1973). Machlup’s 
The Production and Distribution of Knowledge in the United States launched the 
idea of the information revolution and the knowledge society. See Lin (2007) 
for a detailed account of the genesis and elaboration of the knowledge economy 
concept.
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 4. The sources of growth in China are estimated, among others, by Badunenko, 
Henderson, and Zelenyuk (2008); Urel and Zebregs (2009), and Wang and 
Yao (2003); all of whom find that capital played the leading role. Time-series 
analysis arrives at similar results. A more recent estimate by Kuijs (2010) pegs 
the contribution of TFP during 1995–2009 at 2.7 percent and the  contribution 
of capital at 5.5 percent. 
 5. Although China’s exports of manufactures overlap with those of the United 
States, there are wide differences in quality and technological sophistication 
(Edwards and Lawrence 2010).
 6. With general-purpose technologies, countries can expect growth through 
innovations to accelerate quickly after a period of gestation. See Helpman 
(2004).
 7. In the United States, 10 large metro regions are responsible for a third of all 
patents.
 8. Two-thirds of the patents in the United States are not assigned to parties from 
a large metropolitan area.
 9. A background empirical study based on micro-level data in 2007 shows that 
industrial agglomeration has played a significant role in determining the pro-
ductivity of industrial enterprises in China. The productivity effects of indus-
trial agglomeration, however, differ across regions, scales, and sectors. The 
coastal region has especially benefited from agglomeration, and there is scope 
for interior regions to replicate the coastal region’s experiences (He and Wang 
2010). 
 10. This involves improving the quality of education and of health services.
 11. Universities can play a large part in drawing students from other parts of the 
country and overseas to a city. After they graduate, some stay, adding to the 
talent pool and helping to create a critical mass of entrepreneurship and skills. 
See Berry and Glaeser (2005).
 12. Helsley and Strange (2002) make the point that the concentration of an 
industry facilitates not just the generation of ideas but also their realization.
 13. A large literature links industrial productivity to exports and to FDI (with 
qualifications). A recent study by Istrate, Rothwell, and Katz (2010) points to 
the contribution of large metropolitan areas to U.S. exports, in particular, 
exports of manufactures. 
 14. Kahn (2010) discusses how climate change is likely to drive adjustment, inno-
vation, and a redistribution of the population among cities through the price 
mechanism. 
 15. The absence of coordination can lead to the decline of cities and the out-
migration of industry. See, for instance, Pugh O’Mara (2002) on the plight of 
Philadelphia, where the lack of coordination among the 238 local municipalities 
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in the Greater Philadelphia area has contributed to the industrial decline 
of the city.
 16. Sanyal, Nagrath, and Singla (2010) describe and discuss the limited progress 
to date by Indian cities.
 17. ARM (Advanced RISC Machines) was established in 1990 as a joint venture 
between Acorn Computers, Apple, and VLSI Technologies. It is the leading 
producer of microprocessors for mobile telecommunications.
 18. However, most of the more than 600 R&D centers established by multina-
tional corporations are in the coastal cities, chiefly Beijing and Shanghai.
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C H A P T E R  6
Globalization, Urban Regions, and 
Cluster Development
Globalization has resulted in not just a closer integration of economies 
but also a tightening of the links among major cities. Advances in 
information and communication technology (ICT) and transport tech-
nologies, together with the modernization of urban infrastructure, 
have further facilitated interaction among cities at many different 
levels and contributed to the emergence of global urban regions. 
Cities, like Bangkok, Seoul, and Shanghai, lie at the core of urban 
regions and benefit from agglomeration economies that arise from 
specialization and scale of production and from industrial diversity 
that promotes spillovers and the emergence of new activities. Research 
suggests that each doubling of city size can raise productivity by 
between 3 and 14 percent. Urban regions are characterized by a con-
centration of services, high-tech and creative activities, and nascent 
industries in the core city, with large-scale manufacturing coalescing 
in nearby medium-size cities and more specialized cities. This arrange-
ment optimizes the gains from urbanization economies in the core 
city and localization economies in the hierarchy of medium and small-
size cities in the urban region.
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A Holistic Approach to Development
Globalization has created new channels for comparing experiences and 
sharing lessons. At the same time, it has sharpened the competition for 
final goods and mobile human capital. This competition is multidimen-
sional, and it is forcing cities within urban regions to take a holistic 
approach to development and to compete on many different fronts—the 
business climate and the urban infrastructure being just two areas, with 
others, such as livability and urban amenities, acquiring more significance.
To attract resources and sustain the momentum of development, cities 
need to demonstrate their ability to enhance growth potential by cultivat-
ing several vibrant and preferably interlaced leading subsectors. Growth 
potential depends also on the age structure of the population, whether it 
is expanding or not, and the quality of the workforce. Quality, more than 
volume, of human capital appears to be the most significant determinant 
of growth. Recent research also suggests that, in view of the importance 
of entrepreneurship, innovation, adaptation, and invention for techno-
logical convergence among countries, the absolute quality of talent and 
skills might have a strong bearing on economic performance.
Growth potential also depends on how close firms are to technologi-
cal frontiers. Proximity to the frontier increases returns to research and 
development (R&D) and the scope for raising productivity through 
enhanced technological capabilities. In this context, cities signal their 
potential by their reputation for technological dynamism and openness 
to ideas.
The Role of Clusters
The growth imparted by leading sectors can be magnified by the forma-
tion of specialized clusters of networked firms that compete, cooperate, 
and deepen markets for labor, give rise to intangible capital, generate 
technological spillovers, and promote start-up activity. 
A symbiotic relationship between manufacturing firms and service pro-
viders, as is emerging in the Bangkok, Thailand; Hong Kong SAR/Shenzhen/
Guangzhou/Dongguan, China; and Seoul, Republic of Korea urban regions, 
for example, can lead to an unbundling of activities and greater specializa-
tion, to the advantage of both parties. A significant share—close to 37 
percent—of the employment generated by the export of manufactures by 
U.S. companies is in upstream and downstream services. In fact, manufac-
turing gives rise to employment multipliers of up to five and six that are 
far larger than the multipliers associated with services.
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Clusters generally form around nuclei. Urban centers with a strong 
development orientation and leadership, such as Beijing and Shenzhen, are 
attractors, and those with a preexisting industrial base can be a source of 
skills and intangible assets. These assets, which include scientific and non-
scientific R&D, software, worker training, brand equity, product design, 
and organizational capability, have accounted for 27 percent of the growth 
in the United States since 1995. Major research-oriented firms or multina-
tional corporations can provide a nucleus as well, and there are plenty of 
examples from Cambridge (United Kingdom), Medicon Valley, San Diego, 
Silicon Valley, and elsewhere of firms such as CCL and Acorn, Hewlett 
Packard, Hybritech, and Novo Nordisk spawning scores of daughter enter-
prises and helping to scale up the activities of a cluster. Multinational 
corporations and local firms are also giving rise to spinoffs and new start-up 
firms in Beijing, Seoul, Shenzhen-Guangzhou, and Taipei-Hsinchu. 
To thrive and grow, clusters require anchors. The size and affluence of 
the urban market (as in Seoul, Shanghai, and Tokyo) is one of the most 
important, but there are other anchors of consequence as well. Research 
universities have an increasing role if they can supply high-quality skills, 
contribute to network formation—local and global—and enrich the local 
knowledge economy by way of tacit knowledge, workshops, patenting, 
publications, trouble shooting, and the dialogue on technology. Vocational 
training institutions, physical and social infrastructure, affordable housing, 
and recreational facilities are among some of the other anchors. How a 
city goes about developing these anchors determines its overall competi-
tiveness in the global economy. 
Competitive clusters must be capable of upgrading, diversifying, and 
incubating new industries. Silicon Valley, for example, has served as a breed-
ing ground for several kinds of clusters, and both Beijing and Shanghai are 
attempting to develop multiple high-tech activities. A dynamic cluster has 
several attributes. It has an entrepreneurial culture that leverages the 
resources of universities and firms; it benefits from the local presence of 
“angel” investors and venture capitalists who support and mentor local 
activities; it combines the advantages of specialization in key fields with an 
openness to new ideas; it has the capacity to learn from mistakes and to 
unlearn; and it has a “buzz” in national and global circles.
History shows that many clusters formed accidentally because of a 
decision to locate an important facility (such as the National Aeronautics 
and Space Administration center in Houston, Texas), a university, or a 
firm that emerged as a major player in the industry (for example, Dell in 
Austin, Texas, and, perhaps, Huawei in Shenzhen). History further shows 
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that these chance events might have foundered were it not for supporting 
initiatives taken by urban leaders and national governments. 
Policies to Support Clusters
The supporting policies can take many forms. Strategic foresight exercises 
can assist governments in mapping out a long-term cluster development 
strategy and providing the stable long-term financing for R&D that 
research-intensive activities frequently require (for example, the backing 
by the National Institutes of Health has been critical to the success of 
biopharmaceutical research in the United States and the training of a 
legion of researchers). Complementing these are policies to ensure the 
supply of quality skills. 
For cities, policies that attract industry—domestic and foreign—need 
to be supplemented by policies that secure the city finances and ensure 
that services and housing meet the expectations of industries that are 
aware of and compare opportunities in other cities throughout the world. 
But providing services and infrastructure is not enough: cities must also 
market themselves aggressively by organizing events and seeking out 
business nationally and internationally. Such marketing is the most reli-
able way of infusing capital and ideas into existing clusters and sowing the 
seeds of new clusters.
Governments seek to stimulate the geographic dimension of innova-
tion and industrial clustering by promoting technopoles, high-tech parks, 
bio-parks, and industry parks and by encouraging venture capital and 
financial services to be located in the vicinity of such parks. This is in line 
with the knowledge spillovers that Marshall ([1890] 1920) first envis-
aged.1 Firms and areas in close proximity to vibrant areas will benefit and 
learn from each other, leading to increasing returns and further agglom-
eration. Knowledge is transferred through interpersonal contacts and 
interfirm mobility of workers. Knowledge and innovation tend to spill 
over locally first and to diffuse geographically over time. The pace and 
extent of this reaction-diffusion varies geographically and depends on the 
stage of industry life cycle and the importance of tacit knowledge. Closer 
proximity of firms, which helps to lower transaction and transport costs, 
also contributes to this process of diffusion.
Sustaining Clusters
Learning and knowledge transfer occur through networking—social and 
economic—such as user-producer relationships, user associations, mobility 
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of workers, spinoffs of new firms from larger, old firms, local libraries and 
information centers in the area, and so on. The ability of local firms to tap 
into such tacit knowledge depends on the existence of social links and 
open lines of communication in the area. In general, it is the creative 
atmosphere in the locality that contributes the most. New clusters are 
formed when a pool of skilled labor and university-trained human capital 
is available. In this context, there is an important role of diaspora, where 
returning human capital comes back, bringing some savings for risk taking 
and investment in new firms.
For well-established clusters to continue to thrive, it is necessary to 
have an external link or source of knowledge and learning. Therefore, 
links to regional innovation systems or some new source of knowledge 
are necessary for the local area to upgrade itself. Localization and 
 globalization coexist in high-tech clusters. Over longer distances, col-
laboration between the Silicon Valley and Chinese provincial govern-
ments and universities would benefit China. The Indian Institutes of 
Technologies benefited from their cooperation with U.S. firms and 
clusters. For newly formed clusters, the local areas need more intense 
places of interaction in the local area, and external links are less impor-
tant for a while. How do multinational corporations that locate within 
a local cluster respond to such localization? Multinationals are no lon-
ger the key vehicle for ICT development and diffusion. Instead, manag-
ers and skilled human capital are the main actors in this process. 
Therefore, free mobility of these carriers of tacit knowledge is needed 
to sustain a cluster. 
Starting a cluster is entirely different from sustaining a cluster. Starting 
a cluster requires managerial skills, technical specialists, and access to 
technology and market opportunities. Empirical evidence indicates that 
governments should help to support specific new firms (say, specific tech 
firms) through industrial policy rather than invest large amounts in start-
ing an industrial cluster.
As entrepreneurs in emerging markets take the lead in research and 
innovation, there is increased recognition of their impact on global busi-
ness structures. Previously, companies set up manufacturing units in Asia 
mainly for their cheap labor, while keeping the managerial functions in 
the West. However, in keeping with rising incomes and consumption in 
the emerging markets, the supply chains are now being altered. To under-
stand these changes, there is a need to understand the reasons why some 
regions and countries are becoming the new innovation hubs, while other 
regions and countries are being left out. Initial research in developing 
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countries indicates that the following factors are important for innova-
tion clusters:
• Urbanization. The rapid concentration of population in metropolitan 
cities reveals an increasing scope of opportunities that are attracting the 
young and educated to these hubs.
• Educational improvement. A more educated working population attracts 
jobs requiring higher skills, including research and development skills. 
Thus, better education at the higher secondary and university levels 
will have a great influence on the level of innovation.
• Business growth. A growing business sector indicates greater market 
interactions and, therefore, greater potential for innovation.
• Macroeconomic factors. A stable and growing economy is necessary for 
innovative practices. Thus, indicators like gross domestic product and 
value added by a sector are important yardsticks for measuring the 
health of the economy in general.
• Infrastructure improvement. A lack of infrastructural support would be 
an impediment to any business, including an entrepreneurial undertak-
ing. Therefore, basic facilities like electricity, roads, transportation, and 
Internet access are necessary factors for innovative businesses, espe-
cially start-ups.
A review of 24 cities for which data are available indicates a positive 
correlation between agglomeration economies, population, and other 
indicators. For example, the percentage of urban population is positively 
correlated with the other indicators (figure 6.1).
Conclusion
Innovation clusters are important for economic development, locally, 
nationally, and internationally. Yet, too few exist. Mills, Reynolds, and 
Reamer (2008, 6) lament the “thin and uneven (presence of clusters) in 
levels of geographic and industry coverage, level and consistency of effort, 
and organizational capacity.” Furthermore, traditional clusters—for exam-
ple, the automobile cluster in the Midwest—are under tremendous eco-
nomic stress,2 which includes the individual worker, the supply chain, and 
the host community.
Two key elements for successful innovation clusters are place and 
access to finance. Feldman (2009) notes that competitive advantage 
may be inherent to a certain locale. Seed and early-stage financing 
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capital is critical in order for innovative firms to be able to realize their 
ideas from inception through to market and commercialization. Policy 
makers can help. 
For example, the Obama administration has put forth an initiative 
describing a national innovation policy for the United States. Sallet, 
Paisley, and Masterman (2009) examine the innovation environment in 
the United States in which this national policy would operate. 
1. In regions around the country, clusters of universities and high-tech 
companies partner with local and regional governments to boost tech-
based economic growth and create jobs. The two best examples are 
Silicon Valley for computer technology and the Boston corridor for 
biotech development. 
2. Job creation and business creation, the main economic benefits coming 
from innovative clusters, mostly spring from so-called “high-impact” 
companies (high-tech start-ups and established companies alike) that 
sell goods and services outside their clusters to both national and inter-
national markets, drawing revenue back into the cluster (Acs, Parsons, 
Figure 6.1 Ranking of Metropolitan Cities
Source: Authors based on data from the World Bank and Brookings Institution.
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and Tracy 2008). These “traded” services boost regional economic 
growth and national economic competitiveness. As measured by patent 
rates, productivity rates, and other innovation metrics, an innovation 
cluster creates new companies and new jobs in a helter-skelter but 
overall positive direction.
3. The federal government provides large sums of funding for basic scien-
tific research and boasts a variety of programs to help companies and 
state and local governments to prepare executives and workers for 
employment at young, innovative companies seeking to commercialize 
this research. 
4. The national innovation policy under consideration by the federal gov-
ernment would link clusters with R&D firms and academic institutions, 
companies, and local and regional policy makers. The United States 
devotes 1 percent of the nation’s basic R&D budget to programs that 
support regional clusters, while Europe and China invest more. 
Notes
 1. “Marshall ([1890] 1920) suggests that locations thick with similar activity 
generate valuable agglomeration economies for firms—namely, better access 
to skill labor (labor market pooling), specialized suppliers (shared inputs), and 
knowledge spillovers from competing firms” (Alcácer and Chung 2010, 1).
 2. Automobile parts manufacturers told the Treasury Department early in 2009 
that 130,000 jobs had been lost in 18 months (Economist 2009).
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C H A P T E R  7
Urban Development and Growth
The world’s population crossed the 7 billion people mark in 2011, more 
than half of whom now make their home in a city.1 Each week, the ranks 
of urban residents are growing by 1 million, and on every single day some 
20,000 new dwellings and 160 miles of road are added to the existing 
stock. China alone constructs 2 billion square miles of floor space each 
year, which is approximately half of the global total. By the middle of the 
century, demographers project a population of close to 9 billion, barring 
unexpected changes in fertility trends and unforeseen calamities;2 an 
estimated 70 percent of this vast number will rub shoulders in cities. 
More people and more cities are an inescapable part of the future, and if 
urban densities continue declining at about 2 percent a year, as they have 
through much of the twentieth century, the built-up area will expand at 
a far faster rate than the urban population. By one estimate, the urban 
population in developing countries could double by 2030, whereas the 
built-up area encompassed by cities would triple. Clearly, we and future 
generations are in for exciting times.
The authors are greatly indebted to Lopamudra Chakraborti for assistance with 
the research for this chapter.
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The importance of cities predates the industrial revolution. Ancient 
civilizations arose in urban settings, starting with the earliest cities germi-
nating in the marshy areas beyond Baghdad.3 Greek civilization would be 
a desert if it were emptied of Athens, Corinth, Sparta, Thebes, and other 
cities. The Roman Empire was a “world of cities,” with Rome and later 
Constantinople as its political, administrative, and cultural axes.4 Islamic 
civilization, the Renaissance, the glory of China under the Sung and Ming 
dynasties, the remarkable architectural achievements of the Mughals, and 
the later rise of capitalism are all inextricably linked to cities.5 Abstract 
from the urban context, drain out the technological, intellectual, political, 
economic, and artistic achievements that flowered in cities, and most of 
the richness of history simply melts away. The industrial revolution gave 
cities added prominence by enormously enlarging their economic signifi-
cance. Agriculture and rural industry, long the economic heartland of 
nations, was displaced in a matter of decades by the concentration of eco-
nomic power in cities, which were quick to exploit the potential of steam 
and the technologies that transformed the textile, metallurgic, machine 
building, chemical, and other industries starting in the mid-nineteenth 
century. European countries that embraced industrialization experienced 
rapid urbanization and the transfer of the economic center from the rural 
to the urban sector. Henceforth, national wealth was increasingly derived 
from manufacturing industry powered by fossil fuels. In nations where 
modern industry was slow to gain traction or did not take root at all, urban 
development was much feebler. With the widening use of steam power, 
cities became even more attractive because the factory-based manufactur-
ing industry needed pools of labor (especially female workers),6 markets 
to absorb increased output (local, national, and international), and sup-
porting infrastructure and services. Cities could provide all of these rela-
tively efficiently and cheaply, and they simplified the logistics of input 
supplies, reduced the cost of intermediate goods, and facilitated the distri-
bution of products to other markets.
Until well into the 1960s, the growth and dynamism of cities in 
Western countries and Japan were paced by manufacturing activities.7 
Thereafter, the role of industry as the leading sector was displaced by 
services, and the character of urbanization began inexorably to change. 
From the late 1950s onward, many more countries, many of which had 
recently gained independence, began pursuing development along 
Western lines by emphasizing industrialization. Assisted by tariff protec-
tion and other government-provided incentives,8 manufacturing indus-
tries, frequently state owned, were established in the primary cities, with 
Urban Development and Growth       139
the capital city, the seat of administrative authority, being the preferred 
location. This led to the emergence of new business and professional 
classes that quickly allied themselves with administrative and military 
elites controlling the state and responsible for making policy and distrib-
uting rents. Thus began the concentration of wealth and power9 in the 
primary urban centers of developing nations, mimicking to some degree 
similar trends in the industrial countries, with an important difference: 
urbanization took off in the developing world without industry providing 
the main impetus in many cities. The research since the 1960s shows that 
urbanization is closely correlated with industrialization, but industry does 
not cause urbanization (Henderson 2010), as it arguably did between 
1850 and 1960 in Western countries. What then explains the surge since 
1950 that has carried the urbanization rate from less than 30 percent to 
more than half of the global population in 2010?
Urbanization: From Canter to Gallop
Five factors account for accelerating urbanization, and its structural 
characteristics and their persistence determine its dynamics, challenges, 
and policy implications, which will be discussed in the balance of this 
chapter.
First, the demographic transition—a sharp decline in infant mortality 
and increasing life expectancy, followed by a much more gradual reduc-
tion in fertility—has resulted in a ballooning of populations in developing 
nations. The natural increase has caused cities to grow and led to in situ 
urbanization—small towns and villages have mushroomed into cities in 
Brazil, China (Zhu et al. 2009), and Pakistan, for example. Brazil, in par-
ticular, achieved European rates of urbanization by 2000.10 Greater rural 
population densities have pushed people to migrate, and the “urban 
advantage” (a point emphasized by UN-HABITAT 2010) and income 
gradients have exerted a parallel pull.11 With population pressures rising, 
cities are seen as beacons of opportunity that are disappearing in rural 
areas. And urbanization has been correlated with rising living standards, 
although inevitably the transfer of populations has led to rising rates of 
poverty (Ravallion, Chen, and Sangraula 2007). Those living on less than 
US$1 a day in urban areas rose from 19 to 24 percent between 1993 and 
2002; over the same period, the urban share of the population as a whole 
rose from 38 to 42 percent. The urbanization of poverty was most rapid 
in Latin America, with the proportion of the poor living in urban areas 
rising from 50 to 60 percent between 1993 and 2002. By contrast, less 
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than 10 percent of East Asia’s poor live in urban areas, largely because 
absolute poverty in China is overwhelmingly rural.
Second, agricultural production is becoming less labor intensive, with 
machinery, chemicals, and energy serving as substitutes.12 Fewer hands 
are needed on farms, and if the highly productive agricultural systems in 
advanced economies are a mirror of what developing economies can 
expect, the share of the agricultural labor force in low- and middle-
income countries will drop below 10 percent of the national total from 
the average of about 25 percent in 2007. Furthermore, dispersed small-
scale rural industry, inefficient and polluting as it is,13 fights a losing battle 
against urban producers, which enjoy manifold advantages compounded 
by declining costs of surface transport and increasing efficiencies in distri-
bution and marketing technologies.
Third, technological advances and the evolving income elasticity of 
demand are responsible for structural changes that have enlarged the 
role of services. A stream of innovations has raised the productivity of 
manufacturing,14 contributing to growth, but also to a decline in relative 
prices of manufactures and employment in industry (table 7.1 shows the 
fall in the share of manufacturing between 1980 and 2008). Thus, the 
share of manufacturing in gross domestic product (GDP) is a shrinking 
proportion of the output in larger cities, although it remains high in 
smaller cities with industrial specializations. Meanwhile, rising demand 
for urban services and much slower gains in productivity have increased 
the share of urban services in GDP and employment. With the exception 
of China, services now dominate GDP everywhere,15 and in most cities 
in advanced countries, services provide the majority of jobs and generate 
more than half of the income. In fact, with industry pushed to the mar-
gins of some urban economies, services are the economy. A fraction of 
services are tradable, but most urban services in developing countries 
are nontradable, and services constitute a small share of the exports of 
 low- and middle-income countries, tourism being the largest.16 This has 
Table 7.1 Contribution of Manufacturing and Services to GDP, 1980–2008
Manufacturing value
added (% of GDP)
Services value added 
(% of GDP)
1980 2008 1980 2008
World 25 17 56 70
Middle income 26 21 41 54
Low income 12 13 42 49
Source: World Bank 2011a.
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 long-term implications for the number and type of jobs that the urban 
economy is likely to create, for growth, and for exports to balance the 
city’s trade accounts. To be viable over the longer term, cities—much 
like countries—must have something to sell, with any shortfall being 
offset through capital transfers. Until a few decades ago, all growing cit-
ies were industrial cities with export potential. This has ceased to be the 
rule with the rise of formal and informal services,17 which suspends the 
question over the future of urban centers that depend on transfers for 
their survival.
Fourth, cities enable firms to specialize and realize scale advantages. 
These so-called localization economies are an important asset for mid-
size industrial cities and a source of productivity gains from labor mar-
kets, technological spillovers, and the benefits of clustering (proximity to 
other producers and suppliers of services). For larger urban centers, 
urbanization economies are more prominent. These are the economies 
arising from the multiplicity of industry and services that open the door 
to diversification and induce the entry of new firms. Together, these lead 
to significant productivity gains and higher average incomes (see figure 
7.1 on the relationship between city size, industrial composition, city 
clustering, and incomes in China). Currid (2007, 460) notes, “Agglomeration 
may be even more important to maintaining the social mechanisms by 
which the cultural economy sustains itself [through nonmarket transac-
tions].” A vast literature, mostly on cities in developed countries, has 
attempted to estimate the gains from agglomeration, whether from local-
ization or urbanization or scale economies.18 Researchers differ on which 
gains matter more, but all agree that agglomeration pays, although how 
much productivity can be traced to size and diversity varies from 3 to 
12 percent.19 A meta-analysis of elasticities drawn from 34 studies cau-
tions that the gains from largeness should not be exaggerated (see Melo, 
Graham, and Noland 2009), but there is little or no evidence indicating 
that growth is disadvantageous for cities. Nevertheless, casual empiricism 
suggests that, as cities grow larger and become more complex, manage-
ment and services provision become increasingly more challenging, and 
congestion, pollution, and crime diminish the quality of life, as, for 
instance, in Bangalore and many booming cities in China’s Pearl River 
Delta. Whether these collectively erode the productivity-enhancing 
advantages of size has been difficult to establish, and the debate on the 
merits of largeness continues.20 This point is examined further below.
The fifth and final factor contributing to the vigor of urbanization is 
the role of cities in sparking ideas, stimulating social change by inculcating 
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Figure 7.1 Strong Correlates of Urban Productivity (City GDP per Capita) in China, 2007
Source: Lall and Wang 2011. 
Note: Average city income is measured by GDP per capita.
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new values, and encouraging innovation in every sphere of life. Steven 
Johnson (2010, 16, 162) compares cities in all their variegated complexity 
to coral reefs “powerfully suited to the creation, diffusion, and adoption 
of good ideas. … They cultivate specialized skills and interests, and they 
create a liquid network where information can leak out of those subcul-
tures and influence their neighbors in surprising ways. This is one reason 
for superlinear scaling in urban creativity.”21 Such innovation has buoyed 
productivity; equally, it has enhanced human capabilities and raised the 
quality of life. As cities in developing countries attempt to come to grips 
with increasing size, complexity, and the pressures arising from climate 
change, the innovative potential of cities will become ever more impor-
tant and the basis not just of survival but also of prosperity. 
While continued urbanization appears to be a given, urban develop-
ment is likely to evolve in different directions, with implications for 
growth and the quality of life. From the perspective of this book, the 
interesting issues pertain to the potential of the metropolitan model of 
urban development and how creatively metropolitan centers address the 
challenges coming from many directions.
The Metropolitan Powerhouse
Megacities with populations of 10 million and more have increased in 
number from 9 in 1985 to 23 in 2010 and account for almost half of the 
world’s wealth.22 Moreover, some of the megacities in East Asia account 
for a third or more of national GDP. A striking characteristic of the urban-
izing tendencies in East Asia, Latin America, and the United States is the 
emergence of metropolitan regions composed of a cluster of cities that may 
or may not include a megacity. Bangkok, Jakarta, and Seoul are examples 
of metropolitan economies in which the core primary city has brought (or 
created) dormitory, secondary, and edge cities into its orbit. Guangzhou 
and Hong Kong SAR, China, encompass another vast metropolitan region 
that arose with great rapidity once China adopted the Open Door Policy 
in 1979, and industry began transferring from Hong Kong SAR, China, to 
the Pearl River Delta.23 The Washington, DC, metro region and others in 
the United States and in Europe are examples of networked city flotillas. 
For many reasons, urbanization might take the form of the metro region in 
the future, with isolated cities becoming endangered species.24
It is a commonplace that urban development flourishes in certain geo-
graphic locations. In the United States, more than half of the population 
live within 50 kilometers of a coastline, and mild climates attract people.25 
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A prosperous hinterland, space for a city to expand, and adequate sup-
plies of water are other geographic considerations.26 Some of the world’s 
largest cities have been established at strategic points on riverine plains 
and close to river deltas, locations that facilitate the transport of goods. 
Most of the choice spots are taken, and because the availability of fresh-
water and climatic considerations may bulk larger, urbanization will most 
likely concentrate around the most promising existing centers, although 
rising sea levels will imperil several low-lying coastal regions and cities 
and some of the 360 million people who currently live in these areas 
(figures 7.2 and 7.3 show the countries in East Asia with the most vulner-
able populations; China is in the forefront, followed by Indonesia). The 
need to economize on energy use and on the cost of providing urban 
infrastructure makes the metropolitan model, with its compact design, a 
more viable proposition than a relatively isolated city (Glaeser 2011). 
The metropolis can also internalize urbanization and localization econo-
mies by combining a portfolio of cities in a single urban domain. The core 
city with diverse services and the advanced emerging industries that 
Figure 7.2 Exposure of People to Cyclones and Earthquakes, 2000 and by 2050
Source: Jha and Brecht 2011 (adapted from National Disaster, UnNatural Disasters: The Economics of Effective 
 Prevention, World Bank and United Nations, 2010).
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draw oxygen from proximity to centers of research can be the primary 
source of urbanization or Jacobs economies, while smaller peripheral 
specialized cities can serve as sites for industrial activities requiring 
cheaper land for factories and cheaper accommodations for workers. By 
yoking these different kinds of cities together with an efficient multi-
modal transport system, the metropolitan region can maximize the gains 
from agglomeration and market size economies. By expanding in the 
vertical plane, it can also squeeze a lot more people into a place with 
proven locational advantages and capitalize on an existing foundational 
infrastructure and possibly a brand name.
A broad economic base and a large urban market make it easier for a 
metropolitan region to meet its financing needs and minimize fluctuations in 
revenue streams, while keeping tax rates at moderate and competitive levels. 
Revenue adequacy underwrites industrial capabilities and provides the 
means for a city to adapt to changing circumstances, calling for the displace-
ment of older industries by newer ones and the renewal of infrastructure and 
buildings so as to incorporate the latest technologies (such as information and 
communication technologies and green technologies enabling buildings to 
use less water and energy) and accommodate changing lifestyles.27
“Green technologies” is a loose term currently embracing a range of 
technologies aimed at conserving nonrenewable resources, controlling 
and minimizing waste, and squeezing greater productivity out of available 
resources through new technological fixes. Green technologies come in 
many flavors, such as materials that reduce the weight and facilitate the 
recycling of auto bodies and parts; technologies that substitute  nontoxic 
Figure 7.3 Coastal Population of Selected Countries That Are Highly Vulnerable to 
Sea Level Rise
Source: Jha and Brecht 2011, adapted from Prasad et al. 2009.
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for toxic materials and cut down waste; sensor technologies that help to 
smooth traffic flows, provide early warning of impending infrastructure 
breakdowns or disasters, improve land productivity by monitoring soil 
moisture content, and detect toxic pollutants; software that helps to man-
age smart grids and energy use throughout the economic system and 
software that simplifies equipment and cuts capital costs, for example, of 
diagnostic and measuring devices; and design innovations that lessen 
energy and water consumption in cities and buildings or allow for effi-
cient disposal, salvage, recycling, and longevity of products (Tomlinson 
2010). The list goes on and includes manufacturing technologies that are 
energy frugal and reduce waste, technologies for the construction and 
food-processing industries—both vast consumers of resources—and new 
technologies for the information technology industry itself, a major user 
of energy (for production and use of products) and rare metals and a 
generator of toxic waste (see Fiksel 2009). Several of these technolo-
gies—in particular, those associated with transport, energy generation, 
food production and processing, and construction and maintenance of 
infrastructure—give rise to dense links with manufacturing and services 
activities. Replacing the global stock of automobiles and internal combus-
tion engines with hybrid and electric vehicles with smaller direct carbon 
signatures has enormous implications for industry. So does the building 
of equipment for urban public transport. The three biggest sources of 
greenhouse gases (excluding humans, rice cultivation, and cattle) are 
power plants, transport equipment, and buildings. If the vast majority 
needs to be replaced to minimize climate change and “green” becomes 
the order of the day, manufacturing industry will have to take on a chal-
lenge. And once green is “it,” every other activity will be affected, requir-
ing redesign, software retooling, and change in the structure of industry.
No metropolitan region ever optimizes on all of these fronts, and when 
there are many adjacent municipal jurisdictions, coordinating infrastructure 
development, embarking on revenue-raising arrangements, and sharing 
financial burdens can be severely challenging. By failing to arrive at coher-
ent and mutually advantageous outcomes through negotiated give-and-
take, multijurisdictional metropolitan entities are squandering the economic 
and financial benefits of agglomeration.
Metropolitan Challenges
Too many cities in advanced and developing countries are failing to 
exploit the urban advantage and are struggling to cope with the growth 
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of populations and the associated crowding, pollution, traffic, shortages of 
housing and services, increasing poverty and inequality, spread of slums, 
and environmental degradation.28 Very few cities in developing countries 
are able to generate enough jobs for the growing workforce, and unem-
ployment is endemic. Where economic performance falls short of poten-
tial or where revenue effort is weak, urban services suffer, which affects 
business activity and quality of life, especially of the poor. Most cities have 
barely begun to come to grips with the physical and institutional changes 
required to contain greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions29 and to engineer 
the resilience demanded by the threat of climatic extremes.30 If a dou-
bling of urban populations and an increase in average temperatures by 2° 
or more are inevitable by mid-century, then delay is becoming increas-
ingly costly.31
For cities in most developing countries, certain inescapable facts 
demand an adequate response—if not immediately, then definitely in the 
not too distant future—if cities are to reap the urban advantages and sus-
tain their long-term viability. Demographic trends and a youth bulge, most 
notably in the Middle East and South Asia, will necessitate employment-
augmenting policies to maintain adequate growth in incomes and social 
stability.32 For an expanding global economy, energy and resource scarci-
ties will be mounting concerns requiring a change in urban design, in 
modes of transport, and in soft and hard infrastructure. And climate 
change will expose cities to pressures and shocks rarely experienced 
before. Few cities will be spared, and many coastal and semiarid locations 
may only remain habitable through major injections of capital.33 
It is possible for metropolitan centers to thrive and for even the most 
vulnerable to avoid being plunged into vicious spirals leading to steadily 
worsening conditions. Inevitably, there is no infallible recipe, no sufficient 
conditions to assure success. However, the collective experience of scores 
of urban centers, many of which have embarked on innovative policies and 
introduced new technologies, provides reliable guidelines on how to create 
a dynamic metropolitan region that would provide most inhabitants with 
jobs and a decent life.
Wealth of Cities and National Policies
If cities are truly the drivers of economic growth, how closely is that 
performance keyed to the national policy and overall national economic 
conditions? In other words, can cities forge ahead by dint of good urban 
policies more or less independently of what is happening at the national 
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level? Singapore surely fits this description, being a city-state, but other 
cities, even the largest and most prosperous such as Bangkok, São Paulo, 
Seoul, Shanghai, Tokyo, and the complex of Guangzhou and Hong Kong 
SAR, China, depend on the enabling matrix of national trade, investment 
(domestic and foreign),34 fiscal, education, and other policies to provide 
the springboard for their own development. Even though decentraliza-
tion and localization have transferred more administrative and fiscal dis-
cretion and policy initiative to subnational governments, and even though 
cities are at the leading edge of development, fundamental national poli-
cies define policy parameters, incentives, and the degrees of freedom 
available to city managers and determine the fiscal and financial resources 
they can mobilize. The industrialization of Seoul and Shanghai was 
enabled by planning, day-to-day decision making conducted by city 
authorities, and a host of local regulations, rules, standards, and licensing 
requirements, but the opportunities for the cities were delineated and 
circumscribed by exchange rate, trade, industrial, labor, education, and 
technology policies of the central government. Both cities successfully 
groomed highly competitive export industries that generated economic 
momentum and employment and catalyzed the development of other 
sectors of the urban economy. Seoul took a lead in establishing a world-
class infrastructure to harness the potential of information and commu-
nication technologies (ICTs), with Shanghai now close behind. These 
measures initiated the process of modernization and integration with the 
global economy, and the end result as of now are two metropolitan 
economies that rank among the world’s most vibrant. However, in both 
instances—and these examples can be multiplied—urban outcomes were 
prompted and shaped by national policies. The government of the 
Republic of Korea, once it had embraced export-oriented industrializa-
tion, viewed Seoul as the engine room of the economy,35 and urban 
development complemented other policies—more recently, policies to 
develop an ICT-supported knowledge economy. The industrialization of 
the Seoul metro region propelled the Korean economy during the high-
growth era starting in the mid-1960s and continues to do so as Korea 
enters a postindustrial stage. Seoul not only has served as the seat of gov-
ernment and the nation’s cultural hub, but also is home to several of 
Korea’s leading export industries, including textiles, machinery, elec-
tronics, and now the creative industries.36 Once China set its sights on 
reform and catching up with the leading East Asian economies and 
designated Shanghai as one of the principal Dragonheads,37 the city 
authorities had the green light to pursue an ambitious urban industrial 
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strategy that was amply supported by resources from the central gov-
ernment and supplemented by foreign direct investment (FDI) induced 
through central policies reinforced by municipal incentives. Shanghai’s 
development since the early 1990s is the stuff of legend, and it owes 
much to the vision and energy of a succession of local officials,38 but it 
was the central government that loosened the corsets binding Shanghai, 
encouraged the local authorities to raise their sights, and created the 
policy environment that allowed the city to harness its vast latent capa-
bilities and bid for resources from elsewhere in China and from abroad. 
It is the central government that sets the stage and to a greater or lesser 
extent choreographs, through policies and other interventions, urban 
development in positive as well as negative directions. Where central 
governments are missing in action, passive, obstructive, or predatory, 
urbanization may continue, as it has in Sub-Saharan Africa and in South 
Asia, but the urban development that results in growth, exports, and jobs 
may be slow to materialize, if it surfaces at all. Some cities in Africa, such 
as Dar es Salaam and Kinshasa, have become more populous over the 
past decade, but not because of development. Urbanization in Zimbabwe 
and the Democratic Republic of Congo is the direct outcome of conflict 
and worsening conditions in rural areas. Development has gone into 
reverse because the states have faltered or are failing (see World Bank 
2011b). Thus, the policy making and administrative capabilities of the 
state and its urban strategy broadly define the opportunities for urban 
development. Some cities, especially capitals, are favored over others, and 
they have a head start; however, it is up to the municipal authorities and 
other stakeholders to derive maximum benefits from the urban assets at 
their disposal, to enhance competitive advantage in profitable directions, 
to augment the local resource base, and to encourage investment that can 
maximize long-run growth.
Notes
 1. Annual births average 140 million, and deaths average 57 million, leading to 
a net population gain of 83 million each year.
 2. The most recent projections point to 9.3 billion people by 2050 (UN 2011). 
According to John Bongaarts (2011), the margin of error for 2050 estimates 
could be plus or minus 1 billion.
 3. An aerial remote-sensing investigation conducted by Jennifer Pournelle, a 
student of Robert McCormick Adams, suggests that settlements were con-
structed on small ridges in marshy areas called “turtlebacks” (Pournelle 2007, 
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35), and these eventually grew into cities such as Eridu and Uruk—the birth-
place of writing; Vanderbilt (2011a); McCormick Adams (1966).
 4. The speeches of Greek and Roman orators are laced with praise for their 
cities, and such praise was often modeled on praise of individuals. The rec-
ognition accorded to the fallen hoplites in Pericles’s “Funeral Oration” is 
“subsumed into an account of the moral and political virtues of the city of 
Athens” (Grafton, Most, and Settis 2010, 202). Price and Thoneman (2010) 
observe that there were more than 300 cities in the Asian part of the 
Roman Empire alone and that the empire in its entirety contained several 
thousand cities.
 5. Bosker, Buringh, and van Zanden (2008) attribute the cultural and commer-
cial retreat of Arab cities from the heights they had scaled through the twelfth 
century and their lagging performance thereafter relative to European cities 
to the autonomy and “producer” orientation of the European urban centers in 
northern Italy, for example, and the grip of predatory states on the Arab and 
Islamic cities, which became oriented toward “consumption.”
 6. Kim (2005). Immigration to the United States contributed to the growth of 
the cities and supplied the workforce for industrialization.
 7. The share of manufacturing production in the United States peaked in 1979. 
However, cities such as New York and Philadelphia had entered the spiral of 
deindustrialization in the 1950s. New York’s garment industry, which 
invented ready-to-wear clothing, gave birth to the Singer sewing machine and 
accounted for 70 percent of all women’s clothing and 40 percent of mens-
wear in the United States in 1910, was battered by the rise of low-cost pro-
ducers in East Asia and by the revolution in telecommunications and in 
transport. The fact that it survives at all is because some products governed 
by tight schedules require close face-to-face coordination among suppliers, 
service providers, designers, and those who actually sew the various parts of a 
garment (Vanderbilt 2011b). 
 8. Most countries adopted the strategy of import-substituting industrialization.
 9. In some countries, land reform accelerated the transfer of power by disman-
tling feudal systems of privilege, wealth, and political control, for example, in 
the Republic of Korea. In others, such as Pakistan, the political sway and social 
influence of the landowning class has eroded much more slowly.
 10. Brazil’s urban population rose from 36 percent in 1950 to 77 percent in 
1990.
 11. This is the so-called Harris-Todaro effect of higher urban incomes. See Fields 
(2007). 
 12. See Smil (2008, 2011) on the energy (and nitrogen fertilizer) intensity of 
modern agriculture.
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 13. Township and village enterprises blossomed in China with the spread of agri-
cultural reforms in the early 1980s. By 1996, they accounted for 26 percent 
of China’s GDP and employed 30 percent of the rural workforce. But growth 
slowed thereafter, as urbanization began pulling industry away from rural 
locations.
 14. Most striking is the decline of employment in high-tech manufacturing in the 
United States between 1990 and 2008.
 15. Between 1977 and 2007, the share of services in global GDP rose from 55 to 
70 percent, and it rose to 75 percent in the Organisation for Economic 
Co-operation and Development countries (Francois and Hoekman 2010).
 16. See Eichengreen and Gupta (2009, 2011) on the role of services with refer-
ence to India; Ghani (2010) on how growth in India could continue to be 
propelled by services; and Spence and Hlatshwayo (2011) on the contribu-
tion of nontradable services to the bulk of the employment created in the 
United States since 1990.
 17. In 2007, the global value of cross-border trade in services amounted to 
US$3.3 trillion or about a fifth of total trade. However, the share is closer to 
50 percent when measured by direct and indirect value added (Francois and 
Hoekman 2010). Its growth is impeded by regulatory restrictions and by the 
greater protection accorded to services.
 18. Gill and Goh (2010); Glaeser and Gottlieb (2009); Rosenthal and Strange 
(2004);  World Bank (2008). Geoffrey West (2010) compares large cities to 
big animals whose size is a source of scale economies. When a city doubles in 
size, the resources required to sustain it grow 85 percent. See Lehrer 
(2010). 
 19. Rosenthal and Strange (2007) note that a doubling of city size can lead to an 
increase in productivity of between 3 and 8 percent.
 20. Cohen (2004) presents data underlining the inexorable increase in average 
city size over the past two centuries. In 1800, the largest 100 cities in the 
world had an average population of 200,000. By 1990, the population of the 
top 100 had risen to 5 million. Beijing was the only city with 1 million inhab-
itants at the beginning of the nineteenth century, and 100 years later only 
16 cities had attained this size. By 1950, their number had swelled to 86.
 21. Superlinear scaling refers to a faster than exponential rate of increase. Thus, 
as cities grow, according to Geoffrey West and his coworkers at the Santa Fe 
Institute, such superlinearity is evident in telecommunications traffic, patent-
ing, and pedestrian speed. See SENSEable City Lab MIT (2009).
 22. UN-HABITAT (2010) points to the emergence of the mega region—an end-
less city. However, the bulk of the urban population resides in mid-size and 
small cities.
152       Geography of Growth
 23. See McGee et al. (2007) on the rise of the region comprising Guanghzhou and 
Hong Kong SAR, China; Berger and Lester (1997) on the transfer of industry 
from Hong Kong SAR, China, to emerging cities on the mainland of China. 
 24. Eventually some of these will end up as ghost towns, as younger people 
migrate, revenues decline, services atrophy, and infrastructure deteriorates.
25 . The concentration of people in coastal areas is described by Rapaport and 
Sachs (2003). The migration of the U.S. population toward the south and 
away from colder areas is described by Glaeser (2011).
 26. The contribution of geography to city formation in Europe is analyzed in 
depth by Bosker and Buringh (2010).
 27. Smaller household size, increasing numbers of older people, and the explosion 
in relational networking are among the factors influencing lifestyles and 
demands on urban infrastructure and services. Per capita consumption of 
energy is greater in smaller households. http://www.statcan.gc.ca/pub/11
-526- s/2010001/part-partie1-eng.htm.
 28. Inequality is greatest in African cities (Gini coefficients of 0.58), but it is ris-
ing most rapidly in Asia (UN-HABITAT 2010). Although the percentage of 
those living in urban slums is estimated to have declined—from 39 to 
32 percent between 2000 and 2010—the absolute numbers have risen. If 
current trends continue, almost 900 million people will be living in slums by 
2020 (UN-HABITAT 2010).
 29. Cities account for 80 percent of all GHG emissions, with the top 50 cities 
releasing 2.6 trillion tons of GHGs per year (Oxford Analytica 2011).
 30. The topic of urban resilience has brought forth a considerable literature. See 
Newman, Beatley, and Boyer (2009); World Bank (2008); see the ICLEI, 
Local Governments for Sustainability website: http://resilient-cities.iclei.org
/bonn2011/about/.
 31. Heat island effects will only exacerbate the problem for cities, a foretaste of 
which was experienced by Chicago in 1995 and by Europe in 2003.
 32. Recent unrest in the Middle East, sparked by unemployment and growing 
inequality of incomes and opportunities, has demonstrated the seriousness of 
the challenge.
 33. In some instances, this will include expenditures on infrastructure for aug-
menting the water supply with the help of transfers from other parts of the 
country, as in China, and desalination of seawater.
 34. FDI is an important source of capital and technology transfer for industrial-
izing countries and is likely to remain a vital conduit. Singapore was the 
leading urban recipient of FDI projects in 2009, followed by Shanghai, 
London, and Dubai. In Latin America, Bogotá, Mexico City, and São Paulo 
led the field. See FDI Intelligence (2011).
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 35. Even though the Korean government was painfully aware of Seoul’s vulnera-
bility to an attack from the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea given that 
it was just 30 miles from the demilitarized zone, it acknowledged and exploited 
the city’s strategic location and long-standing role in the national economy.
 36. These include online video games, multimedia, and publishing. See World 
Bank (2008); Yusuf, Nabeshima, and Yamashita (2008).
 37. Its past history made Shanghai a logical choice. See Yusuf and Nabeshima 
(2006, 2010); Yusuf and Wu (1997). 
 38. Some of the mayors who contributed to Shanghai’s resurgence were Wang 
Daohan (mayor, 1981–85); his protégé and successor, Jiang Zemin (mayor, 
1985–89, and later Party chief of Shanghai); and Zhu Rongji (mayor, 
1989–91).
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C H A P T E R  8
Elements for Future Success of 
Metropolitan Regions
Size and agglomeration economies can influence urban fortunes through 
productivity, but there are too many examples of metropolitan regions 
that are punching far below their weight. There are megacities where the 
development of industry and tradable services is creeping along or in 
retreat, where growth is stagnating, and where the supply of housing and 
public services is struggling to keep up with the demand because the 
productive economic base and revenue effort are both weak. Cairo, 
Johannesburg, Karachi, Manila, and São Paulo belong to this category of 
cities that are deriving few advantages from size and suffer instead from 
the diseconomies of unbridled agglomeration. What differentiates these 
cities from metropolitan regions that are economically dynamic and reg-
istering high growth rates? For low- and middle-income countries that are 
experiencing lagging urban development in the face of rising urbaniza-
tion, the missing ingredient is exploding business activity represented by 
the entry and growth of firms producing tradables (whether manufac-
tured products or services), creating good jobs,1 generating exports, and 
serving as a channel for new technologies absorbed from overseas and 
supplemented by own adaptation and innovation. Bangalore, Bangkok, 
and Shenzhen owe their dynamism to the continual value-adding and 
growth-enhancing churning of the business scene, with new—domestic 
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and foreign—firms serving as a conveyor belt for investment and technol-
ogy and competitive pressures sharpened by exposure to global markets 
continually weeding out the laggards.
The entry of new firms and the growth of the most entrepreneurial 
firms are the lifeblood of the metropolitan region.2 The dynamic cities not 
only benefit from high rates of entry, but also, as in Beijing or in Dongguan, 
encourage the formation of clusters, which give rise to technological spill-
overs, stimulate productivity, and create conditions conducive to the for-
mation of new firms.3 Entry, cluster formation, and growth of the more 
productive firms can promote exports, which, in turn, further stimulate 
economic expansion.4 In fact, urban industrialization in the current con-
text and for all but the largest countries is inseparable from participation 
in the international market.5 This broadens market opportunities for 
 venturesome firms, which are a minority everywhere—but an important 
one—and spurs productivity growth. Firms with the greatest managerial, 
organizational, and technical capabilities grow, and in both East Asia and 
Latin America, participation in international value chains has provided 
firms with technology and growth ladders. The experience of Taiwan, 
China, in particular, highlights this process of urban industrialization 
through a proliferation of small and medium enterprises, their entry into 
trade, their proactive absorption of technology, and their emergence as 
globally competitive entities that drive the economies of cities in Taiwan, 
China, and the nation. 
Once urban development takes off, the large metropolitan region has 
several advantages. The medium-size peripheral cities are likely to grow 
quickly—a worldwide trend—to have a large youthful population that 
can provide entrepreneurial dividends, and to have lower-priced land to 
encourage new starts, especially in manufacturing. The core city, with a 
concentration of services and unskilled workers, offers a different range of 
opportunities, with many more niches for new start-ups and easier access 
to financing for existing firms or clusters of firms and for small and 
medium enterprises (SMEs).6 The core city is better supplied with busi-
ness development services, which can be valuable for start-ups. The core 
city is also the focus of academic and cultural activities. Together, the con-
centration of universities, research and consulting services, and recreational 
facilities provides the opportunities for knowledge workers with diverse 
skills to exchange and breed new ideas, some of which are enriched by 
being at the intersection of two or several disciplines.
The metropolitan region that combines the advantages of medium-size 
and large cities has strong economic credentials, but its full developmental 
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potential is only realized when certain other criteria are met in whole or 
in part. These are as follows: (a) industrial composition and clustering, 
(b) connectedness, (c) compactness, (d) urban smarts, (e) governance, and 
(f) sustainability and resilience. 
These criteria or attributes were not uppermost in the minds of city 
planners, managers, and developers; when metropolitan cities were taking 
shape in the twentieth century, fuel was cheap, abundant land was avail-
able for development, pollution and population pressures were less 
obtrusive, and sprawling low-rise cities appeared appropriate for the fore-
seeable modes of economic activity and lifestyles. Few if any city author-
ities seriously considered adopting a holistic approach, which seems 
warranted from the vantage point of current knowledge. But in the 
future, to succeed in attracting resources and talent and to maintain 
adequate growth rates, cities will need to monitor progress with reference 
to the above, moving farther along some axes than others, depending on 
circumstances, without neglecting any one.
The Industrial Matrix
It is appropriate to start with industrial composition because this is of 
immediate relevance for growth, employment, and exports, and the cur-
rent mix foreshadows future options for a metropolis. The type and 
competitiveness of productive activities dominating the city’s economy 
are the principal indicators of growth prospects through sales in domestic 
and foreign markets. They indicate the gains to be derived from produc-
tivity, from innovation, or from technological catch-up. Figure 8.1, on 
total factor productivity (TFP) by industrial sector in the United States 
between 1960 and 2007, demonstrates the edge that certain high-tech 
industries, but also services benefiting from information technology (IT), 
have over other activities. Figure 8.2 points to the research and develop-
ment (R&D) intensity of key subsectors among 10 Organisation for 
Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) countries, which is a 
reliable indicator of innovation and productivity growth. And the indus-
trial composition points to employment elasticities and the types of skills 
likely to be in demand. When firms cluster in ways that promote spill-
overs, the productivity bonus can be larger. 
The IT-enabled services sector in Bangalore7 and in Gurgaon, the sec-
ond largest city in Haryana and located about 30 kilometers south of New 
Delhi, are clusters of proven competitiveness and export success, employ-
ing highly skilled workers and diversifying into more complex services 
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offering larger rewards. This kind of industry, with good long-term poten-
tial and significant local linkages, is an asset for the metropolis, not the 
least because it is an industry with low entry barriers, which encourages 
the proliferation of businesses in societies where demonstration effects 
can uncork pent-up entrepreneurial energies.
Dongguan, one of the fastest-growing metro cities in China, is the 
center of manufacturing covering a spectrum ranging from textiles to 
electronics.8 These industries provide jobs for skilled and unskilled work-
ers, and the diversity is fertile soil for new businesses. Manufacturing 
activities in Dongguan target foreign markets, and major multinationals 
such as Foxconn and Nike have located their main manufacturing assets 
in the city. This further enriches the industrial ecology of the city because 
large factories owned by multinational corporations (MNCs) exploit 
scale economies and buy inputs from or subcontract with thousands of 
specialized suppliers.9 The MNCs nourish the ecosystem with capital and 
production technologies and boost the development of local research and 
testing facilities.10 No less important from the productivity angle are the 
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managerial, design, and marketing techniques and the habit of many-
faceted, incremental innovations that the MNCs introduce. That manu-
facturing productivity is increasing by 10 percent or more in cities such 
as Dongguan testifies to the speed at which technologies are being dis-
seminated, and this helps to absorb rising wages, while maintaining 
healthy profit margins.11
Bangkok is yet another example of a dynamic industrial metropolis. 
The core city is richly supplied with services, and around it has sprung a 
necklace of secondary cities crowded with manufacturing firms that rely 
on the providers of IT, finance, management, marketing, logistics, and 
human resource management services located in Bangkok.12 The metro-
politan economies and the advantages accruing from the presence of the 
central government are such that efforts to disperse economic activities 
to other cities in Thailand have largely failed. Other cities, such as Cairo, 
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Johannesburg, or Rio de Janeiro, with a modest suite of tradable activi-
ties pay a price. Cairo’s manufacturing sector is smaller, mainly low-tech, 
and low also on the scale of competitiveness. Services cater mostly to 
domestic demand. This constrains productivity gains, technological 
change, diversification, and growth. Rio de Janeiro is in a similar pre-
dicament, having deindustrialized and failed to substitute departing 
industries with tradable services other than those serving tourists.13 Rio 
de Janeiro, for all its natural beauty, is a city without the leading export 
and research-intensive sectors that can deliver high rates of growth and 
employment and lessen the city’s dependence on budgetary transfers 
from the center.14
In spite of its strong mining and engineering sectors, Johannesburg also 
has to cope with slow growth, largely because of the decline in mining 
and manufacturing activities,15 which tend to be skill intensive and offer 
few jobs for South Africa’s legions of unemployed, youthful, unskilled 
workers. Growth prospects of the Johannesburg-Gauteng region, while 
adequate for the near term, look increasingly dim over a longer horizon 
unless industrial trends are reversed.
What we learn from Chinese and some Southeast Asian metropolitan 
centers is that, for low- and middle-income countries, a broad manufac-
turing base—complemented, as in Bangkok, Shanghai, and Taipei, by the 
densification of services industries—promises growth and the scope for 
diversification. Analysis using the Hausmann-Rodrik-Hidalgo product 
space mapping technique indicates that production systems lying on the 
periphery of the product space without many links to other product 
categories, as in the case of Johannesburg and Rio de Janeiro, face diffi-
culty in acquiring the richly networked core activities that contribute to 
a deepening of industrial capabilities with better longer-term growth 
prospects.16 
Figures 8.3 and 8.4 present the sectors with the highest rates of pro-
ductivity increase in the United States over a 47-year period. These 
industries also rank high in the trade statistics, and the manufacturing 
industries on the list are among the most research intensive, underscoring 
the likely longer-term growth potential.
The list of activities is illustrative: these are some of the subsectors that 
performed well in the recent past and boosted city economies. However, 
productive highfliers can be stingy sources of jobs. Whether it is finance 
and insurance or electronics and biotechnology, leading innovative activi-
ties are more productive and more intensive in their use of capital and 
skills. If recent trends persist, and there is reason to think that they will 
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Source: Jorgenson, Ho, and Samuels, 2010.
Figure 8.3 Contributions to Productivity Growth in the United States, by Industry, 
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for at least a decade, metropolitan centers with a large share of the trad-
ables in the most productive categories could grow faster than other 
centers, but if they wish to produce an abundance of jobs, they will need 
to nurture many nontradables, mainly services.
Connectivity
A highly connected metropolitan region enhances productivity and 
maximizes the benefits from increased trade and capital flows, the circu-
lation of talented people, and the collaborative efforts of researchers in 
different countries. Connectedness has several facets, but the two that 
deserve the most attention are the quality of the information and com-
munication technology (ICT) and transport infrastructure and the links 
they help to create.
A wealth of research has pieced together evidence mainly from devel-
oped countries showing that the cross-sectoral absorption of ICT in 
myriad activities has raised productivity and induced innovation. Erik 
Brynjolfsson believes that IT is changing the innovation process itself. He 
claims, “IT is setting off a revolution on four dimensions simultaneously: 
measurement, experimentation, sharing, and replication that reinforce 
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and magnify each other” and permit the rapid scaling up of innovations 
(quoted in Hopkins 2010, 52). The United States has been the leader in 
this regard, although European countries have also benefited, and some 
developing countries are catching up.
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The centrality of capital for growth in the world as a whole since 1980 
has been highlighted by Jorgenson and Vu Khuong (2009), who show 
that capital was the source of 54 percent of growth in 1989–95 and that 
its share was still as high as 41 percent during 2000–06, exceeding the 
contribution of other factors. The compelling development since the mid-
1990s is the increasing importance of total factor productivity, which 
accounted for 36 percent of growth in 2000–06, compared with less than 
a fifth in 1989–95. If this trend were to persist—and Jorgenson, Ho, and 
Samuels (2010) acknowledge that productivity will be vital for maintain-
ing U.S. living standards over the longer term—then TFP could draw 
abreast or even pull ahead of capital as a driver of growth. However, as 
Jorgenson and his coauthors observe, “With only replication [of estab-
lished technologies] and without innovation, output will increase in 
proportion to capital and labor inputs. By contrast, the successful intro-
duction of new products and new or altered processes, organization struc-
tures, and business models generates growth of output that exceeds the 
growth of capital and labor inputs. This results in growth of multifactor 
productivity or output per unit of input” (Jorgenson, Ho, and Samuels 
2010, 13–14). Innovation, or the successful exploitation of new ideas and 
technology, is becoming the cornerstone of growth, and ICT is the leading 
driver of such growth.17 As Jorgenson, Ho, and Samuels (2009) show,18 
the contribution to growth of IT-producing and IT-using industries in the 
United States has increased steadily, and IT capital now makes a substan-
tial contribution to gains in productivity. Additional evidence on the 
salience of ICT is provided by Brynjolfsson and Saunders (2010) and the 
research conducted by the Information Technology and Innovation 
Foundation on urban activities deriving productivity gains from IT.19
The point to be noted is that the use of ICT for industrial, commercial, 
or social purposes is to a great extent an urban phenomena and, because 
frequent exchanges via electronic media also increase face-to-face 
encounters (Leamer and Storper 2001), a metro region well furnished 
with ICT infrastructure and recreational amenities is the ideal setting for 
the circulation of information, the testing of ideas, and the fruiting of 
innovation.
Seoul is a classic example of a city with state-of-the-art ICT infrastruc-
ture providing locals with unparalleled access to the Internet and the 
latest advances in mobile telecommunications. Seoul’s edge over most 
other cities derives from the government’s ambitious plans, launched in 
1995, to wire the nation in enlightened anticipation of a tectonic shift in 
communications and the use of media20 and subsequent initiatives to 
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develop IT-based activities. Such activities include the Digital Media City 
to support the growth of the digital content industry, a major source of 
high-value-adding jobs in the metro area.
Productivity gains aside, the large strides made in weaving ICT into the 
fabric of urban life in the Republic of Korea have spurred innovation, as 
evidenced by increasing patent output and, more important, the rise in 
international collaboration between Korean and foreign researchers. 
Domestic connectivity strengthened urban civil society and energized 
social and intellectual activities. International connectivity is tightening 
the links that Korea needs to sustain its competitiveness.
Singapore is another city that has leveraged ICT to maximize the gains 
from globalization and made its business environment the envy of other 
countries in the region and beyond. Singapore is a leader in technologies 
to expedite the operations of its busy container port and its world-class 
airport.21 It also uses electronic pricing to smooth traffic flows and to 
minimize congestion. Singapore’s e-government platform is the bench-
mark for other cities, and the government is continuously searching for 
ways to prune transaction costs further. Through these investments in ICT 
as well as others in education and health care, Singapore has strengthened 
connectivity and raised total factor productivity. Other cities taking note 
of the benefits accruing to Seoul and Singapore have begun investing in 
infrastructure and training, but they frequently neglect to adopt a com-
prehensive approach, which is the key to mutually reinforcing gains from 
several interlocking activities.
A major metropolis seeking greater connectivity must also look to its 
airport and port facilities (if it is a coastal city). An urban economy reliant 
on trade—and the foremost metropolitan regions depend on trade to 
boost domestic sources of demand by a few percentage points—must 
enlarge and grease the channels through which trade flows.22 The eco-
nomic significance of ports has long been recognized. A busy port has a 
large footprint, employing tens of thousands and consuming a wide 
assortment of services produced locally.23 The contribution of a major 
international airport equals and may exceed that of a port. By value, close 
to one-third of global trade is now shipped by air.24 This includes high-
value electronic products and pharmaceuticals, cut flowers, meat, and 
other farm products requiring a cold chain—and the percentages are ris-
ing as the cost of air transport declines in relative terms with the intro-
duction of larger fuel-efficient aircraft. In addition, airports serve as the 
gateways for the export of tourism and business travel services, which 
cities such as Bangkok, Cairo, Cape Town, and Rio de Janeiro depend on 
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for the large slice of their earnings from trade. As air transport has 
increased its share of trade, major airports with space around them are 
becoming the foci of industrial and services clusters. A classic example is 
Dulles airport serving the Washington, DC, area, which is the axis of IT, 
telecommunications, and defense industry clusters and the driver of 
growth for the metropolitan region.25 Other cities are also discovering 
that airports can stimulate clustered industrial activities through connec-
tivity and induced employment. Songdo City,26 which is sprouting IT 
activities adjacent to Seoul-Incheon airport, is one example; Bangkok’s 
new Suvarnabhumi airport is another. Both cities see these airports as 
hubs for new activities with a high trade component.
The Smarter Metropolis
The globally connected metropolis, which is a “smart city” like Seoul or 
Singapore or San Francisco or San Jose, is doubly advantaged because it 
has the capabilities to exploit the opportunities arising from globaliza-
tion. There is no precise definition of the smart city. Being smart is associ-
ated with several attributes, including a large percentage of the population 
with a college degree, state-of-the-art ICT infrastructure,27 and the early 
adoption of environmentally friendly and green technologies. However, 
for our purposes, urban “smarts” or intelligence derives from a concentra-
tion of skills and the quality of governance. In other words, being smart 
has to do with the brainpower a city can marshal to manage and acceler-
ate its development with the help of innovation at many different levels. 
Alongside depth and quality of human capital, these cities require insti-
tutional mechanisms and basic research for generating ideas and ways of 
debating, testing, and perfecting these ideas.
The smart city can achieve rapid and sustainable growth of industry by 
bringing together and fully mobilizing four forms of intelligence: the 
human intelligence inherent in local knowledge networks enriched by the 
inmigration of people with diverse talents;28 the collective intelligence of 
institutions that support innovation through a variety of channels and 
serve to urbanize technologies, shaping them to suit the environment and 
making them easily available to users; the production intelligence of its 
industrial base; and the collective intelligence that can be derived from 
the effective use of digital networks and online services—a kind of invol-
untary crowd sourcing that contributes to problem solving and a progres-
sive upgrading of the urban environment (Komninos 2008). Cities 
positioning themselves to become innovative hotspots are open to ideas 
168       Geography of Growth
and thrive on the heterogeneity of knowledge workers drawn from all 
over the country and the world. Moreover, such cities are closely inte-
grated with other global centers of research and technology develop-
ment—they are a part of the global innovation system—and their teaching 
and research institutions must compete with the best for talent and vali-
dation of their own ideas. Last, but not least, because smart cities are at 
the leading edge of the knowledge economy, their design, physical assets, 
attributes, and governance need to reflect their edge over others. Industrial 
cities can become innovative cities, and a strong manufacturing base can 
be an asset, as it is for Munich, Seattle, Seoul, Stuttgart, Tokyo, and 
Toulouse. But industry is not a necessary condition: Cambridge (United 
Kingdom), Helsinki, Kyoto, and San Francisco are not industrial cities; 
they are innovative cities that have acquired significant high-tech or IT 
production capabilities. As long as a city is part of a metro region or adja-
cent to one, size can be a secondary consideration and overridden by the 
advantages of livability. Medium-size industrial cities, by exploiting local-
ization economies, can promote the formation of vibrant industrial clus-
ters. And because they tend to be less congested, medium-size cities can 
appeal to younger age groups, who are concerned about cost of living and 
environmental quality,29 as well as to members of the creative class, who 
place a high premium on quality of life (see tables 8A.1–8A.5 at the end 
of this chapter, which rank cities with respect to quality of life and creativ-
ity and highlight the lead enjoyed by medium-size cities). Of course, only 
a subset of mid-size cities are potential winners, but those that exploit 
their location and strategically develop the assets that contribute to long-
term prosperity can equal or exceed the innovation and productivity 
advantages of the most dynamic large cities.30
A city with an abundance of skills is better positioned to maintain 
industrial competitiveness, to move up the value chain by assimilating 
technologies and reinforcing catch-up with innovations, and to diversify 
into more profitable activities as existing ones enter the stage in their life 
cycle when commoditization lowers entry barriers, pares profit margins, 
and triggers migration to lower-cost locations. Glaeser (2011) singles out 
Boston as a skilled city that has flourished because its world-class univer-
sities and urban ambience have made it “sticky” for talented people (on 
stickiness, see Markusen 1996). The wide base of skills has nurtured 
entrepreneurs and led to the proliferation of firms offering jobs for skilled 
workers; with the universities generating so many ideas, Boston has recov-
ered from downturns and bouts of deindustrialization by pursuing new 
technological opportunities using its unique labor pool and financing 
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these with the help of highly experienced, locally based venture capital-
ists. Boston is not alone. Other cities such as Bangalore, Beijing, Singapore, 
and Taipei are adopting similar models of development to good effect.
The leading smart cities have not only deep pools of skills, but also 
high-quality skills. Growth regressions are uncovering a robust relation-
ship between the quality of schooling, as captured by test scores of middle 
school students, and the increase in gross domestic product (GDP) 
(Hanushek 2010; Hanushek and Woessman 2010). These have been 
capped by related findings highlighting the significance of the numbers of 
students in the upper tail of the distribution of test scores (see Pritchett 
and Viarengo 2010). A country—or city—with many students with sci-
ence and math scores in the highest percentiles has the strongest growth 
prospects. Singapore, which is top-ranked by test scores, also has impres-
sive competitiveness and innovation capacity rankings. It has successfully 
diversified and sustained an average growth rate of 5 percent since 1995. 
Shanghai, which topped the 2009 Programme for International Student 
Assessment results, is en route to becoming a smart metropolis the equal 
of Seoul and Tokyo. Shanghai is a magnet for talent from throughout 
China, and this inflow augments its own base of high-quality skills. As 
traditional light manufacturing industries transfer to cities in Shanghai’s 
hinterland or to the interior, new and more skill-intensive activities are 
enabling Shanghai to expand in fresh directions appropriate for a city with 
per capita GDP that is five times the average for China. Mexico City and 
São Paulo trail Shanghai’s performance, and their prospects are less bright 
because they have not set their sights on becoming smart cities with 
human capabilities as the prime source of growth.
Governing the Metropolitan Center
A metropolis will struggle to accumulate and retain talent and create new 
business lines if urban planning, management, and financing do not pro-
vide the necessary preconditions for development. That is, smart urban 
governance complements other forms of urban intelligence. Suffice to say 
that the selection and empowerment of city managers are one of the req-
uisites. Smart cities plan ahead, establish realistic monitorable targets, and 
place a premium on rapid and efficient implementation of policies.31 
Cities such as Seoul, Singapore, and Tokyo draw their governance capa-
bilities from the quality of a well-paid municipal workforce and an insti-
tutional infrastructure that evolves with changing developmental 
imperatives and is quick to incorporate IT as well as other technologies to 
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improve services delivery. The enduring characteristic of smart cities is the 
awareness of competition and the commitment to incremental progress 
through benchmarking and learning from other cities. Smart cities such as 
Singapore are not caught unawares by the hollowing out of traditional 
industries; instead, they seek to anticipate and avert or neutralize trends 
that can lead to the entrenching of slums and environmental decay—
physical as well as social. Cape Town, Karachi, and Rio de Janeiro have 
sacrificed many of the advantages that could be derived from a concentra-
tion of skills because the environment in both cities is rendered perilous 
by widespread unemployment, serious security concerns, and the obtru-
siveness of slums, whether in the core city areas or on the outskirts.
Being smart is all about defining ambitious but achievable develop-
ment objectives, mobilizing resources using a frequently sharpened set of 
incentives to deliver results, thinking ahead so as to minimize the risk of 
being caught napping, and solving problems expeditiously. Smart cities 
can raise their game by making full use of technological opportunities as 
they arise and by inculcating a culture of innovation. However, high-tech 
and IT intensity is not the answer for most cities, or at best it is a partial 
answer. Smart urban development in Cairo and Karachi would be low-
tech yet innovative at the outset, while aiming for longer-term growth 
based on skills and technological capabilities that would narrow the vast 
gaps in productivity between these cities and some of their competitors 
in East Asia.
The Resilience Imperative
A metropolis that is deemed smart and successful must also meet the test 
of sustainability and resilience. Metropolitan economies in low- and 
middle-income countries must strive after decades of growth in the 5 to 
8 percent range to generate enough employment, raise living standards of 
the vast majority to socially acceptable levels, and find the resources to 
address legacy problems and upcoming challenges, not to mention envi-
ronmental and economic shocks.
Both governance and skills directly impinge on sustainability. 
Governance affects development because it is a determinant of the urban 
business climate and the level of business activity. Skills likewise have a 
powerful bearing on development, as discussed above. The point to be 
noted is that the sustainability of a metropolitan economy is inseparable 
from growth. If growth stalls or goes into reverse, as happens when a key 
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industrial or mining activity implodes—as has happened in Detroit, 
Pittsburgh, and some cities in Eastern Europe—sustainability is imperiled 
because industrial decline is followed by rising poverty and social unrest 
and by an exodus of capital and skills. Avoiding such a contingency is 
central to the notion of sustainability. A diversified metropolitan region is 
at lower risk than smaller specialized urban centers, but, as even New 
York discovered in the mid-1970s, a narrowing of the industrial base and 
excessive dependence on a few services subject to crisis-induced swings 
can become problematic. Both Seoul and Shanghai have industrial 
breadth, as do Karachi, Lagos, and Mumbai, but the plight of the latter 
three cities draws attention to two other facets of sustainability: urban 
finance and urban design.
Financing Urbanization
Urban development assumes the provision of an array of services for 
businesses and households. If these dip below minimum standards of 
adequacy, development is impeded and the urban economy begins to 
stall and unravel, as happens in conflict and immediate postconflict situ-
ations. Infrastructure services, public health services, education services, 
and policies are among the basics. Scarcity of water, for example, can 
seriously constrain urban development, and poor sewage, waste disposal, 
and sanitation severely compromise the health and living conditions of 
the majority.
Whether a metropolitan region can build and maintain physical infra-
structure, finance basic services, supply affordable housing, and offer 
recreational amenities is ultimately a function of finances. Transfers from 
central and provincial governments (both general and specific) are the 
source of revenues, but sustainability requires that these constitute a 
relatively minor source of income and that the local tax base is the pri-
mary source of revenues. At least five criteria must be met for a city to be 
broadly self-sufficient with regard to revenue.
First, revenue generation is a function of the scale of economic activity 
and how this translates into earnings of residents, the distribution of 
incomes, and the value of taxable assets.
Second, the revenue actually raised depends on the degree of local tax 
autonomy and taxes assigned to local authorities. Other fees collected by 
municipalities supplement taxes, but income and real property taxes 
generally constitute the bulk of local revenues. To meet expenditure 
assignments, subnational governments often look to central governments 
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to bridge any gaps, but a sustainable metropolis should, in principle, be 
self-sufficient.
Third, the selection and use of tax instruments need to be efficient and 
to derive the maximum advantage by maintaining incentives for busi-
nesses and households to remain in the jurisdiction (see Inman 2007). 
Moreover, local authorities need to be able to enforce and collect taxes, 
especially property and real estate taxes, and to assess properties and 
adjust rates regularly.
Fourth, a metropolis spanning multiple jurisdictions must be able to 
coordinate regional development so as to optimize the provision of infra-
structure and internalize scale economies where these exist. Equally 
important is the coordination of tax instruments and rates so as to avoid 
distorting incentives and inducing tax arbitrage and Tiebout shopping.32 
Fifth, fiscal responsibility laws can serve to underscore local respon-
sibilities, minimize moral hazard, and induce fiscally prudent behav-
ior.33 Furthermore, the fiscal performance and service delivery of local 
governments can be bolstered by procedures for evaluating perfor-
mance. Bangkok, much like other metropolitan centers in developing 
countries, relies on a mix of transfers and locally sourced revenues, but 
efficiency is compromised by the large number of local government 
organizations and an inability to analyze the data collected to improve 
monitoring and  performance.
Tax revenues can partially finance infrastructure, but most long-lived 
capital-intensive facilities call for additional financing, which can come 
from development grants provided by the center or raised by issuing 
bonds that are guaranteed by the center or provincial governments.
Whether it is tax revenues or financing through public-private part-
nerships or the financial market, sustainability first and foremost assumes 
that industrial development is on track and that trends are pointing in the 
right direction. Where the development impetus is weak or failing, finan-
cial sustainability can prove elusive. Governance mechanisms—central 
and local—are an equally important determinant of sustainability, affect-
ing not just corruption and malfeasance but also legislative log rolling, a 
common problem in U.S. cities, which is when legislators avoid the risk 
of policy gridlock by indiscriminately voting for all new initiatives.34
Designing for Sustainability
Today’s metropolitan regions emerged in most instances with the mini-
mum of planning and attention being given to resource constraints or 
long-term environmental considerations. Low energy prices, transport 
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subsidies, cheap land, low property taxes, the lure of automotive mobility, 
and the emergence of powerful lobbies composed of real estate develop-
ers and auto manufacturers together led to horizontal, sprawling urban 
development. This process is continuing in industrializing economies 
such as China, Indonesia, Malaysia, Nigeria, and South Africa and also in 
North America, which provided the model of the sprawling metropolitan 
region.35 This form of development, while it surely provides city-dwellers 
with more living space, requires costly investment in transport, water, 
sewage, and energy infrastructure and greatly increases dependence on 
private automobiles.36 Sprawl also goes hand-in-hand with eating and 
exercise habits that are injurious to health (Frumkin, Frank, and Jackson 
2004). The sprawling metropolis, with its low densities and emptiness,37 
poses a huge challenge for sustainable development. Sustainability is 
predicated on energy and resource conservation and on the building of 
robust and resilient infrastructures. The model of a resource-frugal city is 
compact and vertical, with high population densities that permit the 
efficient use of public transport.38 This model, attractive to efficiency- 
and resource-conscious planners, may be coming into vogue, but it should 
not take the form of the “tower in the park” model so popular in China, 
which is much more energy intensive and isolating than the mixed-use 
neighborhoods it is displacing.
A doubling of urban populations demands a rethinking of how people 
can be accommodated, especially if there is a growing need to conserve 
both energy and fertile farmland adjacent to cities. The need to invest in 
facilities to protect the more vulnerable cities from the consequences of 
climate change is another factor that will be harder to realize given the 
declining trend in global savings linked to aging populations in the devel-
oped world as well as in some of the industrializing countries. The immi-
nence and seriousness of each of these trends can be debated. Legacy 
housing, transport, and public utility infrastructure and the force of iner-
tia are huge obstacles to changing the pattern of urban development, but 
they cannot be ignored, and retrofitting them is unavoidable. Resistance 
to an increase in energy and water prices, or the price of externalities aris-
ing from unchecked private automobile use,39 reluctance to raise and 
collect real property taxes, and reluctance to modify zoning and floor area 
regulations affecting land use (Mumbai is a frequently cited example) are 
fierce in all countries.40 The political economy of urban development in 
virtually all countries favors endless delay. This is because politicians have 
short time horizons and few incentives to champion radical policies, 
interest groups with a stake in the status quo forcefully oppose actions 
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that would jeopardize the rents they gain from existing arrangements, and 
households reflexively oppose higher taxes and prices. Even severe fiscal 
crises, the threat of spiraling energy prices, and the increasing frequency 
of severe weather events seem unable to persuade metropolitan residents 
in advanced and developing countries that delay is fast becoming an unaf-
fordable luxury.
The issue of urban sustainability is here to stay, and with each passing 
year it will only become more pressing. In different ways—sometimes 
obliquely, sometimes directly—it is being debated in crisis-ridden 
advanced countries in a state of political paralysis such as the United 
States, in industrializing countries currently with deep pockets where 
urbanization is approaching a midpoint, such as China, and in low- 
income countries in the crosshairs of climate change, such as Pakistan, 
that are struggling with acute resource scarcities, limited organizational 
capabilities, and dysfunctional governance. Reluctantly and later rather 
than sooner, the great metropolitan centers throughout the developing 
world will translate the concept of sustainable urbanization into practice 
through a physical redesign of cities and the widespread incorporation of 
green technologies and resource-frugal ways of living. Legacy infrastruc-
ture cannot be wished away overnight; however, through a process of 
deconstruction, retrofitting, adaptation, and new construction based on 
green templates, cities will have to be transformed if they are to remain 
livable and economically dynamic. It may be too late to contain carbon 
dioxide concentration to the desired 450 parts per million, but mankind 
will need to adapt to the 550 parts per million atmosphere toward which 
we are heading.
Metropolitan Futures
The terms smart and IT-enabled, compact, vertical, mixed use, green, 
and livable define the vision of the future for some, but no one knows 
quite how these terms can define a coherent and holistic long-term 
development plan for a Beijing, a Karachi, or a São Paulo, what kind of 
organizations could manage urbanization across several dimensions, 
what it would cost to implement, the amount of dislocation it would 
entail, and the viability of the eventual outcome in the world that future 
generations will inherit. The advantages—and also the drawbacks—of 
the compact city have been aired for many years. The technologies—
hard and soft—that can make a city “greener” have been taking shape and 
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are being tested piecemeal. No one of the tiny experimental green cities 
currently under construction has been put to the test and its carbon 
neutrality convincingly established.41 The livability of compact and 
green cities and how they would accommodate diverse industrial activi-
ties are also not known. The technologies coming off the drawing boards 
and some being commercialized are perhaps decades away from wide-
spread application once they have been debugged and made more 
affordable. However, building sustainability cannot wait. Cairo, Dhaka, 
Karachi, São Paulo, and Shenzhen are daily pouring more concrete into 
the ground, accommodating more people, and building more roads. 
Instead of becoming more dense, urban areas are becoming less dense. 
Bangkok’s urbanized area grew sixteenfold between 1944 and 2002, and 
that of Accra grew 153 percent between 1985 and 2000. In spite of 
recurrent fiscal debacles, local politicians and city managers are unable 
to learn enduring lessons, and acres of literature on urban fiscal policies 
have failed to improve urban tax systems substantially worldwide. These 
are frightening trends and missed opportunities. Left unchecked they 
will make a rationalization of urban development far harder. Some 
economists are of the view that price adjustments reflecting energy and 
water scarcities, increased vulnerability of cities near rivers to flooding 
and coastal locations to rising sea levels,42 and inland areas to droughts 
and firestorms will bring about the redistribution of the population, 
force a refashioning of the urban landscape, and demand the building of 
passive and active coastal defenses, as in the Netherlands. Economists 
rightly underscore the strength of the market mechanism but are apt to 
minimize its failings, as evidenced by the devastating financial crisis of 
2008 and 2009 and the many real estate bubbles.
From the perspective of urban sustainability and green development, 
market-induced changes might be too slow, too myopic, and too piece-
meal, and the market might not promote the kind of fast-paced innova-
tion that is urgently needed or provide the insurance required by the 
inhabitants of vulnerable cities in developing countries.
On the current trajectories, Karachi and Lagos could become the 
world’s two largest cities by mid-century, assuming that the availability of 
water permits such growth. A doubling of populations with no change in 
layout will lead to metropolitan regions that could be unsustainable and 
ungovernable over the longer term and forced to confront painful crises.
Advanced countries may have the resources to indulge in wasteful 
sprawling urban regions, and they may even endure deindustrialization 
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for several decades by living off their accumulated fat. But industrializing 
countries need to learn quickly and avoid the costly decisions made when 
energy, land, and water were relatively cheap, green technologies were 
unknown, and global warming was a scientific curiosity. Low-income 
countries have even less room for maneuver because they are lacking the 
growth momentum of the leading middle-income nations, the techno-
logical capabilities, and the resources; in addition, they must cope with 
rapidly expanding populations.
With so much urbanization still lying ahead and the stakes rising, the 
design and implementation of forward-looking urban development strat-
egies are taking on added importance. Whether countries make rapid 
strides on the economic front will depend on one or a small handful of 
metropolitan centers. And whether these are smart, sustainable, eco-
nomically dynamic, and livable will also depend on how cities develop 
organizational and technical skills, assure revenue autonomy, create agile 
(soft and hard) infrastructure, and make the best use of evolving practical 
ideas and technologies to take existing and budding metropolitan regions 
boldly into an uncertain future.
Annex: City Rankings
Table 8A.1 Mercer Quality of Living Ranking of Cities 
Worldwide, 2010
City and country Rank Index
Vienna, Austria 1 108.6
Zurich, Switzerland 2 108.0
Geneva, Switzerland 3 107.9
Vancouver, Canada 4 107.4
Auckland, New Zealand 5 107.4
Dusseldorf, Germany 6 107.2
Frankfurt, Germany 7 107.0
Munich, Germany 7 107.0
Bern, Switzerland 9 106.5
Sydney, Australia 10 106.3
Copenhagen, Denmark 11 106.2
Amsterdam, Netherlands 12 105.7
Ottawa, Canada 13 105.5
Brussels, Belgium 14 105.4
Source: Mercer LLC, http://www.mercer.com/qualityof living.
Note: Index base city: New York, United States = 100.
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Table 8A.2 Ranking of Creative Cities in the United States, by Arts Employees 
per Capita, 2008
City,State Rank
Arts employees 
per 1,000 residents Population
Atlanta, GA 1 47.7 537,958
San Francisco, CA 2 39.7 808,976
Seattle, WA 3 36.1 598,541
Washington, DC 4 34.4 591,833
Minneapolis, MN 5 33.5 382,605
Boston, MA 6 32.7 609.023
Los Angeles, CA 7 31.4 3,833,995
New York, NY 8 28.0 8,363,710
Portland, OR 9 27.5 557,706
Philadelphia, PA 10 27.4 1,447,395
Source: Americans for the Arts, http://www.artsusa.org; U.S. Census Bureau, http://www.census.gov.
Table 8A.3 Ranking of Innovative Cities in the United States, 2008
City and state Rank Population
Portland, OR 1 557,706
Chicago, IL 1 2,853,114
Seattle, WA 1 598,541
New York, NY 1 8,363,710
San Francisco, CA 1 808,976
Minneapolis, MN 6 382,605
Boston, MA 6 609,023
Los Angeles, CA 6 3,833,995
Baltimore, MD 9 636,919
Sacramento, CA 9 466,488
San Diego, CA 9 1,279,329
Dallas, TX 12 1,279,910
Source: SustainLane, http://www.sustainlane.com/us-city-rankings/categories/innovation; 
population statistics from the U.S. Census Bureau, http://www.census.gov. 
Table 8A.4 Top 10 Innovation Cities in the World, 2010 
City and country Global rank
Boston, United States 1
Paris, France 2
Amsterdam, Netherlands 3
Vienna, Austria 4
New York, United States 5
Frankfurt, Germany 6
San Francisco, United States 7
Copenhagen, Denmark 8
Lyon, France 9
Hamburg, Germany 10
Source: 2thinknow Innovation TM Cities Program, www.innovation-cities.com.
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Notes
 1. All those pouring into cities are looking for “good jobs,” if not for themselves, 
then for their children. Banerjee and Duflo (2011, 228).
 2. Firms test their competitiveness by selling in the domestic market, which is 
frequently sheltered by tariffs, transport costs, local regulations, cultural pre-
dispositions of consumers, and complexities of marketing and logistics that 
foreign firms have difficulty mastering. Lenovo, the Chinese manufacturer of 
personal computers, and Haier, the producer of white goods, have established 
and maintained a lead in the domestic market by catering more effectively to 
local preferences and using domestic marketing channels effectively.
 3. See McGee et al. (2007) on the globally oriented industrialization of 
Dongguan; see Yusuf, Nabeshima, and Yamashita (2008) on the international 
experience with clusters.
 4. Larger, more capital-intensive, and more productive firms are more likely to 
venture into the export market. See Bernard et al. (2007); Iacovone and 
Javorcik (2010). On the relationship between trade and growth, see the sur-
vey by Lopez (2005); Greenaway, Morgan, and Wright (1999). 
 5. Some evidence suggests that successful SMEs begin orienting toward 
global markets from the very outset. See the papers in Lloyd-Reason and 
Sear (2007).
 6. Much depends on the availability of affordable accommodation for small 
firms and their employees. In cities such as London, New York, Paris, and the 
cities in Silicon Valley, such space is becoming hard to find, which is squeez-
ing out the most dynamic elements of the urban economy.
Table 8A.5 Ranking of Innovation Cities in the Americas, 
2010
City 
Rank in the 
Americas Global rank
Boston, MA 1 1
New York, NY 2 5
San Francisco, CA 3 7
Toronto, Canada 4 12
Washington, DC 5 23
Philadelphia, PA 6 30
Montreal, Canada 7 34
Seattle, WA 8 35
Austin, TX 9 44
Minneapolis–St. Paul, MN 10 45
Source: 2thinknow Innovation TM Cities Program, www.innovation-cities.com.
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 7. See Heitzman (2004) on the development of Bangalore; see also http:
//www.nytimes.com/2006/03/20/business/worldbusiness/20bangalore
.html?ex=1300510800&en=993a 11e65908ab91&ei=5088.
 8. With a population of almost 7 million in 2008, including nearly 5 million 
migrants, Dongguan is the fourth ranked Chinese city in terms of exports.
 9. Now Chongqing is attempting to create a similar eco-system by inducing 
Foxconn and Hewlett Packard to establish production facilities in the city, 
with the promise that the city will work with them to attract suppliers to the 
inland metropolis. Together, the two companies will be investing US$3 billion. 
http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/business/2009-08/05/content_8528616.htm.
 10. MNCs account for 87 percent of China’s exports of electronic devices and 
88 percent of the exports of telecommunications equipment (Moran 2011). 
 11. In spite of rising wages, new entry and export growth continued in the Pearl 
River Delta during 2009–10.
 12. Government investment in port and highway infrastructure and incentives for 
developers contributed to the growth of these cities and the transfer of some 
of the automobile, electronic, machinery, and other industries from the core 
city areas. See Yusuf and Nabeshima (2010).
 13. A software industry serves the domestic market, but it lacks the large firms 
that account for the performance of Indian IT centers. Cape Town is in a 
similar predicament: the software-IT industry caters mostly to the domestic 
finance and insurance industry, which constrains its growth prospects.
 14. The discovery of huge offshore pre-salt oil deposits will increase the revenues 
accruing to the state, depending, of course, on the terms negotiated with the 
center. 
 15. Engineering industries are transferring some of their operations to Australia.
 16. See the discussion of the product space and core-periphery issues in Hidalgo 
et al. (2007).
 17. The U.S. Department of Commerce estimates that technological innovation 
is responsible for as much as three-fourths of U.S. growth since World War II 
(Ezell and Atkinson 2010). This is not necessarily inconsistent with the find-
ings of Jorgenson, Ho, and Samuels (2010) because the contribution of capital 
is heavily determined by embodied technological advances. 
 18. http://www.economics.harvard.edu/faculty/jorgenson/files/Houston_
productivity_DJA.pdf.
 19. http://www.itif.org/.
 20. See Farivar (2011); Lee (2005); http://www.itu.int/ITU-D/finance/work-
cost-tariffs/events/tariff- seminars/kuala-lumpur-05/presentation-lee.PDF.
 21. See http://www.portnet.com/WWWPublic/pdt_portnet.html on Singapore’s 
Portnet IT-based business-to-business system.
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 22. São Paulo’s Santos port has long been a bottleneck, even though the cost of 
its inefficiency and its roots are well known. See Doctor (2002). 
 23. Cities with major ports are coming to recognize the air and water pollution 
that is caused by shipping, but they have been slow to take remedial action, 
although some are preparing to offer power sources to run the systems of 
docked ships.
 24. On the importance of air cargo services especially for high-value goods, see 
Leinbach and Bowen (2004).
 25. This has given rise to Internet Alley in a four square mile area called Tyson’s 
Corner, a short drive from Dulles airport. See Ceruzzi (2008).
 26. http://www.songdo.com/songdo-international-business-district/the-city
/master-plan.aspx.
 27. Cisco, IBM, and Siemens are among the companies working to create smart 
networked cities where computer monitoring and control of activities will 
increase the efficiency of everything from transport systems to energy and 
water use. Cisco’s Connected Urban Development approach and how it 
affects the workplace, transport, energy consumption, and businesses using IT 
are described by Villa and Mitchell (2009).
 28. Many of these individuals are likely to be attracted by the presence of major 
universities. See Winters (2011).
 29. Depending on the type of industry and environmental regulations, mid-size 
cities can be more or less polluted.
 30. The relationship between size and innovation is analyzed by Carlino, 
Chatterjee, and Hunt (2007) and by Carlino and Hunt (2009). 
 31. The grave weaknesses of governments in industrializing countries are not so 
much in the making of policies as in their implementation. See Hallward-
Driemeier, Khun-Jush, and Pritchett (2010).
 32. Philadelphia has suffered from a lack of coordination on taxation, land use, 
and transport development among the 238 municipalities making up the 
greater metro area. See Pugh O’Mara (2002).
 33. The bailouts of Rio de Janeiro and São Paulo highlight the problem of moral 
hazard. Discouraging cities from using long-term debt to finance current 
expenditures is a key objective. For a review of international experience with 
fiscal responsibility laws, see Liu and Webb (2011).
 34. See Inman (2007), who cites a study showing that a doubling in the size of a 
city council results in a 20 percent increase in spending per city resident.
 35. North America is the model of the sprawling industrial and science parks, 
which have also proliferated in developing countries (O’Mara 2007).
 36. It also imposes a heavy burden on the poor living on the fringes of the city, 
who must engage in long and costly daily commutes, as, for instance, in 
Johannesburg and Rio de Janeiro.
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 37. The architect Rem Koolhaas remarks, “There are city centers around the 
world in which no one seems to be a full-time resident,” quoted in Heathcote 
(2010, 4).
 38. This point is strongly championed by Ed Glaeser (2011). Although Manhattan 
is compact and densely populated, the New York metro area covers 3,000 
square miles (Greater London is 600 square miles, Paris is 1,000 square 
miles), and it is significantly less dense than Los Angeles—the supposed 
epitome of a sprawling metropolis (7,738 residents per square mile compared 
with 5,728 per square mile for New York). But for all its density, Los Angeles 
is not a walkable city (Rybczynski 2011). Metropolitan São Paulo covers 
8,000 square kilometers, while the Cape Town City region spans 100 kilome-
ters (UN-HABITAT 2010).
 39. The vision of “mobility on demand” (see http://cities.medi.mit.edu/) offered 
by the MIT Media Lab is alluring, and bit by bit, some elements of this are 
taking shape. Whether it or something like it is a part of the metropolitan 
future, not just in a few enlightened cities but worldwide, remains to be seen.
 40. For example, a recent World Bank (2009) report notes that in China, the 
fragmentation of land on the fringes of cities is growing worse, land use is not 
being coordinated with the development of urban transport, and floor area 
ratios are increasing much too slowly. In fact, the gross floor area ratios are far 
lower in Chinese cities than in Seoul or Tokyo and much lower than in 
Manhattan.
 41. Some incredible specimens of the green city are taking shape in Abu Dhabi 
(Masdar), Seoul-Incheon, Shanghai, and Tianjin, but their economic and 
social viability and carbon neutrality have yet to be put to the test.
 42. See also Kahn (2010). See Jha et al. (2011) on both the magnitude of the 
problems and remedial measures.
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